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THE END OF ORTHODOXY AND THE CATHOLICISM OF TOMORROW

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A well-known Roman Catholic review recently observed that modernism is not merely an internal difficulty of the Catholic church, but that the Protestant and Jewish bodies are likewise tormented and undermined by it. And the remark is certainly correct. For if, on the one hand, modernism tends to apply to the internal discipline and rites of the Roman church many of those reforms which the Protestants adopted from the beginning of the Reformation,—reforms rendered necessary by the changed conditions of the times, and today even more necessary than ever, —on the other hand it is profoundly modifying the very concept of revelation and making more and more difficult every kind of stability of doctrine and every *regula fidei;* so that Christianity itself, and the Jewish religion from which it comes, are to a large extent challenged by it and are in a measure associated with the church of Rome in one common defence. This defence, so far as it has any probability of success, thus tends to change not only the relation of these religions to the spirit of contemporary thought, but even their inter-relations, constraining them to abandon one or another of those positions which caused dissension and associating them under the protection of their common spiritual inheritance. Hence it will be worth while to consider briefly what conclusions are suggested by the most recent experience in this controversy, and what forecast we can make, not so much for the future of the individual churches as for a future of much greater interest, that, namely, of Christianity itself and of the religious consciousness among the nations of western civilization.

I. Modernism and Modernists

Modernism is a vague and ambiguous word that readily lends itself to misunderstandings. To make the problem clearer, we need to ask ourselves:

1. Which of the scientific conclusions and practical concepts that contradict, or seem to contradict, the doctrines of the Christian religion and the requirements of the Christian bodies are firmly assured or have any great probability of prevailing in the end?

2. What situation will result from the acceptance of such conclusions by these bodies and their incorporation into doctrine and practice?

3. If, this situation being given, it is possible to retain intact the essential elements of Christianity, what then must be elucidated and defined?

4. What progress will these essential elements make in their development and action, and what changes in the internal structure of the churches and in their various relations can be foreseen as likely to follow?

The problem, as will be seen, is a vast one; to cover all the ground would call for an extended discussion, and would tax the capacity of men better prepared by profound study and wide experience. But some not unhelpful observations may be made within the modest limits of a brief article, after the intense agitation of these last few years and now that the crisis has been precipitated through the action of that very authority who has been compelled by fear to exalt herself *ad absurdum*.

A preliminary statement seems necessary and natural. Modernism, while it sincerely desires to be an internal movement for reform within the different churches and within Christianity, and while it is not opposed to the churches, so as to wish to abandon them and come out from them (as indeed would have been so easy), accepts neither one nor the other of the two classical positions,—neither docile submission to authority, to antiquity, to doctrines petrified in formulas and vigilantly guarded, nor yet abandonment, negation, resolute and entire, and war.

It wishes to be, and this is what characterizes it, a consummation and a synthesis. It accepts Christianity, but with an acceptance that examines, discriminates, judges, and therefore is in some degree the exercise of sovereignty; it is immersed in the modern spirit, has possessed itself of all the means for analysis and research invented or perfected by the modern mind, profited by all the conclusions of investigation, today so rapid and energetic, and it wishes to emerge with a rejuvenated Christianity of its own which shall not deny or ignore the present age and the tests which that imposes, but shall come forth from those tests better fitted to influence life and direct it to its highest ends. The adherents of orthodoxy are saying, it is true, that this is a sort of cunning hypocrisy on the part of the modernists, in order more surely to destroy Christianity; but no calm judge will be able easily to believe in a wickedness at once so exquisite and so nearly useless.

We do not deny that certain individuals who have arrived at negations incompatible with Christianity have called themselves modernists, and that others, modernists for a certain length of time, that is, as long as they deemed it possible to reconcile the results of their researches with religious faith in Christ and his message, have later been carried by the logic of their individual thinking beyond the confines of every positive belief. The latter is the case with A. Loisy; as is the former with the Roman modernists of *Nova et vetera*, who have nearly all remained anonymous. But whether these extremists be set aside or voluntarily give way or drop into the background, Catholicism is nevertheless a prey to the anguish of a profound internal revolution.

The conditions within which the development of the modernist movement among Catholics has been restricted since the encyclical *Pascendi* do not permit us to draw from the number and activity of its followers any deduction as to its vitality. The fundamental principle of the modernists, that they will remain in the church as long as this is not made impracticable by the excessive pretensions of the curia, together with their dignity and sincerity, constrain them to conceal themselves, and in part to change either the direction of their studies or the plane and method of their writings. In France, for instance, LeRoy,

Fonsegrive, Blondel, Laberthonnière, Bureau, Batiffol, Lagrange, and several others, a distinguished galaxy of Catholic modernists, have all remained Catholics, and have either left off writing or increased their care not to collide with the suspicions of orthodoxy. But this does not prevent their thought, for him who knows it, from far transcending the limits of old official Catholicism and of the orthodoxy of Pius X, and from becoming the leaven of profound transformations, while they, meantime, await more favorable conditions for expanding perchance into a new bloom both of writings and of practical activity.

Since, therefore, we are unable, or find it insufficient and dangerous, to judge of the movement by the number of its leaders and followers, we must seek to form our estimate of it from its content. And the problem is that which we have already stated, whether modernism is in a position to succeed in the task of preserving the essential elements of Christianity as a doctrine of life and a society of believers, and of making it once more a great directive force for human society in harmony with all the forces which are today working for the improvement and uplifting of humanity.

II. The End of Clericalism

The cause of Catholicism, and even, in part, of the orthodox churches, would be lost if these were without the vigor to adapt themselves to the state of separation which is slowly becoming more general, and which will necessarily become universal through the advances of democracy itself. But let it be noted that we are not speaking of separation in the too radical sense which the word has acquired in France. The state, as the sole fountain and organ of the law, will always have to intervene to fix the conditions and judicial forms within which the religious communities may live and develop; and since historic law is never the pure incarnation of an abstract principle, but is determined in its development by the influence of human wills, practical situations, and concrete interests, therefore the state, in legislating for and governing the religious bodies, will ever give heed to practical considerations of expediency dictated by that degree of trust which

it has in the religious communities. Hence separation does not require that the state and the church should be constituted as autonomous sources of law for all that severally concerns each, possessing a divided sovereignty, and proceeding in mixed matters by negotiations and agreements, as was the case under the separation of powers in the Middle Ages, when there was almost a division of legal jurisdiction. Religion is, and evermore will be seen to be, the unfolding of free activities among the citizens, proceeding from the innermost fibres of the human personality and hostile to any interference whatever that tends to violate personality and pervert its expression and its aims. The state will content itself with offering to religion the legal forms of outward life, not interfering in the content of the individual faiths, and will treat these with perfect impartiality, as long as they do not offend commonly accepted moral and social principles or become a peril to public order.

Catholicism and certain established churches in this or that country may show repugnance to renouncing a position of privilege and the advantages which ecclesiastical orders (rather than true piety) obtain from the protection and favor of the civil power; but no one would now venture to say that, in general, churches cannot live and develop in a state of liberty, since in other countries they have promptly adapted themselves to it and have found their advantage in it. Political clericalism, therefore, against which in several countries the modernists have to struggle, is certainly not an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of their ends; we may rather say that, if that were all, special grounds of hope for the future of the churches could be drawn from the spectacle of its more and more general collapse.[1]

And the question, still so much debated among Catholics, of how to reconcile this transition of the church from privilege to liberty with the pretensions of the Holy See so solemnly and tenaciously affirmed in the *Syllabus* and in later documents, some of them very recent, can have importance solely for the apologists

[1] Of clericalism I have written at length elsewhere; see, for example, La politica clericale e la democrazia, Rome, 1909; and Della religione, della chiesa e dello stato, Milan, 1910.

of the Roman curia and the champions of its policy; it has none for him who looks to the future and investigates the signs of the times.[2]

III. The Religion of the Spirit

On the other hand, the cause would certainly have been lost for Catholicism and for the Christian churches, if that conception of life had been destined finally to prevail which, invoking scientific principles and methods, gives a secondary and subordinate importance to conscience and spirit and moral law, and puts the human "soul" in direct, deterministic dependence on the biological and economic conditions of existence. While Christianity says, "What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" this view of life says, "Your soul is a by-product; win your place in the world of happiness, of riches, and of force, and a soul will be given you in addition." The former demands that a lofty ethical aim be set in the centre of the inner life and made the sun of the moral personality, redeeming itself from enslaving externals and ascending to the liberty that is sovereignty and dominion. The latter places the laws of life and human development outside of man, and finds the secret of success in adaptation to one's environment and joyous self-expansion.

It is true that a pantheistic interpretation of the universe has diminished in the eyes of many the brutality of this doctrine, declaring that the supreme and ineluctable laws of life fulfil deterministically and of themselves a kind of divine fate. But the interpretation is insufficient to cover the ruinous effects of materialism; and moreover it has not been understood or heeded by the majority. In practice, all that world of laws and ends which offers itself as a training for liberty and as a system of ideal and absolute values for the government of men's consciences, is here set aside.

In comparison with such doctrines and such advice, the old

[2] See the volume of P. Laberthonnière, Positivisme et catholicisme, in which a laborious attempt is made to soften the famous distinction between the thesis (the exclusive right of Catholicism) and the counter-thesis (religious liberty), in so far as it is justified by peculiar historical conditions and so made tolerable.

positive religions, with their fund of mystic experience accumulated through the ages, their methods of moulding the spirit, their sound idealistic doctrines, have appeared as the preservers of blessings without which human civilization would have encountered most serious losses and been in danger of exhaustion.

The attempts that have been made to devise a lay system of morality, a religion of duty, a human solidarity, and a virtue which should appear and be accepted as the finest consummation of an enlightened utilitarianism, have been the endeavor of but a few individuals or of limited groups, and have not passed current in the market of social values. In practice, this new doctrine brought spiritual impoverishment, dissipation of energy, the stifling of lofty purposes and responsibilities in the desire for positive and immediate enjoyments; and it was easy to verify the pernicious effects of this tendency in the young, in the classes, in the societies, which took it for their guide. The churches were therefore strengthened by the moral weakness of their adversary. Even the families of atheists and worldlings continued to send their children to the schools of the clergy, because they knew that there a powerful principle of moral education was at work and that at least the best years of youth would be sheltered from the disintegrating activity of the new principles. The Catholic or Christian youth who, even in the midst of the errors of an education in many respects defective and sectarian, had felt within them the desire for purity and moral energy, and had come to respect the seriousness and sanctity of life, became attached to the doctrines, the rites, the exterior discipline, in which their experience had shown them that substantial aid lay for this moral growth.

And this explains, even without having recourse to pragmatist doctrines, the religion of many young people. Once given a personal faith in a pure and lofty ideal of life, this faith spontaneously falls back upon the means which seem necessary to attain the end. In reflection, in cold investigation, in criticism, is seen the enemy lying in wait and seeking to penetrate the lines of defence which must be held. Better believe confidingly and await, upheld by the old supports, the edification of one's own inner I. The witness of life, given to the ancestral worship,

becomes a witness of truth before which the presumption of the new doctrine falls. And this educative power is surely a great merit of the churches and of the Christian tradition, and opens up to us the way to judge of what is vital and permanent in them, and of the varying value of the accumulations which history, in the course of the ages, has superimposed upon the first teaching.

IV. The Defence of Personalities

The Christian tradition has met of late years another and perhaps a more dangerous enemy in critical idealism. Much less fit than materialism to become popular and be transformed into a practicable doctrine, it had in its favor an admirable dialectical power and the fact that it was a great vindication of the spirit, valuable because achieved in the name, not of uncertain and miraculous revelations, but of human reason itself. Critical idealism in the fulness of its expression, having overcome the cautious reserves of Immanuel Kant, dissolved the exterior world into the ego and the ego into the universal Self, the Spirit which, as the All in all and in every concrete manifestation, transcends itself and so becomes. The moral precept of this doctrine is: Be the spirit; that is, transfuse your ephemeral and phenomenal will into the universal will which ascends by transcending itself and is evermore making itself clear and conscious in history. But the spirit is here not an absolute ideal and a full perfection, placed above, and therefore in a manner outside of, the concrete motives of our practical action, so as to be the cause as well as the end,—namely, through being joined to the concrete will as a norm that transcends it and forces it to come forth from itself. Moreover, this absolute becoming is all history and all praxis, and therefore justifies in its own way all history and all praxis as consecutive and dialectically determined moments of all becoming. For these reasons this coldly dialectical and in its way monistic and deterministic idealism does not contain moral teaching that can save men, nor can it be a religion. For in it perfection appears as immensely remote, being at the end of all history, while at the same time immensely near and within reach, but in minute forms which need to be transcended almost before

they are attained,—a process which only a state of continual becoming permits.

Some thinkers, whose influence is today on the increase, have sought to save personality, human and divine, from the insidious dialectic formalism of this doctrine; but their undertaking is naturally difficult because of the necessary subtlety of their reasoning, which can only with difficulty be translated into a practical rule of life.

Here also, then, we have one of the great merits of Christianity, the merit of preserving the postulates necessary for life and for training in spiritual and moral liberty,—namely, the belief in a divine personality as the measure and goal of perfection, and in human personality. In order that man may feel the moral responsibility that weighs upon him, and may feel the duty and ideal beauty of making himself and of possessing his soul, it is necessary that he feel himself capable of this, as being his own master; that is, that he feel himself able and in duty bound to withdraw his life from the coil of infinite possibilities which are developing around him and in him, and which are autonomous or victorious only if he know not how to direct them; that he place himself alone face to face with the Absolute, and feel as his own, irreducibly his own, this life which he is training and wills to master.

Great are the difficulties of these affirmations, if they be understood as philosophical positions; not indeed because dialectical metaphysics excludes them (and we cannot undertake here to show that it does not)—for then the cause would be lost; but through the subtlety of the concepts which it is necessary to employ and of the affirmations, with difficulty intelligible to our thought—thought moulded, as it were, of time and space, and incapable of recognizing intuitively the spirit as a concrete entity. And on this account faith is necessary,—faith, which theoretic reason must abstain from contradicting, and which practical reason justifies with all the weight of the demands of life.

Now this, let us repeat, is the great merit of Christianity: it places before us the divine personality and the individuality of our everlasting soul, whose "hope is full of immortality," as fundamental doctrines and as objects of faith; and "faith is the

substance of things hoped for," that is, it *accepts* as much as it *wills*, and justifies itself by itself, in so far as it is already a lively adherence to the divine principles of the life that reveals itself within us.

How the absolute reality that escapes clear apprehension corresponds to this faith, how this hope is to be realized beyond time and beyond space, we know not; and it is possible for us today to wonder at the sobriety of the gospel message, which contents itself with a few popular images, and to laugh at the pretensions of the theologians and the devout, who know so much and have received so many messages from the dead, and who grant reductions of punishment and accelerations of grace and blessedness. And we must not forget, although the charge is often exaggerated, that the hope in the hereafter became a marvellous source of lucre and of power when religion was made the encourager of selfish fears and pretexts, accustomed as these were to hope from "good deeds" what they did not dare ask for from "doing good,"—which ought to be understood as an inner bent of mind towards purification and love. But, brought back though they be to their necessary sobriety, these two "dogmas" still preserve their fundamental character, and remain the fundamental basis of Christianity, which may be summed up in three principles: God the father; the absolute value of the individual soul; life according to the ethical teaching of the Christ as the soul's way to God.

V. Christ and Christianity

We have alluded to Christ and the divine worth of his teaching; but just here arise in Christianity the greatest difficulties. For the Christian religion is not merely belief in the realm of spirits, but likewise faith in Christ, the revealer and intercessor, the way to truth and life. A Christianity without Christ, without a society in which faith in him is, as it were, the soul and the binding force, without the life in Christ, or the life of Christ in the soul, of which Saint Paul spoke, would be evidently quite another thing: no longer a positive, revealed, transcendent religion, and above all no longer this religion, with its characteristic tradition and doctrines and rites.

Now there is reason for asking ourselves if the idea of the historic Christ, as it emerges from the most recent criticism, can still support the weight of so much faith and of the venerable structures that rest upon it. With historical trustworthiness denied to the account of the infancy and of the resurrection, as they are narrated by the Synoptic Gospels, and to all the Fourth Gospel, with the miracles in large part gone, and the value of the testimony to all of them shaken, with the teaching of Christ stripped of the reflex influences of a later faith which had already in part transfigured the Master and his history, with the relation between the church and its founder changed, and with the eschatological character of the announcement of the Kingdom made prominent,—it seems as if the Christ fashioned by the theologians, their God incarnate, the Word of God made flesh, melted away. His message and work, at first enveloped in a divine nimbus, again strike their root deep into history,—into that history which preceded and prepared the way for them, and into that which has so quickly and so profoundly modified them.

It is obviously proper, then, to ask ourselves if the doctrine of the Christ may not owe its good fortune to a most singular historical coincidence; whether, that is, the pure flower of Jewish wisdom, matured in a grievous intensity of expression from the anguish of the Hebrew people, blooming at the moment when the Roman world was fusing together into one great circle of life all anxieties and all aspirations, and nourished by the best sap from oriental rites, from Hellenic thought, and from Roman discipline, did not cast its seeds upon a soil that absorbed them eagerly and was quick to make them germinate; whether the obscure and humble proclaimer of the Kingdom, slain by the Romans, exalted then in the glory of a marvellous unforeseen flowering-forth of the faith excited by him, did not almost by chance give his name to a movement which the religious consciousness of the age was carrying in its womb and which appeared at the opportune moment. Thus today we should have to rest content with the substance of that faith, vindicated by an immanent process of revelation of the divine to the religious consciousness, and leave to one side the wrappings, corroded by time and by criticism.

Some observations are here necessary.

And first this, that the divinity of the Christ is the work of faith itself. When his message is taken as the *absolute* of the religious consciousness, and the Christ as its proclaimer, and the mind abandons itself trustingly thereto, not as to an abstract doctrine, but as to a living thought of the Absolute palpitating in mortal flesh, and lives it out in its turn in faith, hope, and charity, then message and proclaimer become for faith one and the same thing, the latter being the very life of the former. *If the doctrine of Christ is true, Christ is God through faith.* And that which is of value here is no longer the details, nor even the particular form of expectancy or of historical illusion which the doctrine assumed in the thought of the Christ,[3] but its fitness to become the living and operative norm for the religious consciousness; a fitness that is proved by faith, which then suffices of itself and asks no other proof.

If the first generations of believers knew not how to understand this living truth of the doctrine without the miracles of the nativity and of the stone rolled away from the sepulchre, if they were led to formulate so complex and artificial a christology, that was not their faith, but the effective reflection of their faith upon the minds and culture of the age. Nor is it permissible to declare the faith false because it formulated and took on certain transitory forms of expression; but it is expedient to investigate whether its vitality is indeed permanent and whether, with changed modes of thought, and with the corresponding change in the aptitude of the spirit to invent suitable expressions and in the aids which are at its disposal for this purpose, it still has the force and virtue to create for itself new, and more nearly true, forms of understanding and of representation, which shall be to the preceding forms as the spirit is to the letter. In other words, we do not deny the divinity of the message and of its proclaimer, even if the latter was not born of a virgin, and neither spoke nor acted in his mortal life as the Fourth Gospel says he

[3] I have shown elsewhere that the eschatological announcement of the Christ has no internal and necessary connection with his moral doctrine, and that it could be the spontaneous and necessary form of a religious announcement which desired to surmount the peculiar contingencies of time and space and to place the human consciousness face to face with the absolute and the eternal, with a vigorous withdrawal from the contingent and the occasional.

did, and does not correspond adequately to the Hellenic conception of the Logos, and so forth; but we shall seek—nor is it perhaps difficult to do so—to declare and understand the divinity in the way in which our historic culture and our philosophic thought permit, affirming the fundamental fact that his doctrine appears to us as the religious Absolute become man's living, throbbing thought. Nor, even when the history of the Christ is scrupulously reduced to its most certain data, is there anything in it which contradicts this interpretation.

In other words, we do not believe that the belief in the divinity of the Christ, in so far as it is the axis and basis of every Christianity which is truly such, adds any special philosophical difficulty to that which is contained in the two affirmations made above. Given the reality of the world of consciousnesses as distinct realities and as irreducible vital subjects; given the reality of the absolute spirit, complete in the possession of itself; given, finally, the immanent action of this spirit in the world of those consciousnesses, by acting in whom it truly becomes; given all this, and the function which, in the history of these relations, has been attributed to the Christ by faith, is not repugnant to any certitude, historical or philosophical.

VI. Theology and Orthodoxy

But as soon as we leave such fundamental positions and descend to details, it becomes much harder to advance. We shall certainly not indulge here in long discussions on this or that particular of doctrine or ritual in controversy between the Catholic and Protestant churches (we cannot say that outside of these there are any discussions about positions commonly admitted by all Christians) nor take up generally all the complex mass of doctrinal and ritual positions over which "orthodoxy" watches,—positions in which Christianity has come to embody and define itself. It may, however, be affirmed in general terms that the moment is a sad one, and the peril great, for every form of orthodoxy.

If Christianity, from the beginning and afterward, had been above all things the practice of the Christian precept of goodness

and love, and had developed more as a religion of the spirit and of liberty than as an ecclesiastical institution, doctrinal quarrels and heresies would have had much less part in it, and its vicissitudes would have been different. But whatever the causes,—and a prominent one was surely the rapidly increasing importance of the ecclesiastical element,—in practice the Christian communities soon began to give great importance, more and more rapidly increasing, to doctrine. Faith, a living soul, was changed into a body of doctrine, under favor of which was invoked the authority of tradition, as expressed by the fathers, by the liturgies, by the councils, by the *consensus ecclesiarum.*

As long as Christianity was young, and the doctrines deemed necessary were relatively few, dispute was based on documents and proofs. As time went on, an historical centre of reference and a peremptory authority became necessary, and the papacy took a hand in the game of this *unitas fidei;* but although with the progress of events an increasing obedience was rendered to Rome, nevertheless the theology of the classic age always harked back directly to the great fountains of doctrine in the universities, in the monasteries, in the councils; and the thought of Rome was valid only in proportion as it is trustworthily shown to be really the thought of the fathers, of the canons, of the churches. No one, therefore, held himself really bound to the thought of a pope; but every one felt himself one with a great historic tradition, going back to Christ, made illustrious by the fathers, confirmed by the councils, living in the teaching of the doctors, sustained by the *consensus ecclesiarum.* Hence it was not possible, and would not have sufficed, for Rome to have an official doctrine of its own,—it was not until a very advanced period that Rome had a university; if there had appeared officialdom, that is, subjection to absolute authority, the enchantment would have been broken. It was necessary that doctrine be in intimate accord with the culture of the age; that approach to the Roman theology be made by all the ways of the trivium and quadrivium, and that this theology be surrounded with all the prestige of a science, proceeding, indeed, by authority, but from a divine authority, the wonderful documents of which were at the dis-

posal of all and were only waiting to be seriously consulted. In this circle of intellectual life the authority of the pope is in its fit place as that of a prime minister of tradition and of culture; in this great historic unity of traditions, of norms, of interpretation, the *regula fidei* is transmitted throughout a whole world of culture.

Today matters are distressingly complicated through the deep schism made between theology and science as early as the seventeenth century. Against Protestantism and its chief doctrines it was still possible laboriously to pile up traditions, canons, doctors, by means of a vast deal of evidence that came, or seemed to come, from the entire church; it was the last time, and success was possible only amid tremendous difficulties. On the other hand, Protestantism could still determine the *regula fidei* from the Bible, in which was still seen the written evidence of a miraculous external revelation, to which it seemed irreverent to add external criteria of interpretation; the word of God, printed in visible form, was within the reach of every soul. Today, thanks to the extraordinary enrichment of our methods of critical and historical research, we read with a very different eye all the ancient evidences,—the Bible, the fathers, the councils, and the doctors. The evidence which to the eyes of the men of olden time sprang an integral whole from the system of a miraculous revelation appears as a slow process of historic formation, linked in a thousand ways to the complex development of human culture, into which flow from numerous sources both stimuli and forms. The labor of interpretation is strangely complex and difficult. The alteration is so profound, the human history of doctrines and rites at many points so clear, that upon almost no precise point of formulated, established doctrine is it possible to concentrate the harmonious light of the evidence, to establish the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*

Official theology is in incurable discord with modern critical investigation, whose methods and results it ignores and, ignoring, condemns. And the pope is alienated from that world of culture and authority in which he was once in his fit place. His authority becomes either ambiguous—recall to mind certain documents of Leo XIII on the Biblical question—or ridiculous, as soon as

it loses its lordship over scientific methods and becomes a question, not of theses or counter-theses, but of shades of interpretation. The *consensus ecclesiarum* is meaningless, since all the bishops of Roman Catholicism have learned their slender stock of theology on the school-benches or in the manuals of Rome. Even practical reforms appear arbitrary, often anti-liturgical, and give rise to a vast chorus of recrimination.

Upon official theology are imposed, along with an oath to maintain certain reserves, definite restrictions of method, fixed conclusions even in matters which depend upon critical investigation: the *argumenta credibilitatis*, the proof of the *preambula fidei*, which at first were referred with confidence to reason, are today guarded, forced, maimed by a suspicious theology, which does not trust free criticism, but finds in it its most dreaded and dangerous adversary. Theological teaching is stricken unto death by the anti-modernist oath.

To these difficulties answer is made by exaggerating the pontifical authority beyond all credence; the more it becomes personal and arbitrary, through lack of traditional supports, the more it is imposed; and not merely in theological, but even in economical and political matters it is attempted to make the pope's personal thought and command an incontestable norm.

Thus in reality in the Catholic church,—and the same thing holds good in their degree with respect to the other churches,—the orthodox are no more, and orthodoxy is no more. Whoever blindly follows authority has no longer a guarantee against the caprice of one man; whoever studies, investigates, and forms judgments by personal effort, necessarily reaches conclusions which do not correspond to any pre-established type, and which modify and deform, or else elude, the old-time formula, since over the means of investigation the churches no longer exercise any effective control, while uniformity of doctrine becomes meagre with the slow rise and prevalence and decay of particular doctrines and of their various forms. The unity of the faith, if by the faith we understand theology, has therefore become definitively impossible; there will remain the *fides cum operibus*, faith as ethical guidance, the expression of a religious enthusiasm, a practical bond of action.

VII. The Catholicism of Charity

The conclusion of all that we have just said is evident; and it is the forecast of the end of orthodoxies. It is becoming impossible to justify by the authority of a miraculous revelation of God any doctrinal points whatever which form part of theological systems and confessions, for these are now seen to have been formed in the vast, complex cycle of human culture by a logical process, and one which we can reconstruct.

So also it is perhaps impossible to wish to sanction by the prestige of immediate divine institution any part of the ritual, as it is now practised in the churches. Even in respect of the two or three rites through which we go back directly to the Christ, it is not difficult to show that they were different in the beginning, and had in the thought of the founder a different value. If orthodoxy, the unity of the faith as it has been inculcated by the official theologians, were a necessity of the churches, then, such orthodoxy being impracticable, the end of the churches would be near, and would arrive coincidently with the education and elevation of man's intelligence to the mastery of his own thinking and the government of his own inner life. The theologians will certainly be the last to be persuaded of this; but they should find food for reflection in the fact that they had to define modernism simply as the most baneful of all heresies, precisely because it was not possible to fix and define it as a determinate heresy. The entire theological system, torn from its base, afloat, an enormous rootless mass of parasitic vegetation, is going adrift.

But let us understand one another. This cannot mean that doctrine and ritual must now henceforth be abandoned. If the message of Christ lives, if Christ lives in the consciousness of those who follow him and in the united body of believers, if Christianity, sprung from the deepest recesses of the religious consciousness where the Spirit has its activity, is a religion that persists and renews itself, then doctrine and ritual are necessary in order that religion may not suffer interruption or arrest,—necessary as vehicles of substantial faith, as a pedagogic system

of religious training, as institutes and instruments of life and of collective action.

The difference will be this, that doctrine, instead of being the supreme criterion, will henceforth be—and for that matter always ought to have been—subject to another and a loftier criterion,—charity, the life in Christ. Formal orthodoxy will be practically renounced. The practical, proper aims of a religious community —purity of life, the elevation of consciences, the exercise of brotherly love—will acquire a dominant importance. Much will be forgiven those who love much. Those most fervid in faith, in good deeds, in sacrifice, will be adjudged the best. An attitude of fraternal sympathy will take the place of the actual theological hatred and the jealousies and rivalries of sects. Looking to the fruits of the doctrines more than to their formulas, men will give up entirely the vain attempt—a practical denial of God—to impose a faith or insidiously to suggest it, and will not use the fetters of interest to hold back men's consciences from changing a compromised religion. The professional importance of the clergy will diminish enormously, when religion shall cease to be the mechanical repetition of rites and formulas, but shall of necessity have sprung from the living breath of the Spirit, which "bloweth where it listeth." The church as teacher and the church as learner, today so sharply divided, will again be fused together, for teaching will be practised—in accordance with the principle which Christ indicated and which, later forgotten, is reappearing in all modern pedagogy—as a being again made little with the little children in order to lead them into the possession of the truth and of themselves, until teacher and teaching become unnecessary.

Christianity and Catholicism, as historic institutions, will thus have to be considered as the development and expression, in a form in many respects transitory, of an eternal doctrine of life. This doctrine endures and at the same time develops, and, in the progress of human culture, enters into profound and vital connection with all the active energies of civilization as a grand pedagogic system for the formation of the divine life in human consciousness. Respect for this living, profound soul will make us respectful toward the forms and institutions which have trans-

mitted it to us, and the desire for it will permit us to guide our experience among them, letting go what has lost its efficacy and value, revivifying and renewing the intimate significance of what can still be a way to the living Christ.

For the welfare of Christianity it would be good that Pius X were the last pope of orthodoxy, of excommunications, of syllabuses, of condemnations. A pope who was unwilling to continue and renew these errors would be bound to apply himself to calming theological contests, inducing men to forget the faults and errors of recent times, calling attention to the few most important and decisive points of doctrine and practice, to making Christianity avail and live through all that which can still be its strength and efficacy. With the slow detaching and falling away from the ancient tree of every leaf that is withered, many hostile prejudices and many reasons for dissension would disappear, and Christianity, a spontaneous and living union of free churches, could aspire to be the religion, not perhaps, for a long time to come, of multitudes or of entire peoples, but of elect souls, athirst for goodness and for sacrifice, desirous of aiding one another as brethren in a vast communion of purposes and endeavors, in a work of spiritual light and good.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON GENESIS, CHRONICLES, AND THE PSALMS

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I. GENESIS[1]

"What with Winckler, Jeremias, and Cheyne, and now Eerdmans, Old Testament scholars have a good many new eras dawning on them just now. Whether any of them will shine unto the perfect day, time will show." With these gently sarcastic words Dr. Skinner describes the situation which a commentator on Genesis must be prepared to face at the present time. But the dawn is the waking-up time. The reveille sounded by these various scholars is exhilarating. The war to which they challenge Old Testament investigators may not prove to be a world-war, the critical map of the Old Testament may not be materially altered; but it is a good thing that the dominant school of criticism which follows Wellhausen should be compelled to meet antagonists equipped with all the resources of modern warfare. So long as their opponents were armed only with the weapons of the old apologetics, these critics had an easy time of it. After the publication of the great *Prolegomena* it seemed as if the last word had been spoken. Canaan had been conquered anew. All that remained for the victors to do was to settle down in the land, appropriate the high-places to themselves, and reduce the ancient inhabitants to Nethinim. But no sooner had they entered into possession than the temptation of the settled life began to beset them as it beset the Hebrews of old. They had driven out the traditions that had occupied the land

[1] A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis. By John Skinner, D.D., Hon. M.A. (Cantab.), Principal and Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature, Westminster College, Cambridge. New York, 1910.

for millenniums, but the ancient inhabitants, as is so often the case, soon threatened to conquer the conquerors. Traditions began to assert themselves in new forms. A very pronounced exegetical tradition was developed, and a series of priests and prophets arose whose sole function it was to conserve this tradition. Any one who ventured to differ from the new critical orthodoxy did so at his peril. In these latter days, however, certain bold Rechabites have risen up to challenge the tenets of popular criticism, and in some cases they even dare to reassert the probability of an ancient Mosaic ideal of considerable ethical and religious significance. Welcome to all the Rechabites, to all the protestants, pan-babylonians, pan-egyptians, pan-jerachmeelites, or pan-amorites (the latest reforming sect)! Perhaps they will do again for the history of Israel what they did of old. It was only when the popular tradition was pressed from all sides by these various influences within and without that the new prophetic movement was born.

Genesis was the starting-point of the Old Testament criticism of the nineteenth century. But after all the scenes had been acted, and the plot had come to its conclusion, and the audience was ready to go home, suddenly the lights have all been turned on again and the play is resumed. In order to understand at just what point in the drama of criticism the commentary of Dr. Skinner makes its entrance, it will be necessary to give a brief résumé of the plot.[2]

The critical movement of the nineteenth century was predominantly a literary movement. That is, its attention was largely fixed upon the disentanglement and dating of the various sources within the Old Testament itself. The means with which it operated were primarily literary; and the language, the style, the subject-matter, of different portions of the Old Testament were its criteria. The most remarkable result of these literary operations was the analysis of the Hexateuch into three great and originally independent narratives, the Priestly Code (P)

[2] What follows was written before I had seen either Mr. Burney's article "A Theory of the Development of Israelite Religion in Early Times," in the Journal of Theological Studies, April, 1908, or Mr. Stanley A. Cook's review of "The Present Stage of Old Testament Research," in Cambridge Biblical Essays, 1909.

and the two histories of early Israel known as J and E. The critical analysis started from the peculiar use of the divine names in Genesis, and the most successful demonstration of its propriety and utility has been in Genesis. This movement culminated in the work of Kuenen and Wellhausen. Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* marks "the final and decisive turning-point in the history of the criticism of Genesis" (Gunkel). It was his distinctive merit, not so much to unravel the documents—that had largely been already done—as to date them, and thereby to construct a clear-cut and fascinating theory of the development of Israel's religion. The Priestly Code, which up to his time had been regarded as the oldest of the three main literary strands in the Hexateuch, was held by Wellhausen, and since his day by the great majority of Old Testament scholars, to be the youngest of the hexateuchal documents, and placed after the exile. Instead of "Moses and the prophets" we have been taught for upwards of a generation to say "the prophets and Moses." The rest of the Old Testament was examined through this readjusted binocular, and the various documents appeared to arrange themselves in three great groups: those which reflected a pre-prophetic stage in the religion of Israel, those which reflected a prophetic stage, and those which represented a final, legalistic stage. In the last two stages we are on fairly firm historical ground. There are a sufficient number of contemporary documents to enable us to sketch out with considerable accuracy the main features of the prophetic religion of the later monarchy and of the legalistic religion of the post-exilic period. But what was the character of the pre-prophetic religion? Here was the place where conjecture and speculation set in. And there was plenty of elbow-room for opinions. By the literary method nearly all the sources in the Old Testament had been brought down to later times. With the exception of some important sections in Samuel and Judges, it was held that only a few fragments of Hebrew literature had survived out of the period preceding the great literary prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries. The consequence was that these prophets, beginning with Amos, stood out as the real founders of the higher religion of Israel, the religion of ethical monotheism. In proportion as this view was held, the pre-

prophetic religion, which *ex hypothesi* was largely without documents, was regarded as on a much lower level. Those documents which expressed higher ideals having been removed by the critical process to later times, there were left to the pre-prophetic period only those passages which reflected a rawer, more barbaric type of religion, and it became the fashion to associate with the pre-prophetic period those phases which characterize the most primitive forms of worship—animism, totemism, fetishism, polydaemonism. The pre-prophetic religion was considered to have two clearly marked stages, a nomadic stage of a very primitive type, when Israel was only a group of loosely connected tribes wandering through the desert, and an agricultural, or peasant, stage in which Israel, after its settlement in Canaan, was strongly influenced by the agricultural baal-worship of the Canaanites. In the formulation—Nomad Religion, Peasant Religion, Prophetic Religion, Legalistic Religion—sketched out with remarkable lucidity by Marti[3] and implied in the latest exposition of his views by Wellhausen himself,[4] the theory of the literary school of criticism corresponded with beautiful nicety to the theories of the development of religion in general which grew up in the nineteenth century in connection with the evolutionary hypothesis.

This great construction is without doubt one of the most remarkable achievements of historical investigation in the past century. In the process of its development the absolute untenableness of the old orthodox conceptions of the Bible was demonstrated. It is as impossible to return to them as it is to return to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. The minute examination to which the Old Testament was subjected and the new angle from which it was surveyed revealed a vast mass of hitherto unsuspected material to be studied and classified. For this, future students of the Old Testament can never be too thankful. It must not be forgotten, furthermore, that it is due to Wellhausen and his followers, more than to any other students of the Old Testament, that the prophets first came to their own. Here again these scholars have

[3] The Religion of the Old Testament, 1907.

[4] "Die israelitisch-jüdische Religion," in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, 1906 (2nd ed., 1909).

laid all future investigators under lasting obligations. And the formula itself, "the prophets and Moses," is likely to stand the test of time, so far as its essential meaning is concerned. While it is probable that a large part of the legal material in the Hexateuch will be found to be much older than many have been willing to admit, yet the vital thing in their contention is not likely to be overthrown,—namely, that the Law in its present systematized formulations, and as the constitutive principle of the national life, in other words, Moses as a written authority, as a code, follows the Prophets.

But within the last few years this critical school has been attacked at two vital points. First, its analysis of the documents has been questioned; and secondly, its views of the pre-prophetic stage of the religion of Israel have been challenged. The analysis started from the variation in the use of the divine names, Jahveh and Elohim, in Genesis. In general the correctness of the massoretic text in which these variations occur was assumed. But a number of scholars, among whom may be mentioned Dahse (1903), Wiener (1909), and especially Eerdmans (1908), have attacked this assumption. They raise the previous question. Is the massoretic text to be trusted? They point in particular to the differences in the occurrence of the divine names in the Septuagint. It is not my purpose to enter into this debate. Whether it is to be only an episode, a mere skirmish without importance, or is to develop into a general attack in force, remains to be seen. Its principal significance at present is as a symptom. In passing, however, attention may be called to Skinner's discussion of this newest phase of criticism in his introduction (p. xxxv). The discussion is a model of the pregnant brevity in which the limitations, evidently imposed upon the author by the publishers, have often compelled him to express himself. It is unfortunate that Mr. Wiener has seen fit to import the *rabies theologorum* into the debate, and to impute bad motive to Dr. Skinner and even to the general editors of the *International Critical Commentary*.

The attack from the historical side upon the current critical conception of the pre-prophetic period is a far more serious affair than the literary skirmish just alluded to. It is at this point that

these critics seem to be placed distinctly on the defensive, and it is here, if anywhere, that the positions occupied by them will have to be abandoned.

There are three serious weaknesses in Wellhausen's construction, which are revealed most clearly when one comes to his treatment of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel. The first is the tacit assumption that the first appearance of an idea in extant literature is its first appearance in history. There is a tendency to make this assumption all along the line, and it is for this reason among others that the name of the "literary school" of criticism is appropriate. There is a certain amount of justification for this assumption, since the primary sources for the historian are the written documents, and it is proper for him to cling to these as long as he can. Nevertheless, where only fragments of a people's literature are left to us, as is the case with the Hebrews, the assumption is peculiarly unsafe.

The second weakness, closely connected with the first and really growing out of it, is the inability of these historians adequately to account for the prophetic movement. Their attitude toward the prophetic movement is similar to Marcion's attitude toward Christianity. For them it comes as something entirely novel. It is sudden, historically unaccountable, organically unconnected with the past. But the prophetic movement is far too permanent a growth to belong to the genus *cucurbitaceae;* it must have had a tap-root. And they have failed to discover an adequate tap-root. When one turns from the traditional view of the Old Testament to the *Prolegomena*, the latter presents a view relatively so intelligible and convincing that at first it seems to satisfy every demand. As a sanctuary of refuge after the impossibilities of the old positions, it appears to be immune to attack. Yet I think one cannot read dispassionately the latest expositions of the development of the religion of Israel which have come from these writers (for example, the sketches of Wellhausen and Marti mentioned above) without realizing that the bridge which they throw over the gulf between the pre-prophetic and the prophetic religion is of the most flimsy character. Wellhausen tacitly recognizes this when he falls back upon the mystery of the prophetic personality to account for things that his view of the evolutionary

processes cannot explain.[5] In a construction that is avowedly evolutionary this is a fatal defect.

In the third place this reconstruction is in the main an intra-canonical reconstruction; it has built primarily upon the literary analysis of the Biblical sources. In this direction it has accomplished wonderful results, and yet the strictly intra-canonical method is always in danger of arguing in a circle. When outside sources have been drawn on for the interpretation of the earlier periods of the history, these have been mainly taken from present or pre-islamic conditions in Arabia, or from peoples no farther advanced than the Bedouin in civilization. Since it is held that the early Hebrews were nomads, it is maintained that their religion must be interpreted by Bedouin analogies. The result is that the early religion of Israel, the Mosaic religion, appears as distinctly primitive.

But discoveries have been made in the past twenty-five years which show us that an intra-canonical induction is not broad enough, if we are to understand the religion of Israel. The traditional dogmatic orthodox view explained the Old Testament out of itself by following the surface indications, which were really due to its latest revisers. The orthodox critical view explained the Old Testament out of itself by following those indications which lay beneath the surface and which the latest revisers had not succeeded in altogether obscuring. This was an advance. But the period has now arrived to consider all the Old Testament material anew in the light of the ancient oriental civilization in and out of which it originated. The first edition of Wellhausen's *Prolegomena*, under the title, *History of Israel*, was published in 1878. This was only six years after George Smith's publication of the Babylonian deluge-tablets and only two years after the publication of the creation-tablets. Since that time the cuneiform material has been accumulating with such rapidity that the decipherers are almost overwhelmed by it. The really epoch-making discovery, however, which constitutes the watershed of Biblical criticism, was made in 1888, when the Tell-el-Amarna tablets were found in Egypt. At one stroke the veil was torn away from Moses' face. The Mosaic period, instead of being seen

[5] "Die israelitisch-jüdische Religion," in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, p. 15.

in the dubious light of the dawn of history, or rather in the gloom of the prehistoric period, could now be examined in the broad daylight. A new school of investigators has grown up, called by their opponents the pan-babylonians, who have been endeavoring to reinterpret the Old Testament (and for that matter the New Testament also) in the light of the new material now accessible. Winckler is the head of the new school but his work has been brought to the attention of the general public principally through the more popular, though equally authoritative, exposition of it by Jeremias.[6]

Whatever exaggerations and unsound speculations Winckler and his followers may be guilty of in their natural enthusiasm for the new discoveries, the new premise in Biblical research from which they start, and which Winckler emphasizes and re-emphasizes in his pamphlet, *Religionsgeschichtlicher und geschichtlicher Orient* (1906), must hereafter be reckoned with. The pre-prophetic stage in the history of the religion of Israel can no longer be examined simply from the point of view of primitive religious conceptions. We are not dealing with primitive man in the Mosaic period, nor even in the patriarchal period. In those early days we are already confronted by advanced civilizations with millenniums of history behind them. This is true of Babylon, of Egypt, and of Arabia as well. The Bedouin of today are not necessarily replicas of the tribes out of which Israel emerged. In Arabia itself there were also great civilized kingdoms. In a word, Wellhausen's theory of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel is that it was primitive, that is, prehistoric in its general features; but we now know that it emerged in a late historic period, when civilization had reached a high degree of development. And not only so, we know also that Israel was not isolated from the great seats of ancient culture, but was closely connected with them, and has preserved in a remarkable degree a consciousness of this close relationship in its traditions of the migrations of Abraham from Mesopotamia, and of Joseph into Egypt, and in its recollection of Moses' connection with Egypt and through Jethro with Midian (that is, with the Minaean civilization). This is the

[6] Das alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients, 2nd ed., 1906; English translation, 1911.

first great new consideration with which the theory of the early religion of Israel must reckon. It can no longer be assumed that we are to construe the early religion of Israel in every respect as a primitive religion because it may have had nomad antecedents. There may well have been higher conceptions in it even in those early days. But as a matter of fact were there such elements? At this point we arrive at a discussion of the stories of Genesis, and these furnish the second important point of which account must be taken.

Genesis is the Biblical book primarily involved in the debate between the older literary school of Biblical criticism and the new pan-babylonian school. Commentaries on Genesis, therefore, excite uncommon interest at this time. Four commentaries which have appeared in recent years require special mention. Holzinger's commentary (in Marti's *Kurzer Hand-Commentar*, 1898) still represents in the main the older critical position. The newer points of view make themselves felt here and there, for Gunkel's remarkable book *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit* had already appeared in 1895; but the new ideas in no sense dominate the commentary. The *Westminster Commentary* on Genesis by Driver (8th edition, 1910) occupies a somewhat different field. It is written for a more popular audience. Its aim is not to solve the more difficult scientific problems of Genesis, but to give an interpretation of the book from the generally accepted positions of criticism. It discusses at length the old debates between dogma and science,—for example, the relationship of Genesis to the physical sciences; and this is done with the thoroughness, candor, and lucidity which make Dr. Driver the most successful guide among English and American scholars to all those who are seeking to effect a change of base from the old positions to the new. Gunkel's commentary (in Nowack's *Handkommentar*, 2nd ed. 1902, 3rd ed. 1910) is a different sort of work. It is epoch-making, as distinctly so as Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* itself. Those who accept its views would probably be inclined to say that it is the greatest commentary that has ever appeared on an Old Testament book. And with all its learning it yet reads like a novel; the style is as happy as that of Robertson Smith. In one way Gunkel has made it hard

for his successors; it is difficult for those who agree with him not to copy him by the page.

The fourth commentary is that of Dr. Skinner in the *International Critical Commentary*. The author does not give much attention to the old debates on Genesis and geology. For him these are dead issues, and his interest is in the problems of the present time. His commentary, therefore, forms an excellent supplement to Driver's work, and the two together will give the English and American student an adequate acquaintance with the problems of Genesis, past and present. In form Skinner's commentary is a model. The critical apparatus is not allowed to interfere with the easy flow of the exposition. The less advanced student is thus enabled to learn the leading positions of the commentary without difficulty, and the masterly way in which the more technical material is handled and the really important and decisive facts pushed to the front makes the work a joy to the advanced student. Skinner has the true expositor's faculty of knowing where a reader of Genesis needs enlightenment. He is a master of condensed and at the same time lucid argument. Altogether it is a genuine satisfaction to have at last a commentary on Genesis in English that is at once thorough, up with the times, and classic in form. In what follows, the positions of Gunkel and Skinner are treated together, and the attempt will be made to show wherein these commentaries mark an epoch in the history of the criticism of Genesis.

The stories of Genesis fall into two main groups,—the stories of the dawn of the world, found in the first eleven chapters, and the stories of the patriarchs, found in the rest of the book. Now all these stories are mainly found in the JE documents of Genesis, and the JE documents are assigned by the various representatives of the critical hypothesis to the eighth or ninth centuries B.C. at the earliest, with of course larger or smaller accretions from a later period. In other words, the documents in which the stories of Genesis are found have been brought into proximity with the prophetic movement. But do they reflect this movement or did they anticipate it? The dates hitherto assigned to J and E show that this problem was not wholly solved. The contrast between Holzinger, on the one hand, and Gunkel and Skinner, on the other, is instructive.

In Holzinger the question whether J and E are prophetic or pre-prophetic is not definitely formulated. The dates (J *ca.* 850–700; E *ca.* middle or third quarter of the eighth century) suggest that these writings are prophetic in the sense that they reflect more or less accurately the views of eighth-century prophecy. In the case of E it is expressly stated that "the thoughts of the prophets are normative." In the case of J, Holzinger is perplexed. On the one side he discovers ideas closely allied to those of the literary prophets. On the other side he is "astonished" to discover ideas not at all consistent with these more developed conceptions. The position of Gunkel and Skinner marks a significant departure from that of Holzinger. Gunkel, followed by Skinner, lays down the proposition that the only way to fix the dates of J and E without becoming involved in an argument in a circle is to raise the question of their relationship to written prophecy. Both argue that the two documents as a whole (E as well as J) are pre-prophetic. This they do on grounds of which the cogency can scarcely be denied. But in this conclusion the first step has been taken toward the modification of the current critical views of pre-prophetic religion; and the step is a conscious one, as is shown by the following statement of Gunkel:

> No doubt there are in Genesis many points of contact with this [written] prophecy. But the supposition of many moderns that this affinity is due to the influence of written prophecy is in many cases anything but certain. We do not know the religion of Israel adequately enough to be able to maintain that certain ideas and feelings first entered the world through the men whose writings we now possess, that is, since the time of Amos. . . . Such feelings can have existed long before "the prophets." Indeed we must assume that they did so in order that we may understand the appearance of the prophets.

In this paragraph we have very clearly expressed a consciousness of what we have seen to be two of the weaknesses of the general position of Wellhausen. Skinner expresses himself to similar effect, and adds a sentence of still greater significance:

> We must bear in mind that the 9th century witnessed a powerful prophetic movement which, commencing in N[orth] Israel, extended

> into Judah; and that any prophetic influences discoverable in Genesis are as likely to have come from the impulse of that movement as from the later development which is so much better known to us. But in truth it is questionable if any prophetic impulse at all, other than those inherent in the religion from its foundation by Moses, is necessary to account for the religious tone of the narratives of Genesis (p. li).

In the matter of fixing more exact dates for J and E, Gunkel and Skinner are exceedingly cautious. Gunkel contents himself with arguing at length for their pre-prophetic character. He then concludes with the brief statement that J may be assigned to the ninth century and E to the first half of the eighth; but he gives no arguments for these dates, and says expressly that "they must remain uncertain." Skinner is somewhat more definite. The date of E lies between the two limits, 750 on the one hand (the rise of written prophecy) and 930 on the other (the disruption of the kingdom), "if it be the case that 37 8 in E presupposes the monarchy of the house of Joseph. . . . Between these limits there is little to guide us to a more precise determination. General considerations, such as the tone of political feeling, the advanced conceptions of God, and traces of the influence of 9th century prophecy, seem to point to the latter part of the period, and in particular to the brilliant reign of Jeroboam II. (785–745) as the most likely time of composition" (p. liii). But in the passage previously cited Skinner had said that ninth-century prophecy need not be taken into account in order to explain the religion of JE. As to the suitability of the reign of Jeroboam, Holzinger had urged the pessimistic tendency in E as a reason for bringing the date down to the time when North Israel was rapidly disintegrating. On the date of J, Skinner remarks, "In J there is no unequivocal allusion to the divided kingdom and nothing absolutely prevents us from putting its date as early as the reign of Solomon." But he does not accept this date (now advocated by some critics) on the ground that "it is improbable that J and E are separated by an interval of two centuries; if E belongs to the first half of the 8th century, J will hardly be earlier than the 9th." It is quite evident that there is nothing fixed here. The selection of the eighth and ninth

centuries respectively is really hardly more than an adherence to a traditional formula, and when once the step implied in the assertion of the pre-prophetic character of the JE documents is taken, the whole question of a date earlier than the eighth and ninth centuries is thrown open.[7]

But an even more important departure from the older treatment of J and E than the definite assignment of both of them to the pre-prophetic period must now be noticed. For many years the documents J and E had been largely treated as homogeneous works, due to authors and not simply to compilers. The older characterizations of J and E make the impression that we are dealing in these documents with the work of two remarkable and dominant personalities. But Wellhausen himself had laid the foundation for a different conception, for in the J-sections of the primitive history (chaps. 1–11) he distinguished several strands; and the disintegration of J was carried still further by Budde. But how little the ultimate consequences of these observations were at first realized is illustrated from the introduction to Holzinger's commentary. In this he speaks in one short paragraph of "the gradual origin of this stratum [J] so that J must be regarded as derived not from one narrator, but from a circle or, *cum grano salis*, from a school." The composite character of E is barely referred to, and the characterization of both documents is in general in the old terms. What Holzinger admits *cum grano salis* is strongly emphasized by Gunkel, and lies at the basis of both his exegesis and his historical criticism. According to him J and E are not homogeneous works of two authors, but collections of stories arising gradually in different schools. Our present documents are only the literary deposit of a long oral tradition. In this view of the JE material Skinner is at one with Gunkel. The result of this changed conception of J and E is shown in a characteristic way when the arrangement of material in the introductions to the commentaries of Holzinger on the one

[7] In an exceedingly interesting essay in the Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 1910, Gressmann maintains that "the time of Saul furnishes the *terminus ad quem* before which the legends of Genesis were in general complete, though individual traits were added later. . . . Prophetic influence nowhere makes itself felt" (p. 31).

hand, and of Gunkel and Skinner on the other, is examined. Holzinger starts with a history of the literary criticism of Genesis in the nineteenth century, and ends with a discussion of the documents J, E, and P, their peculiarities and dates, in a thoroughly conventional fashion. Consequently the interest is concentrated upon J and E as documents. Gunkel and Skinner, on the other hand, begin, not with a history of the criticism which culminates in the recognition and chronological definition of these documents, but with the definition and analysis of the legend and its probable history in the oral tradition which was finally precipitated in J and E. With Holzinger J and E, as documents, are the all-important thing. With Gunkel and Skinner they are the least important thing. The final collections are now regarded only as the literary receptacles for the oral tradition, and as such are of minor importance for the purposes of historical interpretation. The interest is shifted, and the emphasis now falls, not on J and E, but on the oral tradition before it was stored away in J and E. This means that a new and fascinating perspective is opened up into the pre-prophetic religion of Israel. The J and E documents themselves are pre-prophetic, and the tradition behind them, upon which all the emphasis now falls, is still earlier. The stories of Genesis thus become the key to our understanding of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel.

Having definitely assigned the J and E documents to the pre-prophetic era, and having next assumed a long history of the stories in the oral tradition prior to their deposit in the J and E collections, the next step is the attempt to trace, if possible, the history of the oral tradition itself. At this point we are largely thrown back upon conjecture. As might be expected, the brilliant, speculative German is much more sure of what happened than the cautious, matter-of-fact Englishman. Hence a more precise sketch of the earlier history of the stories is attempted by Gunkel than Skinner ventures to give. Gunkel distinguishes three stages in the history of the stories: (1) the period of their formation, (2) the period of their transformation, and (3) the period of their more or less official compilation. In following their history, two groups of stories must be kept distinct: (*a*) those contained in chapters 1–11, which, as a whole, have to do

with the beginnings of universal history, and (*b*) those contained in the rest of the book, which deal with the patriarchal history. The former stories are intimately connected with similar stories in Babylonia, the latter show little Babylonian influence. In the first group of narratives the peculiar nature of the similarity to the Babylonian myths and legends points, according to both Gunkel and Skinner, to a dependence upon these latter. At this point Gunkel attaches the results of his studies in Genesis to the doctrines of the pan-babylonians. He adopts their theory that in the pre-mosaic period the soil of Palestine was saturated with Babylonian culture. On the other hand, the Genesis narratives of chapters 1–11 also show traces of what seem to be Phoenician influence. Accordingly Gunkel propounds the exceedingly interesting thesis that the Hebrews adopted these stories ultimately from the Babylonians, but through a Phoenician medium. Of course this could only be done after the conquest of Canaan, and hence a date after the settlement in Canaan is set for the formation, or rather, in this case, for the appropriation, of the stories in Genesis 1–11.

To this view Skinner will not commit himself. He discusses briefly the arguments for and against Gunkel's position, and arrives at the negative conclusion that it is impossible to determine the precise channel or the approximate date of this infusion of Babylonian elements into the religious traditions of Israel. But in the course of his discussion of the theory he lets fall one statement which shows which way the wind is beginning to blow. In arguing against Stade's view that the monotheistically colored myths of chapters 1–11 could not have been adopted by Israel before ethical monotheism had been established by the prophets, Skinner observes, "Monotheism had roots in Hebrew antiquity extending much further back than the age of written prophecy, and the present form of the legends is more intelligible as the product of an earlier phase of religion than that of the literary prophets" (p. x).

With regard to the patriarchal legends, which are of such fundamental importance for the interpretation of the beginnings of Israel's religion, Gunkel defends the thesis that the core of them was already in possession of the Hebrew tribes before the conquest.

The scenes of these stories are mostly laid in the steppes to the east and south of Canaan, and not in Canaan itself. The life described in them is nomadic, not agricultural. All these traits are urged in favor of a very early date for the rise of the stories. The latest of them, it is maintained, do not, in the substance of their contents, reflect conditions later than the earlier part of the period of the Judges. The period of the formation of the legends is therefore held to have been closed about 1200 B.C., at which time the period of their transformation began. Finally, since scarcely any reflection of events later than the period of the early monarchy is to be found in these narratives, the period of their transformation in the oral tradition is defined by Gunkel to be 1200–900 B.C. There were some additions after this time which are prophetic in the strict sense of reflecting later written prophecy (for instance, Abraham's plea for Sodom), but, as we have seen, the gradual changes which were introduced into the stories are held by Gunkel to be in general pre-prophetic.

Skinner proceeds by somewhat different and more general lines. He emphasizes the long interval which must have elapsed between the inception and the final compilation of the stories in J and E. But here two questions are raised. First, were these stories transmitted unofficially, "cast adrift upon the stream of popular talk," or was there more or less of an official transmission of them? On general principles Skinner inclines to the latter view, and though he does not finally decide between the theories that regard the local sanctuaries as the custodians of the traditions and those that ascribe this function to the prophetic guilds or (Gunkel) to professional story-tellers, he favors Gunkel's theory (pp. xxxi, xlvi). Secondly, what relation does this whole process of transmission bear to writing? Was the history of these legends altogether oral, before their final deposit in J and E, or were there written collections antecedent to them? Skinner strongly favors the latter view. The fact that the written documents J and E run so nearly parallel suggests that there was a great national epos already "codified" before them, and it is held that "we have no reason for placing the unification of the traditions later than the founding of the monarchy. From the age of Samuel at least all the essential conditions [for such a codification] were present."

But when the J and E collections have been definitely assigned to the pre-prophetic period, and when the attention has been shifted from the documents themselves to the long tradition, both written (probably) and oral, that lies behind them, a new question of the greatest importance presses upon us. What is the historical significance of these views of the JE material? If the stories of Genesis are pushed so much farther back than was for a long time supposed to be possible, may they not have a far greater historical value, and reflect more accurately the patriarchal period, than has generally been admitted by critics?

At the outset the literary character of the legends is to be considered. In a masterly manner Gunkel has analyzed the stories of Genesis and has demonstrated the fact that they are legends. This part of his commentary has already become classic. He points out convincingly how the frank recognition of their legendary character is the indispensable prerequisite for the correct historical and religious estimate of the value of the narratives. Gunkel covered the ground so thoroughly in this connection that Skinner has been able to do little more than give a résumé of the main facts as he had pointed them out. It is not my purpose to review the arguments used by these writers to establish their point of view, but two sentences from Skinner will serve to show that these views are not advanced in any destructive interest:

> It is no question of the truth or religious value of the book that we are called to discuss, but only of the kind of truth and the particular mode of revelation which we are to find in it. . . . As a vehicle of religious ideas, poetic narrative [that is, legend] possesses obvious advantages over literal history.

Now the legend, as distinct from the myth, originated on the plane of history, and therefore generally cherishes in its heart of hearts some historical reminiscence. The original fact which gave rise to the legend cannot always be discovered, but it is always worth while to attempt to discover it. In the case of the legends of Genesis it would seem to be peculiarly worth while in view, as both Gunkel and Skinner emphasize, of the highly conservative attitude of the story-tellers with respect to their mate-

rial. If we could adopt Skinner's suggestion of a semi-official, "professional" oversight over these stories, the chance of discovering true historical reminiscences in them would be still stronger.

In considering the historical value of the legends of Genesis, there are, as Skinner points out, two distinct questions. The first is as to the historical character of the persons and fortunes of the patriarchs. The second relates to the age of the religious ideals attributed to them. May not the prophetic ideals in the stories of Genesis, which have led earlier critics to bring them into the closest possible chronological contact with eighth-century prophecy, be after all centuries older? The first of these two questions can be analyzed into the further questions: Are the figures of the patriarchs to be interpreted as persons? and, if so, are they to be regarded as historical persons?

In the treatment of these questions it is again interesting to observe the important departure from the original position of Wellhausen. Gunkel points out expressly how, on the assumption that the documents J and E belonged to the eighth and ninth centuries, Wellhausen denied all historical value to the legends of Genesis as reminiscences from an earlier period. The assumption was that no historical recollections could have persisted through so many centuries,—an *a priori* consideration, it is true, but one of considerable force. Accordingly Wellhausen sought to interpret the legends as reflections of events in the period of the monarchy. For example, the struggle between Jacob and Esau is a reflection of the wars between Israel and Edom, the struggle between Jacob and Laban a reflection of the Aramaean wars, and so on. But this method of interpretation has been thoroughly discredited in recent years,[8] and in consequence a step backward was taken. Since the legends could not be explained as reflections of the period of the monarchy, they were explained as reflections of the earlier tribal relations. The patriarchs are tribal eponyms,[9] and their journeys, marriages, and other adventures are supposed to be figures

[8] Cf. especially Eerdmans, Alttestamentliche Studien II. 1908. Gunkel goes so far as to cite a statement of B. Luther that "the logical application of the method used by Wellhausen would speedily lead to absurd results."

[9] Cf. especially the constructions of Cornill and Steuernagel.

for tribal migrations, relationships, and the like. Undoubtedly there is a certain element of truth in this view. Moab, Ammon, Israel, Edom, are tribal names as well as personal names, and in some cases the legends themselves expressly state this view (cf. Gen. 25 23 ff.; 31 44 ff.). The legends have thus been regarded as furnishing information of the greatest historical value, but of "ethnographic," not personal, kind. This theory better satisfies the ancient character of the legends than does Wellhausen's theory, but it fails to do justice, as Skinner points out, to "the wealth of detail" in the stories. It is here that "the breakdown of the ethnographical method becomes complete" (p. xxi). Skinner lays down the canon that the ethnographic interpretation must be confined to those incidents where it is either expressly indicated by the narratives or confirmed by external evidence (p. 357). In these views Skinner is in line with recent criticism. Gunkel warns against the "pedantry" of the exclusive application of the ethnographic method of interpretation. Eduard Meyer, after apologizing for having sinned in this direction, describes Steuernagel's treatment of the legends of Genesis as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the method.[10]

Gunkel and Skinner are equally opposed to the mythologizing interpretation of the patriarchs, by which they are regarded as faded divinities. Two different lines of investigation have been followed by the mythologizers: that which sees in the patriarchs Canaanitic local *numina* and that which sees in them reflections of astral divinities. The former view has been supported by no less an authority than Eduard Meyer in the work above mentioned, in reliance mainly on the evidence of the patriarchal names. His views, however, have been subjected to a searching criticism by Eerdmans[11] and Gressmann,[12] and they are rejected by Gunkel and Skinner, at least so far as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are concerned. Skinner says with justice that Meyer's earlier arguments for the tribal interpretation of the patriarchal names are more convincing than his later arguments for their

[10] Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme, 1906. This work has had a great influence upon recent criticism of Genesis.

[11] Alttestamentliche Studien II.

[12] Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 1910.

mythological significance. "That names of this type frequently denote tribes is a fact; that they may denote deities is only a hypothesis."

A much more plausible theory of the legends of Genesis is propounded by Winckler and his followers. They start from the premise that the ancient Orient was dominated by an astral doctrine, the great thesis of which was that earth corresponds to heaven. Theoretically, everything that happens in the heavens has its counterpart on earth. Practically this means that everything that happens on earth has its counterpart in the heavens. But the movements of the heavens are described in mythological terms. For example, it is the god Marduk who overcomes the powers of winter and darkness when the sun arrives at the spring equinox. So it comes to pass that what happens on earth, as a counterpart of what happens in heaven, may also be described in mythological terms. According to Winckler's school of criticism this astral doctrine dominated all the ancient civilized world, and the Biblical writers thought in terms of it just as we today think in terms of evolution. The legends of Genesis cannot escape the influence of the stars. They too are supposed to be shot through with astral *motifs*. Thus Winckler regards Abraham as "the heroic precipitate of the moon-god." [13] The name Abram (the Father is exalted) is pointed to. It reminds us of the moon-god of Harran who was preferably called Father. Abraham was connected by tradition with Ur and Harran, the two great seats of the ancient moon-worship. Sarah, Abraham's wife, and Milcah, his sister-in-law, correspond to the Babylonian *sarratu* and *malkatu*, the titles of the moon-goddess of Harran and of Ishtar. The number 318 in Genesis 14 is the number of the days in the year in which the moon is visible. This method of interpretation is not so absurd as it might seem. The legend of the birth of Moses would appear to be a convincing illustration of its propriety in certain cases. Nor does the method do away entirely with the historical nucleus of the legends of Genesis, as might be supposed at first sight. There has been considerable misunderstanding of Winckler's real position at this point, though his mode of presenting his views is probably largely

[13] Geschichte Israels, vol. ii, 1900, p. 23.

responsible for it. In reality, the formula that earth corresponds to heaven allows the adoption of a very generous attitude toward the reliability of the tradition, as may be seen in the pages of Jeremias. Something did actually happen on the earth, although, according to Jeremias, the Biblical writers used mythological formulas in describing it, just as a poet writes in metre or an artist paints in colors.

But against the main principles of this astral mythologizing of Genesis Gunkel objects that the legends originally existed independently of each other. Hence we could hardly expect to find a system in them. Moreover, the spirit of the legends is popular, not scientific, as it would be if they were dominated by astral doctrine to the extent which Winckler's school supposes. Here Gunkel has decidedly the best of the argument. That J and E are to be compared with Manetho and Berossus, as Winckler actually compares them, is ridiculous. It implies an utterly impossible literary judgment upon these simple narratives. But "without previous aesthetic analysis of the sagas," as Gunkel correctly observes, "this entire method of investigation hangs in the air."

But if the patriarchs (and by the patriarchs must be understood primarily Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not Israel) are neither tribal eponyms nor faded deities, they must be persons. This is the only other possibility, as Skinner points out. Are they, then, historical or unhistorical persons? Siegfried, as Gunkel says, is an individual, but he is not historical. At this point a new factor enters into the discussion. In favor of the historicity of the patriarchs is urged the background in which they are set. Thus Jeremias contends that "the background of the patriarchal narratives agrees in all details with the ancient oriental conditions of civilization to which the monuments bear witness for this particular period." Gunkel himself, in arguing for the premosaic origin of these legends, makes the strong statement that "the conditions of the nomad period are here described with such freshness and vividness that one cannot avoid admitting a real, even though of course idealized, reminiscence of the conditions in which the patriarchs lived." Jeremias frankly concedes that the truth of the historical background does not of itself prove

the historicity of the patriarchs, but he urges with force that it undermines the assumption that the legends are historically impossible.

There is, however, another important element in the stories which must be reckoned with. While they agree in the main with the historical situation in which they are set, on the other hand they idealize the situation in a way that belongs to legend rather than to exact history. This point is strongly urged by Skinner. "It seems to us," he says, "that the remarkable thing about these narratives is just the absence of background and their general compatibility with the universal conditions of ancient Eastern life." He refers in this connection with great appositeness to the Egyptian tale of Sinuhe, which describes the adventures of an Egyptian courtier in Palestine at about 2000 B.C. In this tale everything is concrete and specific. In the patriarchal narratives there is "a washing out of the historical background." To the present reviewer this seems to be a just and significant contrast. In other words, a literary estimate of the stories of Genesis again compels the admission that they are legendary, not historical. We cannot, therefore, successfully argue to the historical character of the patriarchs from the cultural background of the stories, for that is an idealized background. Still, when real, even though idealized, reminiscences of the ancient past are admitted, and the distinction is remembered between a legend, which starts from the plane of history and presumably embodies some historical nucleus, and a myth, the question whether Abraham was a real person becomes not unreasonable.

At this point Gunkel and Skinner part company. Gunkel, for his part, wholly rejects the historicity of the person of Abraham. "It is difficult to understand," he says, "what importance the contrary view has for religion or for the history of religion. For even if a man by the name of Abraham once lived, yet for every one who knows legendary history it must be certain that, after so many centuries, the legend cannot preserve a picture of the personal piety of Abraham. The religion of Abraham is in reality the religion of the narrators, which they ascribe to Abraham." Skinner, on the other hand, while admitting that in

the nature of the case only subjective considerations exist to guide us, contends that "in the absence of external criteria a subjective judgment has its value, and one in favour of the historic origin of the tradition is at least as valid as another to the contrary effect." He then proceeds to narrow the question down from the patriarchs generally to Abraham alone, whose name "represents no ethnological entity and occurs historically only as the name of an individual." Here he lays all the emphasis on the character of Abraham. "The character has been idealised in accordance with the conceptions of a later age; but the impression remains that there must have been something in the actual Abraham which gave a direction to the idealisation." Therefore Skinner ventures, "in spite of the lack of decisive evidence, to regard him as a historic personage, however dim the surroundings of his life may be." The difference, however, between the position of Gunkel and that of Skinner on the question immediately at issue is not vital, since Skinner is willing to admit a considerable amount of idealization. A few pages earlier, in discussing Genesis 14, he remarks, "To us the Abraham of oral tradition is a far more important religious personality than Abram the Hebrew, the hero of the exploit recorded in ch. 14." This can only mean that the idealized Abraham of the tradition is more important than any possible historical nucleus. In that case Skinner would be occupying substantially the same position as Gunkel, who identifies the religion of Abraham with the religion of the narrators.

While the difference between Gunkel and Skinner is thus seen to be of minor importance, the cause for the difference is of considerable importance. Gunkel has been influenced at this point by Gressmann, who had attempted on the basis of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* to carry one step further the analysis of the stories in Genesis. Back of the legend which attaches itself to some historical fact he posits the *Märchen*, or simple tale, told only to amuse. The originals of the stories of Genesis are *Märchen*. The absence of the definite and concrete details which Skinner attributes to later idealization is explained on Gressmann's theory by the original literary species of the narratives. On this view there is no "washing out of the historical

background," because there was no historical background to wash out. Abraham was originally only a figure in a tale. The name is assumed to be a typical story-name like Hänsel or Gretel in the German folk-tale. The theory is presented by Gressmann with great attractiveness, yet I cannot feel that it has the inherent probability of Skinner's view. While the name Abram has been found in Babylonia as a personal name, it is found in Israel attached only to the one person. If it had been a current story-name among the old Hebrew tribes, would its use in later times have been so concentrated upon one particular *Kindlein?* There is also the undoubtedly historical name "field of Abraham," in the list of Sheshonk I., to be accounted for. The name here would seem to suggest a figure altogether too substantial to be originally woven out of the moonshine of a tale.

It is of no great importance that a man by the name of Abraham should once have lived. But did the religion for which Abraham stands exist as early as the time of Abraham? This is the second question raised by Skinner, and it is the vital question.

"The central idea of the patriarchal tradition," according to Skinner, "is the conviction in the mind of Israel that as a nation it originated in a great religious movement, that the divine call which summoned Abraham from his home and kindred, and made him a stranger and sojourner on the earth, imported a new era in God's dealings with mankind and gave Israel its mission in the world." Can this conception be adhered to? In answering this question, Skinner falls back upon two *a priori* considerations. (*a*) If Abraham really "had the importance assigned to him, the fact is just of the kind to impress itself indelibly" upon the tradition. (*b*) "The appearance of a prophetic personality, such as Abraham is represented to have been, is a phenomenon with many analogies in the history of religion . . . and nothing forbids us to see in Abraham the first of that long series of prophets through whom God has communicated to mankind a saving knowledge of himself. . . . It is difficult to think that so powerful a conception has grown out of nothing." These considerations are interesting, but unless some foundation in historical fact can be secured for them they are unable to support a belief in the Abraham of the tradition. At this point a serious omission would

appear to be revealed in Skinner's argument. Can a religious movement of such epoch-making character be understood in the historical situation in which the tradition places Abraham? To the question as to what that historical situation is, Skinner adverts at the outset of his discussion of the historical value of the tradition, but he does not discuss the real points at issue. Granted that the patriarchs were nomads, what kind of nomads were they? Were they exposed to influences from a higher civilization? If so, from what kind of a civilization? The first of these questions is not formally treated by Skinner anywhere in his book, so far as I have been able to observe, though incidental statements indicate his general views. The last two are discussed, but in a distinctly skeptical spirit.

That the patriarchs are nomads in the tradition is clear. But there were nomads and nomads; and Eduard Meyer has pointed out two distinct classes.[14] There were the nomads proper, the Bedouin, the wandering desert tribes that never settled down anywhere. There were also the semi-nomads who occasionally settled down for a time at this place or that, and thus formed a class between the Bedouin proper and the peasants, or settled agricultural communities. The Hebrews belonged to the latter class. This view has been adopted by Gunkel and Gressmann. But it makes some difference, as Eerdmans has remarked, upon which connection of the semi-nomads with the other two classes the emphasis is laid, whether upon their connection with the Bedouin (as in the view of Gunkel and Gressmann, following earlier critics) or (as by Eerdmans) with the peasants. The point is that if the Hebrews, being semi-nomads, are thought of as more closely connected with the settled population than with the Bedouin, their religious ideas are to be interpreted in the light of what we know about the religion of the settled peoples of pre-mosaic time, as well as in the light of conditions in the desert. In that case it is easier to assume that they were exposed to influences from foreign civilization, although these influences are by no means to be excluded even in the case of the pure Bedouin themselves.

Gunkel and Gressmann, on the other hand, interpret the legends of Genesis in their original forms by the light of strictly nomadic conditions. These are, indeed, reflected with remarkable fidelity

[14] Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme, p. 301, ff.

in the stories of Genesis (after later deposits of thought have been removed). The stories reveal neither an agricultural religion (note the absence of the name Baal in Genesis as the name of a god) nor a religion of Jahveh (the name does not occur in the personal names of the patriarchs) but a religion of El, which Gunkel distinctly characterizes as "extra-israelitic or at least pre-jahvistic in its origin." This nomadic religion is not influenced by Babylon, and the patriarchal stories differ remarkably in this respect from the international myths which underlie Genesis 1–11. Thus far it might seem as if Gunkel and Gressmann had returned to the original theory of Wellhausen, which starts with the nomads. But, if I understand them, this is not the case. In the first place they insist upon the great historical importance of these legends as actual reflections of the ancient nomad life and thought. Wellhausen, by bringing them down to the monarchical period, was led to deprive them of all historical value. In the next place, and this is of especial importance, Gunkel, at least, does not propose to interpret early Israelitic religion necessarily in terms of the pre-israelitic nomadic religion. This would seem to be the implication of the following very important passage, which I venture to quote at length:

> Just at this point [in the history of the religion implied in the Genesis stories] it is important to remember the extra- and pre-israelitic origin of these narratives, and not to explain off hand that view of God which stands lowest as the oldest faith of historical Israel, transferring the higher idea of God, seen in the primeval history, to a late period. Rather, as Gressmann has properly observed, is it true that the religion of Genesis is not simply the religion of Israel. . . . If we would recognize what is peculiarly Israelitic, we must not look to the bare material of the sagas, but to what Israel has made out of it, or to the history that it has undergone in Israel. But for this the observation is decisive that Israel has stamped its Jahveh upon all the manifold ideas of God that have been handed down in the legendary material, and has thus harmonized the inner differences. How developed its idea of Jahveh was, is seen in the fact that Israel was able to subsume under it the Canaanitic-Babylonian gods of the primeval history. It is Jahveh, as the most ancient Israel was able to maintain, who brought the flood upon the whole earth and scattered all peoples in Babylon. Universalistic ideas, accordingly, must have belonged to the earliest

> religion of Israel. But beside these the ideas of an earlier stage of religion were not entirely forgotten. Otherwise the old legends would not have been retained, but would have been destroyed. Genesis shows us how the higher ideas struggled with the lower material and gradually reshaped it.

This remarkable paragraph was not found in the second edition of the commentary, but it illustrates how the principles adopted in the second edition have in the third worked themselves out to their logical conclusion. In this conclusion the break with Wellhausen's view of the earliest stage of the religion of Israel is complete. Instead of interpreting that stage by nomadic conditions, the religion of Israel is sharply distinguished from the religion of the desert. The Israelitic forms of the legends of Genesis must be differentiated from the primitive nomadic forms. The Israelitic forms contain a much higher type of religion.

The question then arises, What was the occasion of this difference? It would seem to the present writer logical to deduce from the premises of the above paragraph a pretty substantial Moses.

But if Moses, as the personal symbol of the early religion of Israel, is not to be explained out of nomadic conditions as these are sketched by Gunkel, but rather represents a contrast to them, how can we account for him? Were these universalistic conceptions his peculiar property? Is he as entirely inexplicable as Amos is on Wellhausen's theory? Has Moses' religion no historical substratum? It is at this point that the pan-babylonians undertake to enlighten us. They refer to the tradition of a connection of Moses with Egypt on the one hand and with Midian (through Jethro) on the other. They also point to the really remarkable fact that Mount Sinai, the scene of the revelations to Moses, is almost certainly to be connected with the moon-god Sin, who was worshipped at Ur and Harran. But in all the religion of these regions there are fairly distinct monotheistic tendencies which grow out of the ancient oriental astral conceptions. These tendencies, as Baentsch[15] pointed out in the remarkable pamphlet in which he broke with Wellhausen's construction

[15] Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus, 1906.

after having been one of its ablest defenders, would form just the basis required to make Moses historically intelligible. But were these tendencies entirely unknown among his own Hebrew tribes, at least among the higher spirits in those tribes? Here the tradition must be recalled which associates Abraham with Ur and Harran, that is, with great civilized centres where an astral (lunar) monotheism seems to have been recognized. How does this tradition agree with Gunkel's and Gressmann's view of the purely nomadic conditions of the patriarchs? Can the tradition be trusted?

We are now able to appreciate where the weakness in Skinner's argument for a nucleus of truth in the tradition of Abraham lies. Meyer denied the trustworthiness of the tradition that Abraham was associated with the great civilized cities of Mesopotamia. He gave more weight to the genealogy of Gen. 22 20–24, in which Abraham's brother Nahor is the father of the Aramaean nomads of the Syro-arabian desert, than to the tradition that connected Abraham's family with the Aramaeans of Mesopotamia. The latter tradition was held by Meyer to be due to J, who misunderstood the reference to Aramaeans. In that case the connection with Babylonia and Babylonian thought suggested by the tradition would be broken, and we should be thrown back on an undiluted nomadic theory of the old Hebrew tribes. Skinner follows Meyer (p. 334), and in so doing robs himself of the one piece of evidence that would give support to his *a priori* arguments for the historical significance of Abraham. If Abraham, or the religious movement for which he stands, can be connected with Mesopotamia, that movement is not to be interpreted solely in the light of conditions in the desert. The ancient oriental doctrine must come into consideration. Skinner is very skeptical of those lines of connection which have been worked out by Winckler, Jeremias, Baentsch, and others, although he recognizes the "ingenuity and breadth of conception" of Winckler's interesting pamphlet *Abraham als Babylonier, Joseph als Aegypter* (1903). He remarks, "It is not unfair to suggest that it rests mostly on a combination of things that are not in the Bible with things that are not in the monuments." This may be true of specific details of Winckler's theory; indeed Eerdmans had

already dealt certain details of it some staggering blows. But these criticisms leave untouched the essential thing in Winckler's construction.

If it should be satisfactorily established that there was such a thing as an ancient oriental *Weltanschauung* in which there were latent monotheistic tendencies (and this appears to be more and more recognized), the tradition of the connection of Abraham with Ur and Harran would become of signal importance as an historical basis for belief in the possibility of a higher form of religion among the pre-israelitic Hebrew tribes. That this tradition can be eliminated in the way proposed by Meyer is seriously to be questioned. Gunkel, at this point more circumspect than Skinner, admits that the whole problem is not yet ripe for settlement, but suggests the possibility of a double tradition of the origin of the patriarchs. This is interesting; and especially if the semi-nomadic theory of the Hebrew tribes is admitted, and a consequent connection more or less close with civilized communities is recognized, it is easily conceivable that a strain of higher thought and religious experience could enter into and elevate the ordinary low levels of the nomadic mind. To hold with Jeremias that Abraham is a kind of *mahdi* and his journey from Harran a *hijra* is to give to his figure a tangibility which is unwarranted, but the connection between the Hebrew tribes and Babylon which is vouched for by the tradition of Abraham's journey from Ur does justify the supposition that there may have been in these tribes tendencies toward higher thought than has commonly been ascribed to them.

With this we arrive at the last observation which I desire to make upon the present disposition to break away from the tradition of Wellhausen and the earlier critics. As late as 1906 Wellhausen said: "Deep and thoroughgoing contradictions are present [in the Old Testament] and they compel the assumption of a development of the religion of Israel, more especially of the Mosaic cultus. They cannot be understood as coexisting phenomena, but only as successive phenomena, as phases of an historical process in the history of civilization."[16] As a general statement this is of course true. But the proposition has too

[16] "Die israelitisch-jüdische Religion," in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, p. 4.

often been construed to mean that there is a regular progress from lower to higher throughout the history. Such a conception smacks too much of the study and too little of real life. We are again indebted to Winckler for emphasizing another consideration, namely the distinction between the Biblical religion—the higher, prophetic religion—and the religion of the common people, which is every day revealed more clearly by the excavations in Palestine. The higher religion was present in a tolerably pronounced form from the beginning of the national life. How far it reached back into the pre-mosaic period it is impossible now to say with any certainty, though the considerations advanced above show that a pre-mosaic higher religion among the Hebrew tribes is by no means inconceivable. But that it was there when the tribes became a nation, the combined results of a study of the cuneiform texts and of the legends of Genesis are making every day more probable. This fact is recognized in express terms by Gunkel in the last sentences of the paragraph cited above, and is also hinted at as possible by Skinner when, in speaking of the higher conceptions of E as compared with J, he says, "We cannot tell how far such differences are due to the general social *milieu* in which the writers lived, and how far to esoteric tendencies of the circles to which they belonged." I would strike out the word "esoteric," for the champions of the higher religion of Israel, unlike the priesthoods of other nations, did not seek to keep their higher conceptions to themselves, but made them the common property of all the people.

If I have presented fairly the tendencies in the recent criticism of Genesis, especially as represented in the work of Gunkel and Skinner, it is clear that there is more basis for the traditional view of the history of the religion of Israel than has been commonly admitted by critical scholars of the past generation. But to urge this as an earnest of ultimate complete vindication for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and of rehabilitation of the dogmatic conception of the Old Testament is to pervert the results of scientific investigation. It seems to me that this is the mistake which such good fighters as Professor James Orr are making. Granted that Moses should be proved by

historical evidence to be more of a prophet as well as more of a law-giver than Wellhausen allowed him to be, and that we may in time see the patriarchs as trees walking, these would be important and interesting historical facts, and every candid scholar ought to be glad to recognize them. The mistake of Dr. Orr lies in supposing that he can vindicate the dogmatic view of the Bible by shoring up the traditions at this or that point. This is impossible, and so keen a critic of others as Dr. Orr should be able to discover the weakness in his own position. The critical movement of the nineteenth century, as it culminated in the reconstruction of the history of Israel, was incidentally a refutation of the old dogmatic conception of Scripture and a completely successful one. But because of this conflict the partisan of the victorious side is at times chary of conceding points to his old enemies. He is tempted, also, to be unduly skeptical of new truth which conflicts with his old theories, and this attitude is less excusable in a critical scholar than it is in an apologist. Happily, the commentaries of Professors Gunkel and Skinner show that with these scholars historical facts have more weight than academic traditions.

II. CHRONICLES[17]

When we turn from the first to the last book in the Hebrew Bible, we are conscious of a different religious climate. In Genesis we are in the uplands. The fresh air of the early dawn is blowing freely, and springs of living water are bubbling all about us. In Chronicles we seem to be in a low, flat land. The air has lost its tonic qualities, and the waters are stagnant and rather brackish to the taste. In Genesis religion is in the making; there is about it all the freedom and flexibility and joy of a new experience. In Chronicles religion is made, labelled, boxed, and

[17] A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles. By Edward Lewis Curtis, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature in the Divinity School of Yale University, and Albert Alonzo Madsen, Ph.D., Pastor of the First Congregational Church at Newburgh, N.Y. New York, 1910.

[Professor Curtis's lamented death occurred after this review was in the editor's hands.—Ed.]

preserved as an heirloom. The story-tellers of Genesis are serious, but they are poets. The Chronicler is serious too, but he is a pedant. It is little wonder, therefore, that the Chronicler's work has never proved a very attractive subject for study, and that the literature upon it, especially in English, is meagre.

Yet these strictures upon the Chronicler tell only half the story. With all his literary infelicities, with all his theological pedantries and ethical platitudes, the Chronicler, or the school which he represents, has exerted a profound influence upon subsequent generations. It is his view of the ancient history of his people that has prevailed in synagogue and church down to the nineteenth century. His work has been a corner-stone of the dogmatic, as contrasted with the historical, interpretation of the religion of Israel. When one considers the poverty of expression and lack of originality of this writer, the influence which he has been able to exert is truly astonishing. The fact of his influence furnishes an interesting criterion for appraising the intellectual level of popular Judaism and popular Christianity.

But it is only within comparatively recent years that the full significance of the Chronicler as the historian of dogmatic Judaism has begun to be appreciated. Since the translation (1876) of Zöckler's commentary in Lange's series, the commentary of Professor Curtis is the only one in English which undertakes to treat in full the textual, critical, and historical problems of Chronicles; for the commentaries on Chronicles in the *Expositor's Bible* (1894), the *Cambridge Bible* (1900), and the *Century Bible* (1906) are much more restricted in scope. The commentary of Dr. Curtis stands by itself, and is likely to retain this unique position for years to come. It is of importance, therefore, to understand the attitude which this commentary assumes toward the problems of Chronicles and the nature of the contribution which it makes to the solution of these problems.

The great problems of Chronicles are the problems of its sources and of its historical trustworthiness. The problem of sources is twofold: the relation of the Chronicler to his known, canonical sources, and to his unknown, non-canonical sources. The question of his trustworthiness will largely depend on his relation to these two groups of sources.

We are happily in possession of certain of the Chronicler's sources, notably the books of Samuel and Kings and the memorabilia of Ezra and Nehemiah. We are thus enabled to observe his methods in using sources. From the beginning of the critical movement the comparison of Chronicles with these sources occupied much attention, and it soon revealed the fundamental difference between the Chronicler's representations of the pre-exilic history and the picture that we find in Samuel and Kings. In the earlier period of investigation the war was waged about the question whether these two pictures could be harmonized. Since Wellhausen's brilliant chapter on Chronicles in his *Prolegomena* the impossibility of reconciling Chronicles with Samuel and Kings has been generally recognized, and the inevitable corollary to this conclusion was the further recognition of the unhistorical character of Chronicles taken as a whole. This result has formed an important part of the foundation in the critical reconstruction of the history of Israel and of Israel's religion. Wellhausen's work, which investigated primarily the relationship of Chronicles to its known sources, may therefore be considered to mark the end of the first great stage in the interpretation of the book. In the present commentary the conclusions of Wellhausen are unhesitatingly accepted, and the student will find in it no attempt to bolster up by harmonistic devices the Chronicler's picture of the pre-exilic history. But when the apologetic study of Chronicles has been discarded, the way is open for the true estimate of the work. Useless for throwing any additional light of importance upon the ancient history of Israel, the book becomes of the greatest value as a record of what those who lived in post-exilic times thought about that history. Its interest lies in its unconscious contribution to our knowledge of the beliefs and practices of post-exilic Judaism.

At this point a new critical problem emerges, namely, the relation of the Chronicler to other, unknown sources. Are the beliefs and practices reflected in his pages consistent or not? In other words, is the Book of Chronicles homogeneous, the work of one man, or does it betray chronologically different points of view such as to imply a composite origin? For the purpose that Wellhausen had in view it was necessary only to compare

Chronicles as a whole with Samuel and Kings. As contrasted with these books, Chronicles may be treated as a unity. At first sight, also, the markedly uniform and individual style that prevails in those sections of Chronicles not found in Samuel and Kings was most naturally explained as due to unity of authorship. Accordingly, Wellhausen and many since his day, notably Driver, and in our own country Professor Torrey of Yale, have maintained the essential unity of Chronicles.

But meanwhile another critical movement set in. It started from the Chronicler's own claim that he had used various sources which are not to be identified with our canonical sources. It is at present conceded on all hands that the imposing critical apparatus which the Chronicler purports to have had at his command (he cites some twenty works by name) is illusory, and that all may be reduced to two or three at the most. Of these residuary sources the main one would seem to be a history of the kings of Israel and Judah, not to be confounded with our canonical Kings, but a work of distinctly midrashic character. Did the Chronicler simply refer to this uncanonical work as an authority or did he actually copy out of it as he did out of Samuel and Kings? In the latter event can any of this work be identified in the present book of Chronicles?

In 1834 Movers advanced the view that most of the matter peculiar to Chronicles came from this midrashic source. His theory did not seem to attract much attention until in 1899 it was revived in a new form by Büchler in two articles of great suggestiveness in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* entitled "The History of the Temple Music and the Temple Psalms." Benzinger in Marti's *Kurzer Hand-Commentar* (1901) and Kittel in Nowack's *Handkommentar* (1902) carried the investigations of Büchler still further. They eliminated some of his more extreme contentions, but adopted his view that the main extra-canonical source or sources could be distinguished with tolerable certainty. They also thought that they could point out a good many glosses, or even accretions of greater length, to the Chronicler's own work.

The difference between the position of Wellhausen and his followers and the position of Büchler, Benzinger, and Kittel is

of far more importance than one might at first suppose. The former critics see in the Chronicler an author. The latter see in him a compiler. The first position, paradoxical as it may sound to say so, is the more radical position. If the Chronicler is an author, and if it is impossible to distinguish any sources in his work apart from the well-known canonical sources, the tendency is to regard his work as pure invention. Torrey carries out this view to its logical limit. For him the Chronicler is one of the most famous novelists in literature, a veritable Defoe in his ability to give the air of reality to imaginary history. Further, on the supposition that the work is a literary unity, the internal discrepancies and discords which have been urged in favor of its composite character become so many additional charges against the trustworthiness and literary ability of the author. On the other theory of the book, a far longer historical perspective is opened up. The work is given a deeper and richer background. It becomes a living organism whose growth covers a considerable period of time. On this theory, the lack of coherence in the book is not chargeable so much to the want of literary skill in the writer as to the constantly fluctuating conditions of the post-exilic period which his various sources reflect. On the compilatory theory, provided it can be established, it is evident that the good faith of the Chronicler can be more easily vindicated and his work made to yield a richer harvest of historical results than on the theory of the unity of his book. It is quite conceivable that, if the Chronicler is relying on written sources, some of the things which he contributes may have floated down out of the past; and though they may be only the wreckage of veritable history, it might still be worth while to attempt to rescue them from the current of tradition in which they are found. Flotsam cast up by the tide sometimes has real interest and value. In other words, the way is opened to do for the legends of Chronicles what Gunkel and his school are doing for the legends of Genesis. This attempt would be justified even if nothing but oral tradition were behind the present form of the narratives, but the existence of preceding written documents would tend to give more solidity to the tradition. The theory of Torrey would in principle seem to deny

all right to try to discover any nucleus of historical fact in the Chronicler's stories. In this connection it is interesting to observe how much more inclined to find historical reminiscences back of the Chronicler's narratives Benzinger and Kittel are than was Wellhausen.

The position of Curtis on these controverted topics, which governs all his exegesis, is best stated in his own words:

> In regard to the literary structure of 1 and 2 Chronicles I cannot follow the view of those who regard the author throughout as a mere copyist, nor yet of those who hold that apart from his Old Testament quotations he composed freely with no recourse for information to other written sources. I have given the view of a free composition but allowed a recourse to non-canonical written sources.

Theoretically, this is certainly the most reasonable position to adopt. Practically, the all-important question is, upon which element in the last sentence quoted the emphasis falls, upon "free composition" or "written sources." In fact, the emphasis certainly falls upon "free composition," and the consequence is that the yield of historical material is comparatively poor. It is somewhat more abundant than Wellhausen's gleanings, but not so large as Kittel's or Benzinger's. Historical reminiscences are found at 2 Chron. 26 (Uzziah), 28 17 ff. (invasion of Edomites and Philistines in the reign of Ahaz), 2 Chron. 33 (the captivity, but not the repentance, of Manasseh), and a few passages elsewhere. I am inclined to think that somewhat more pre-exilic history, admittedly of the conjectural sort, may possibly be elicited from these stories in the future. For example, in the Chronicler's treatment of the reign of Ahaz we have a classic illustration of midrash. But in addition to the historical reminiscence preserved in 28 17 ff. I would suggest that there is an historical background even in vss. 9–15. At first sight this description of the return of Jewish captives on the suggestion of the prophet Oded seems to be pure *Tendenz*. But the so-called Syro-ephraimitic war was an anti-jewish demonstration intimately connected with the anti-assyrian policy of Israel and the pro-assyrian policy of Judah. When Tiglath Pileser came on

the scene, Hoshea seized the throne with the support of the Assyrian king, slew Pekah, and gained the upper hand in Israel. This meant that a pro-assyrian party now controlled the policies of Israel. It would be very natural for such a party to attempt to re-establish friendly relations with pro-assyrian Judah, and vss. 9–15 may well be a distorted reminiscence of such a change in the politics of the northern kingdom.

But the historical significance of the Chronicler does not lie in the few kernels of historical fact that he may have preserved out of the period of the monarchy in addition to what is already found in Samuel and Kings. It rather lies in the way he has served up these kernels to us. He has disguised them by a kind of levitical sauce which seems to have been greatly relished in the post-exilic period. This garnishing is the thing of real importance in the Chronicler's work. The levitical revision of the old material and the genealogies which introduce it reflect more or less accurately the politico-ecclesiastical organization of the post-exilic community and are therefore of the greatest historical interest. But it is just at this point that the problem of sources, especially the relationship of the Chronicler to his uncanonical sources, becomes acute. Have we in Chronicles a homogeneous work, and is the picture of the post-exilic period which we find reflected in its pages a consistent picture? Or have we before us a compilation, and is the picture which it reflects a moving picture, changing with the changing times in which its various sources were composed? In order to illustrate the method and results of Curtis's work, I shall take a cross-section out of his commentary in which the passages bearing on the history of the musical guilds are discussed. These passages furnish, perhaps, the strongest evidence for the composite character of Chronicles.

(1) One of the linguistic evidences for a source adduced by Büchler is in the varying use of the word "trumpet." The word is found nineteen times in Chronicles (three instances in Ezra-Nehemiah being included), and regularly these instruments are assigned to the priests, while cymbals, psalteries, and harps are assigned to the levites. The Chronicler is scrupulous in distributing the musical instruments always in the same way and evidently attached much importance to this exact distribution. In

three passages [18] the Chronicler is obviously glossing his known sources. In the sources the reference is to lay music. But the Chronicler, as the contexts show, modulates it into a levitical key. Here, then, are two fixed facts, first, the consistent view of the trumpet in Chronicles as a priestly instrument and, secondly, the demonstrable glossing in a levitical interest of a known source which originally referred to lay music. From these premises Büchler argues that in the two passages in Chronicles where "trumpets" are found in the hands of the laity, we really have the Chronicler's source and not the Chronicler himself. If the position of Büchler should be accepted, a point of considerable importance in its bearing on the history of the temple music would be established.

In the first of these passages (2 Chron. 20), if vs. 28 is interpreted by vs. 27, the reference is to lay music. But at vs. 19 there is a reference to levitical musicians [19] which tends to reflect a different meaning upon what follows. Verse 19, however, is a parenthesis, the subject of vs. 20 going back to vs. 18. Büchler argues that parenthesis is here equivalent to interpolation. In other words, we have at 2 Chron. 20 an analogy to the passages cited above,—a source (this time the uncanonical source) in which the original reference was to lay music, glossed by the Chronicler in a levitical interest. This conclusion is corroborated by the word *rinna* translated "sing" at vs. 22, a word found but once again in Chronicles and there copied from the source (2 Chron. 6 19 = 1 Kings 8 28). Since the Chronicler is most consistent in his use of musical terms, the occurrence of this word only here outside of the passage copied from Kings is held to

[18] 1 Chron. 15 28 = 2 Sam. 6 15; 1 Chron. 13 8 = 2 Sam. 6 5; 2 Chron. 23 13 = 2 Kings 11 14.

[19] In the commentary at p. 7 the "singers or musicians" are mentioned but I have observed no discussion of the exact force of the Hebrew word (*meshōrēr*) regularly translated in the R. V. by "singer." I am persuaded that a more accurate translation would be "musician." The question has a bearing upon the history of temple psalmody. If we translate by "singer," we naturally think of psalms; if by "musicians," we think more of instrumental music, though psalmody is not necessarily excluded. But the emphasis of the Chronicler's evidence for psalmody would be quite different if "musician" were substituted in each case for "singer." Especially at 2 Chron. 29 28 there is no discussion of the very doubtful translation of *hashshīr meshōrēr* by "the singers sang."

betray a source. In the second passage where "trumpets" are found in the hands of the laity (2 Chron. 15 14) they are associated with "cornets." Now the word "cornet" is found again only at 1 Chron. 15 28, where it is borrowed from Samuel. This suggests that at 2 Chron. 15 14, where lay trumpets and cornets are combined, we are also dealing with a source.

Curtis treats this argument of Büchler as follows. (*a*) The introduction of levites at 2 Chron. 20 19 is held to be "natural in connection with the praise to Jehovah, since the assembly is in the court of the temple." No notice is taken of the parenthetical character of vs. 19. (*b*) The peculiar construction of *rinna* at vs. 22 is discussed, but not the singularity of its occurrence. (*c*) The use of "trumpets" at 2 Chron. 15 14 is cited as one evidence among others of the Chronicler's style, whereas the point of Büchler's argument is that the use of the word here is in striking contrast with the Chronicler's use of it elsewhere.[20]

(2) 2 Chron. 5 11b–13a is an obvious interpolation between 1 Kings 8 10a and 10b. The source speaks of no levitical music. The scene here described occurs before Solomon's prayer of dedication. Then follows the prayer (1 Kings 8 12–53 = 2 Chron. 6 1–42). At the end of the prayer the scene at the beginning is repeated in Chronicles (not in Kings), that is, 2 Chron. 7 1–3, which follows the prayer, is the equivalent of 2 Chron. 5 11a, 13b–14 = 1 Kings 8 10–11 which precedes the prayer. The duplication is unnatural; the two consecrations of the temple by the cloud negative each other. Bertheau long ago suggested that in 7 1–3 the Chronicler was following another source, and a new confirmation of this view was found by Büchler in the fact that at 2 Chron. 7 1–3 it is the laity, not the levites, who take part in the music. But at 7 4–6 = 1 Kings 8 62–63 the levitical music

[20] Curiously enough on p. 30 where the word "trumpets" is cited as a characteristic of the Chronicler, and all the cases of its occurrence are supposed to be given, 2 Chron. 15 14 is unfortunately omitted. In the same list the use of the word at 2 Kings 11 14 = 2 Chron. 23 13 is set off by itself as a "general use" (lay music?). This is true in the case of Kings but it is not true in the case of Chronicles. The relationship between the two passages in their use of the word "trumpets" is precisely the same as at 1 Chron. 15 28 = 2 Sam. 6 15, where the trumpets are properly classified in the list as priestly, in spite of the fact that in Samuel the reference is to lay music. The analysis of the usage at this point must be considered misleading.

is again interpolated (vs. 6). The distinction between sources, which either did not refer to music at all (Kings), or only referred to lay music (2 Chron. 7 1–3, an uncanonical source), and the Chronicler, who emphasized levitical music, would here seem to be obvious.

Curtis replies that "the Chronicler could have invented this narrative (7 1–3), even as he added the miraculous fire at 1 Chron. 21 26 = 2 Sam. 24 25." The resort to "invention" at this point in order to avoid the admission of sources is not convincing. If 1 Chron. 21 is also ascribed to the Chronicler, he must be held to have invented the same scene twice, and in the second instance he would have brought himself very unnecessarily into conflict with the narrative in Kings which he was following. This procedure, which would be most artificial if the Chronicler were inventing, would be quite intelligible if he were following sources and wished, so far as he was able, to preserve all the traditions, even when they varied. The argument of Curtis might be reversed and 2 Chron. 7 1–3 might rather be utilized as evidence that 1 Chron. 21 with which it agrees is also a source. For this view a new consideration may be urged. When the Chronicler transcribes Samuel and Kings, he usually does so almost verbatim (cf. 2 Chron. 10 = 1 Kings 12), the variations being almost always in the nature of tendency-glosses. But at times he varies considerably from these sources, when *Tendenz* is not so noticeable. Benzinger reasserts the canon of Movers that where the Chronicler departs from Samuel and Kings in a parallel account without the *Tendenz* of the differences being obvious, he is probably following a source intermediate between the canonical source and himself. 1 Chron. 21 is an excellent illustration of such a variation.

In the above instances we are dealing with narrative sections. In these and similar instances, where sources are inferred by Büchler, Benzinger, and Kittel, Curtis falls back upon the argument from style in opposition to the argument from content. But the argument from style in the present discussion is a double-edged weapon. On the one hand it must be freely admitted that the style of the Chronicler is uniform. No evidence for sources can be drawn from it except in a few cases like the use of the

word for trumpets. On the other hand, if the Chronicler is a compiler, and the main portion of Chronicles is really taken from his uncanonical source, then the style of the Chronicler is resolved into the style of his source. Curtis expressly admits this difficulty (preface, pp. vii ff.). It is probably because of the tentative character of the entire discussion that he has regularly quoted the statements of Benzinger and Kittel in full in each important case where the assumption of sources is made by these writers. This fulness and fairness in the treatment of the views of those who differ from him is one of the greatest merits of Curtis's commentary. The student is thus aided to an impartial judgment.

(3) It is when we turn from the narrative sections to the genealogical sections that the failure of our author to recognize fully the composite character of Chronicles seems to the present reviewer most unfortunate.[21] It is in the discussion of the genealogies that the resources of a commentator on Chronicles are put to the severest test. These lists of names, which fill so large a part of the Chronicler's work, and which at first sight seem so unpromising, can often be made to yield most interesting historical material. This is especially true if the composite character of the genealogies is admitted. As an illustration of what is involved in the study of these genealogies and of the consequences of Curtis's failure to recognize the sources, I have selected his treatment of 1 Chron. 6. This chapter furnishes the key to the history of the temple musical guilds, and is of the greatest interest and historical importance. The chapter falls into the following divisions:

(*a*) Vss. 1–15, a genealogy of high priests from Aaron to the Babylonian exile.

(*b*) Vss. 16–30, a genealogy of the levitical families, Gershom, Kohath, and Merari.

(*c*) Vss. 31–47, a genealogy of the three eponyms of the musical guilds, Heman, Asaph, and Ethan.

[21] According to the preface, Professor Curtis's co-worker, Dr. Madsen, has contributed especially to the genealogical sections of the commentary, the treatment of 1 Chron. 21–29, in particular, having formed the subject of his doctor's thesis.

(*d*) Vss. 48, 49, the duties of priests and levites.

(*e*) Vss. 50–53, a genealogy of high priests from Aaron to Ahimaaz (a contemporary of David).

(*f*) Vss. 54–81, a list of levitical (including priestly) cities, taken from Josh. 21.

The first thing that strikes the attention is the unnatural duplication of the genealogy of high priests (*a* and *e*). Both of these lists cannot be original. Benzinger and Kittel reject the first list as the later accretion; Curtis rejects the second.[22] Benzinger and Kittel appeal to the formal infelicity of vs. 1 before vs. 16; Curtis, to the formal infelicity of vss. 50–53 in their present context. This has not been sufficiently recognized by Benzinger and Kittel, but it is certainly not so obvious as is the awkwardness of vs. 1 before vs. 16. Benzinger and Kittel suggest as a motive for the later insertion of the first list the desire to carry down to the exile the genealogy (vss. 50–53), which originally only ran to the time of David. Curtis suggests as a motive for the insertion of the second list the desire of a scribe to incorporate it because he thought it proper that a list of priests should follow a statement of their duties. The motive suggested for the later insertion of the first list is far more intelligible. By eliminating list (*e*) instead of list (*a*) from the original genealogy, one of the important clues to the interpretation of the chapter is lost. This clue is the fact that list (*e*) ends with a contemporary of David.

The next thing that strikes the attention is that the genealogies of levitical families, Gershom, Kohath, and Merari (vss. 16–30), are repeated and enlarged in the genealogies of the eponyms of the musical guilds, Heman, Asaph, and Ethan (vss. 31–47).

[22] Curtis argues that if vss. 50–53 were omitted, we should have a sort of chiastic arrangement, which he holds to be characteristic of the Chronicler elsewhere, e.g. genealogy of priests and genealogy of levites, duties of levites and duties of priests, cities of priests and cities of levites. This arrangement assumes that vss. 54–81 stand in the order originally intended by the Chronicler. This cannot for a moment be admitted. A glance at Josh. 21 shows how senseless is the present order of 1 Chron. 6 54–81. This chiastic arrangement of the material is also supposed to be followed in chaps. 23–27 (cf. p. 260). It is assumed at this point in order to avoid the admission of the composite character of these chapters, but the assumption is most artificial and unsatisfactory.

The following tabular arrangement of the chapter, based on Kittel, in which the *guild* genealogies (B, D, F) are placed in parallelism with their corresponding *family* genealogies (A, C, E) will make this clear.

A. GERSHOM (6 20 f.)	B^1. ASAPH (6 39–43)	C^1. KOHATH (6 22–24, 25–28)	D^1. HEMAN (6 33–38)
Gershom	Gershom	Kohath	Kohath
Libni	Jahath	Amminadab (Izhar)	Izhar
Jahath	Shimei	Korah	Korah
Zimmah	Zimmah	Assir	Ebiasaph
Joah	Ethan	Elkanah	Assir
Iddo	Adaiah	Ebiasaph	Tahath
Zerah	Zerah	Assir	Zephaniah
Jeaterai	Ethni	Tahath	Azariah
	B^2. Melchiah	Uriel	Joel
	Baasiah	Uzziah	D^2. Elkanah
	Michael	Shaul	Amasai
	Shimea	C^2. Elkanah	Mahath
	Berechiah	Amasai Ahimoth	Elkanah
	Asaph	Elkanah	Zuph
		Zophai	Toah
		Nahath	Eliel
E. MERARI (6 29 f.)	F. ETHAN (6 44–47)	Eliab	Jeroham
Merari	Merari	Jeroham	Elkanah
Mahli	Mushi	Elkanah	Shemuel
Libni	Mahli	Samuel	Joel
Shimei	Shamer	[Joel]	Heman
Uzza	Bani		
Shimea	Amzi		
Haggiah	Hilkiah		
Asaiah	Amaziah		
	Hashabiah		
	Malluch		
	Abdi		
	Kishi		
	Ethan		

Into all the intricate text-critical questions of these lists it is unnecessary for our purposes to go, but, when certain necessary emendations [23] have been made, the following equations are accepted by Curtis as well as by his predecessors: $B^1 = A$; $D^1 = C^1$,

[23] The most important of these, which are generally accepted, are (*a*) the transposition of Jahath and Shimei in B, thus showing that there was a variation in the tradition as to which of the sons of Gershom (Libni or Shimei, cf. vs. 17) stood at the head of the pedigrees A and B; (*b*) the deletion of Assir and Elkanah in C; (*c*) the substitution of Izhar for Amminadab in C, the error being due to a reminiscence of Ex. 6 23 (cf. the context); (*d*) the emendation in vs. 26a to "Elkanah, his son," i.e. son of Ahimoth, instead of the present text. The genealogy represented by C^2 (vss. 25–28) is really a second genealogy traced back to Elkanah and down to Joel, the son of Samuel the prophet, and not a continuation of C^1.

and $D^2 = C^2$. (For the relationship of F to E, see below.) Now the crucial point in the interpretation of the family genealogies, A, C, E, lies in the answer to the question, Why do these genealogies leave off where they do, at Jeaterai, Shaul, and Asaiah? The answer to this question will depend on our answer to the preliminary question, Are Jeaterai and Shaul original at the end of A and C^1?

In place of Jeaterai (A) we find Ethni in B^1. Ethni is certainly a corruption of Ethan. Benzinger, Kittel, and Curtis all refuse to decide between Ethni-Ethan and Jeaterai, though they all hold that there is corruption here. But as Jeaterai is a wholly unintelligible name, occurring only here, the chances are that it is a corruption of Ethni-Ethan rather than the reverse. But it is not probable that Ethan itself was original in A. It is noticeable that Ethan has once before in B taken the place of Joah in A. It might be possible that Ethan was again substituted, in the second case of its occurrence in B, either for Joah or for a name that looks like Joah and that could easily be confused with it. At 7 3 we actually find a certain Joel the son of Izrahiah (another form of Zerah).[24] This would suggest that Joel was the original name at the end of A. Joel then became corrupted to Joah, and Ethan was substituted twice for Joah in list B. In the second case Ethan (Ethni) worked back into A in the corrupted form of Jeaterai, a complicated but entirely normal instance of progressive corruption of the text, every step of which is intelligible.[25]

In C^1 Uzziah is undoubtedly the same as Azariah of D^1, the same king being called by these two names, 2 Kings 15, Isa. 6 1. Shaul is usually equated with Joel. This leaves Uriel = Zephaniah unaccounted for. But Uriel is even more easily confused with Joel than is Shaul. I would suggest that there has been an accidental transposition in C^1, and that the last three names in this list should be read in the order Shaul (?),

[24] That 7 3 is dealing with Issacharites, not Levites, is of no consequence when one remembers how these names are shuffled about in Chronicles. Cf. 7 7 with 25 4.

[25] Benzinger conjectures that an original Joel at the end of A has been omitted. This would be less probable.

Uzziah, Uriel (Joel).[26] These suggested emendations are remarkably confirmed, and at the same time the clue is furnished to the interpretation of the family genealogies (A, C, E), by 1 Chron. 15. This chapter is nearly related in several ways to 1 Chron. 6. Benzinger pointed out that the Asaiah who is the representative of Merari at the transportation of the ark (15 6) must be the Asaiah at the end of E. At 15 5, 7 Uriel is the representative of Kohath and Joel of Gershom. These names correspond exactly to the names which we have conjecturally placed at the end of C and A.

If the reader has threaded his way through the above argument, his patience will be rewarded, for the aim of the family genealogies in chapter 6 now becomes clear. They seek to bring down the levitical pedigrees to the time of David, in harmony with what we have seen to be the more original list of high priests (vss. 50–53). Each list closes with the name of a contemporary of David (Ahimaaz the priest, Joel the Gershomite, Uriel the Kohathite, and Asaiah the Merarite).[27] In other words, these family genealogies have an independent significance. When this is once recognized the critical relationship of the guild genealogies (B, D, F) to the family genealogies (A, C, E) is also perceived. It is the purpose of the guild genealogies to establish the levitical descent of the musical guilds. This they do by attaching themselves to levitical family genealogies already in existence. This means that the family genealogies are older than the guild genealogies. But the chronological difference in the two sets of genealogies naturally means a difference in literary origin. This conclusion is borne out by the further fact that the guild genealogies are based, not on the exact form of the family genealogies found in chapter 6, but on a variant tradition of these genealogies. This is clearly seen (*a*) in the fact that A traces the genealogy through Libni, while B traces it through

[26] 2 Chron. 29 12 has the Azariah-Joel of D^1. But as Uriel is the rarer name, it is much more likely that it was original and that the more usual Joel was substituted for it.

[27] By accepting with Curtis the first list of high priests, which brings the pedigree down to the exile, as the more original, the aim of the chapter would seem to be violated.

his brother Shimei; (*b*) in the fact that F does not correspond at all to E, as we should expect it to do; and (*c*) in the very different chronological implications of the two sets of genealogies. While the family genealogies imply only eight or nine generations between Aaron and David, the guild genealogies put from thirteen to twenty-one generations into the same period. (*d*) Finally, when the subject of the general section, chapters 1–9, is examined, the guild genealogies are seen to be out of topical connection with the context. From every point of view, therefore, vss. 31–47, which contain the guild genealogies, are to be considered an accretion.

Now it is conceivable that the Chronicler himself, who is especially interested in the temple music, added the guild genealogies to the family genealogies which had come to him from tradition, written or oral. In that case we should find here another instance in which the Chronicler had interpolated his levitical music into his source. But two considerations are opposed to this view. (*a*) 1 Chron. 6 16–30 is an integral part of the great section, chapters 1–9. This section is in all probability the work of the Chronicler. It follows that if vss. 31–47 are an addition to vss. 16–30, they must be later than the Chronicler. (*b*) This is confirmed by the position assigned to Heman in the guild genealogies. Here we arrive at a very interesting fact revealed in these genealogies. Everywhere else in the Bible, except at 1 Chron. 15, Asaph either stands alone or is placed first in the references to the singers. In chapter 6 Heman stands first.[28] Not only so but he traces his descent from the priestly family of Kohath, and even claims the great prophet Samuel as his ancestor. These facts combine to push Heman into the position of greatest prominence. This is not accidental but intended; the artificiality of the guild genealogies, admitted on all hands, proves motive. If these genealogies were real genealogies, motive could not be imputed to them, but we can see how the Hemanite genealogy, D^1 and

[28] It is true that Kohath, the priestly as well as levitical family from which Heman claims descent, sometimes precedes Gershom, the oldest-born, but this is not the regular order, notably not in vss. 16–30 (another evidence of their critical distinction from vss. 31–47), and, as stated above, only here and at chap. 15 does the Kohathite guild of Heman precede the Gershomite guild of Asaph.

D^2, is formed by simply adding the parallel genealogies C^1 and C^2 together, so that Samuel is appropriated at the same time as an ancestor of Heman. Artifice that results in a certain definite thing, namely, the exaltation of Heman, must be purposed, and the guild genealogies of chapter 6 therefore reflect a time in which Heman had superseded Asaph. But a study of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles shows very clearly that whether the Chronicler knew of these three guilds or not, he certainly did not regard Heman as the chief guild. Here, then, would seem to be proof of the strongest character that vss. 31–47 are later than the time of the Chronicler. This conclusion is at once seen to have the most important bearing upon the history of the development of the musical guilds.[29]

If the above criticism of chapter 6 is accepted, the treatment of the chapter in Curtis's commentary must be regarded as wholly inadequate. At three points in particular the positions adopted in the commentary seem to the present reviewer to be irreconcilable with the real significance of this chapter. (*a*) The elimination of the second list of high-priests, from Aaron to David, instead of the first list. (*b*) The failure to bring out the independent significance of the family genealogies, which almost certainly were intended to carry the pedigrees down to the time of David. These genealogies are treated as the equivalents of the guild genealogies. The Gershomite genealogy is actually called a fragment of the Asaphite genealogy. The break in the Kohathite genealogy at vs. 25 is observed, but the fact that we are here dealing with a parallel line is not brought out, and the Kohathite genealogy is treated as a unit on the basis of vss. 33–38, and hence regarded as a duplicate pedigree of Heman. In reality it is a double genealogy of Shaul-Uriel (C^1) and of Joel the son of Samuel (C^2). The difficulty of Curtis's method of treating the family genealogies is fully revealed in the geneal-

[29] In the above the criticism of Benzinger and Kittel has been followed in the main, but the attempt has been made to formulate their positions somewhat more precisely and to strengthen them at certain points. The difference between the name Ethan for the third guild in chaps. 6 and 15, as contrasted with Jeduthun elsewhere, properly enters into the discussion, and furnishes another argument for the later date of 6 31–47. But the treatment of this point would lead us too far afield.

ogy of Merari. "This pedigree," he says, "should present a line of descent of Ethan, but a close similarity of names is wanting. Still they have been held sufficiently alike [by Bertheau] to warrant this inference." This is anything but convincing. The fact is that the family genealogies when construed as guild genealogies are entirely meaningless. Twice Curtis seems on the point of recognizing what the present reviewer thinks is the true situation. On page 132 the identification of Asaiah at the end of list E with the Asaiah of 1 Chron. 15 6, suggested by Benzinger and in reality the clue to these genealogies, is tentatively allowed. Again on page 134 it is said that the guild genealogies are probably dependent upon the family genealogies, "which originally may have been of Levites not classified as singers," and on page 135, "the Chronicler may have utilised some current genealogies of the singers to supplement the Levitical tables of 6 20 ff." But these clues are not followed up, and are really in no organic connection with the general interpretation given of the chapter (pp. 130–135). (*c*) In the third place the intention to exalt Heman is denied. It is urged that Heman is not called chief, that Asaph's descent is traced from Gershom, who is the oldest son, and that he is given a place of honor on the right hand. But unfortunately it is at the right hand of Heman! The fact that Asaph is traced to Gershom is an interesting reminiscence of the orginal position of Asaph. Since Heman is placed first, it is not necessary to speak of him as chief. This attempt to deny the pre-eminence of Heman is probably due to the desire to save the passage to the Chronicler, whose authorship is urged on the basis of the names in the guild genealogies which are frequently found elsewhere in the Chronicler's writings, and on the ground of the style at vss. 31–33a, which point to the conclusion that "these genealogies of the singers were composed by the Chronicler or in his day." I should certainly choose the latter alternative; only I would stretch the term "day" so as to cover a somewhat longer period of time than Curtis probably intended.

The same aversion to the admission of a composite structure in Chronicles stands in the way of an adequate interpretation of 1 Chron. 25 (the musical courses) and of 1 Chron. 15–16. In

the latter case a harmonistic method is employed in the interpretation of the chapter which might be justified if it were not for the testimony of the other musical passages, especially 1 Chron. 6. Curtis accepts, indeed, interpolation at 15 19–21, 23, 24b, yet holds that the difference between vss. 18b and 24 on the one hand, in which Obed-Edom and Jeiel are gate-keepers, and vss. 21 and 23 on the other, in which Obed-Edom and Jeiel are singers and Berechiah and Elkanah are gate-keepers, is due to a misunderstanding of vs. 18 by the interpolator. Benzinger and Kittel hold that the difference is due to the changes in organization in the temple musical guilds.

It will be seen that the present reviewer strongly inclines to the compilatory theory of Chronicles, and therefore has felt compelled to express his dissent from the positions taken in the commentary in a number of crucial passages. But he would not leave the impression upon the reader's mind that this work, which was completed with heroic perseverance under the most trying circumstances, is of relatively small importance. On the contrary, in its exhaustive text-critical apparatus, in its wealth of material, archaeological, exegetical, and critical, in which it far surpasses its two recent German competitors (Benzinger and Kittel), in its clear presentation and scrupulous objectivity, giving to views of the school of criticism it opposes a fair and full presentation, the commentary of Professor Curtis will remain for years to come the standard English commentary on Chronicles, and will worthily take its place among the most indispensable volumes of the *International Critical Commentary*.

III. THE PSALMS[30]

The problems connected with the Psalter are endless, but those most assiduously discussed during the past twenty-five years may be grouped under four heads: (1) the historical question of the origin of the Psalter as a collection, (2) the question of the origin of the individual psalms, (3) the literary question of the nature of Hebrew poetry, with its necessary accompaniment of problems in textual criticism, and (4) the exegetical question concerning the speaker in the psalms, whether the "I" of the Psalter has an individual or a collective reference. The scholar who can answer these questions successfully must be possessed of an historical sense, a literary feeling, and an exegetical tact of a very high order. Since the psalms are hymns, and as such for the most part deal only with generalized or idealized experiences, the problem of their date and place in the development of the religion of Israel is a singularly complicated one. The dating of the psalms must rest on established dates in the rest of Hebrew literature, and one who undertakes the criticism of the Psalter must have a very clear and well-balanced conception of the problems of the religion of Israel. Without it the attempt to discuss, for instance, the tradition of the Davidic authorship of the psalms, or even their pre-exilic origin, would lead to no secure results. Again, the question of the nature of Hebrew poetry and its bearing upon textual criticism is one of the most vexed questions of Old Testament study. Few combine a gift for textual criticism with a fine literary sense. Finally, the problem of the nature of the speaker in the Psalter is one of the most fascinating and important, but at the same time one of the most delicate of exegetical problems.

The literature upon these various subjects, unlike the literature upon Chronicles, is enormous; but the recent commentaries, with which the work of Dr. Briggs would naturally be compared, are

[30] A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopaedia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Emily Grace Briggs, B.D. Two volumes. New York, 1906, 1907.

those of Baethgen in the *Handkommentar*, Duhm in the *Kurzer Hand-Commentar*, and Kirkpatrick in the *Cambridge Bible*. The first of these is marked by solid learning, clear exposition, and a commendable agnosticism in the matter of dating the psalms, but is perhaps too cautious in its textual criticism, and it is in no sense a creative work. Kirkpatrick's commentary belongs to the more elaborate and ambitious commentaries in the *Cambridge Bible*. It is clear and informing on its exegetical side, though largely an echo of Baethgen, but seems to be distinctly defective in its historical criticism. Attempts to find suitable situations for the psalms in David's life (compare, for example, the remarks on Ps. 41) should be abandoned. Duhm's commentary is the work of an expository genius, compact, clear-cut, illuminating, marked by a speculative daring that often throws a flood of light upon obscure passages or gives to what had become a platitude the interest of a newly discovered truth. But it has the defects of its author's other work. It is very one-sided, and maintains a theory of the origin of the Psalter in the late Maccabean period which conflicts with the external evidence and involves serious intrinsic improbabilities.[31] Nevertheless, if the reader does not allow himself to be dazzled by Duhm, he can probably learn from his pregnant pages more about the crucial problems of the Psalter, and in a shorter space of time, than from any other commentary.

As compared with the three works just mentioned, Briggs's commentary is a vast thesaurus of statistical facts. In its learning it is like one of the post-reformation Biblical treatises rather than a modern work. One can well believe that the labor of forty years, as the author informs us, has been crammed into its more than one thousand closely printed pages. As an example of erudition, this commentary is likely to remain a monument to one of the most learned American scholars of this generation. But is it an illuminating commentary? Does it make stimulating and suggestive contributions to the solution of the problems above referred to? This, if the present reviewer may be permitted to

[31] For instance, the view that we have whole series of violently polemical psalms, both Pharisaic and Sadducean, incorporated in our Psalter. How both these hostile groups of psalms could have been inserted into the Psalter in the short space of time which Duhm allows for its compilation after they were written, is not made clear.

express himself with absolute candor, it does not always appear to do. It is possible that Briggs's positions have not all been fully understood. The book is no easy reading. Its style is not infrequently opaque; the author's "buts" and "fors," when he provides them, often refer (like those of the Johannine gospel and epistles) to something in his own mind rather than to anything actually expressed, and the student is left to infer as best he can the connections which the writer may have had in mind. But those parts of the commentary which will be most severely criticised in what follows have been studied with care, and the effort honestly made to understand the positions to which exception has been taken.

Briggs's introduction treats at length of the Text, the Higher Criticism, the Canonicity, and the Interpretation of the Psalter. Under the caption "Higher Criticism" (pp. liv–xcii) are discussed the origin and growth of the Psalter as a collection, and an entirely new theory on this subject is advanced. Briefly, it is as follows: There was first an early collection of six *miktam* psalms (the word being explained after the rabbinic etymology as "golden" or "choice" psalms) made in the early Persian period. There was also a collection of thirteen *maskil* psalms (explained as "meditative poems") made in the late Persian period. About the same time (late Persian) the Davidic collection of psalms was formed, originally sixty-eight in number, although in the present Psalter we have seventy-four. This was the first of the minor psalters, andinto it were inserted all the *miktam* psalms and six of the *maskilim*. Next in order came the two originally independent collections of the Korah and Asaph psalms (late Persian or early Greek period). The Asaph collection adopted two of the *maskilim* not appropriated by the Davidic collection, and the Korah psalter adopted four others. The next stage in the evolution was the collection (early Greek period) of fifty-seven *mizmorim* (the technical word for "psalms"), which was a selection from the existing collections of certain of the Davidic, Asaph, and Korah psalms with the addition of a few others. This was apparently followed by the elohistic psalter (Pss. 42–83), a group of psalms in which the name Elohim is regularly used for God, although in their original form many of these psalms used Jahveh (middle

Greek period). It is inferred from the use of the divine name Elohim that this psalter was composed in Babylonia (a very precarious inference). The elohistic psalter also was made up of selections from David, Korah, and the *mizmorim*, and included all of Asaph. About the same time there came into existence in Palestine another psalter, containing fifty-five psalms, and known as the "director's psalter," this being Briggs's interpretation of the phrase which the English Bible renders "for the chief musician." Then arose the groups of *hallels* and pilgrim psalms, which were mainly compiled in the Greek period. In the Maccabean period the Psalter received its final shape, being divided into the five books which we find at present.

Both from the method and the results of this section of the introduction a thorough-going dissent must be recorded. In the first place, it seems to the present reviewer that the subject is approached from the wrong angle. The treatment is dominated by the chronological point of view, and an attempt is made to indicate the gradual growth of the Psalter out of preceding minor collections. This is all very well, but first of all it should be proved that such preceding minor collections existed. This is not done: we have merely the statement, "This is the way the Psalter grew," and the reader is left to guess which of the multitudinous facts presented in the course of the discussion would have been used to support the theory, if the author had chosen to state his argument. The complaint is not that the facts, or at least the more important ones, in support of a critical decomposition of the Psalter are not given, but rather that because of the chronological arrangement of the material facts which naturally go together and throw light upon each other and upon the critical structure of the Psalter, are violently separated and thus lose a large part of their evidential force.

In order to illustrate the confusion which arises from the chronological arrangement of the material, it may be well briefly to indicate the evidence commonly employed in the critical analysis of the Psalter, and then to show how this material is utilized by Dr. Briggs.

Criticism has usually started, and with obvious propriety, from the division of the Psalter into five books, a division plainly

indicated by the doxologies that stand at the end of the first four books. The doxologies, therefore, give us our first clue. On nearer inspection this fivefold division is seen to have been superimposed upon a more fundamental threefold division, the key to which is the alternation in the use of the divine names. Book I is a homogeneous collection of Davidic psalms, in which Jahveh is regularly used; in Books II–III, Elohim is regularly used; in Books IV–V, Jahveh is again used. Thus the elohistic redaction of the middle books of the Psalter furnishes our second important clue to the analysis. It will be observed that the doxology at the end of Book I coincides with a critical line of cleavage. If we turn to Books II–III, in which the elohistic psalms are found, four very distinct groups emerge: (*a*) a Korah Elohim-group (Pss. 42–49); (*b*) a Davidic Elohim-group (Pss. 51–72); (*c*) an Asaph Elohim-group (Pss. 73–83); (*d*) a Korah Jahveh-group (Pss. 84–89).[32]

The first thing that strikes the attention in this analysis is that the elohistic redaction does not quite coincide with the division into books. We should expect the dividing line, marked by the doxology, to fall at the end of the elohistic psalms (that is, after Ps. 83), and that Psalms 84–89, which are Jahveh psalms, would be combined with the Jahveh psalms of Books IV–V. On the other hand, this little group is principally a Korah group with close affinities to the elohistic Korah-group. The suggestion has been made that Psalms 84–89 are an appendix to the elohistic psalter. If so, the doxology at the end of Book III (Ps. 89 52) is again seen to have critical significance. Further, it would seem proper to postulate a somewhat different literary history for the two groups of Korah psalms. Otherwise, it is difficult to see why they did not all suffer an elohistic redaction.

In the second place, the elohistic redaction is unexpectedly broken in two by the division between Books II and III, again marked by the doxology, Ps. 72 18 f., and also by the remarkable editorial note, Ps. 72 20. Because of this division the Korah and Davidic Elohim-psalms are classed together and, with one Asaph psalm (Ps. 50), are separated from the group of Asaph

[32] Psalm 50 is an isolated Asaph psalm inserted between the Korah and Davidic psalms. The significance of its position is discussed below.

Elohim-psalms. The anomalous position of Ps. 72 20 has always been recognized; but the very peculiarity of its position gives it an unusual critical significance. It points to the necessity of a critical analysis both of what precedes and of what follows. It proves that the Davidic group (Pss. 51–72) must have once existed apart from the Korah group (Pss. 42–49), for this note is only appropriate at the end of a *homogeneous* Davidic collection. And we may go a step further with considerable probability. The Korah group (Pss. 42–49) and the Asaph group (Pss. 73–83) are the psalms of the two great levitical singing-guilds. They would naturally, therefore, be grouped together. The fact that this is not the case, but that the Korah group is illogically combined with the Davidic group to form Book II, strongly suggests that a collection of Korah and Davidic psalms was made before these were combined with the Asaph psalms to make up the Elohim psalter. Probably, then, the homogeneous group of Asaph psalms also had at one time an independent existence. It thus appears that the collections of the Davidic, the Korah, and the Asaph elohistic psalms all had once an independent existence; that the Davidic and Korah psalms were then grouped together in our present Book II; and, finally, that these two groups were combined with the Asaph psalms into the present Elohim psalter (Pss. 42–83).

But the editorial note, Ps. 72 20, enables us to draw still another inference. The writer of this note could not have known of any of the Davidic psalms that follow it in the present Psalter. Consequently, the scattered Davidic psalms in Books III and IV and the groups of Davidic psalms in Book V probably had a different literary history from the homogeneous Davidic Elohim-psalms of Book II. On the other hand, the relationship of the Davidic Elohim-group of Book II to the Davidic Jahveh-group of Book I is an unsettled question. Did these two groups originally form one collection, of which Ps. 72 20 was the conclusion, or are they independent parallel collections? To the present reviewer the latter view has always seemed more probable on general principles; but the relationship between the two Davidic psalters is further complicated by the fact that Psalm 16 is found, as Psalm 53, in an elohistic redaction—a positive proof that in the elohistic psalms we are dealing with a distinct psalter.

It will be seen from the above that the doxologies at the end of Books I, II, and III indicate correct critical divisions of the Psalter. The case is different with Ps. 106 48, the final doxology of Book IV. It is admitted on all hands that this division is critically unsound. Psalms 105–107 form a very closely connected group of psalms. Their separation by the doxology into different books is unfortunate, and the division evidently artificial. Books IV–V are therefore generally regarded as in reality making up one collection. Within it, however, the pilgrim psalms (Pss. 120–134) stand out very distinctly and can most probably be regarded as forming a minor psalter.

In the above analysis, which sums up in general outline the evidence for a critical structure of the Psalter as it has been developed in the last twenty-five years, the following collections emerge with distinctness: (1) a Davidic collection constituting Book I; (2) the Davidic collection of Book II (probably originally distinct from the collection of Book I); (3) the Korah and Asaph collections of Books II and III; (4) the elohistic psalter, which represents a combination of the second collection of Davidic psalms with the Korah and Asaph psalms, together with a Korah appendix; (5) a great collection of miscellaneous psalms (Books IV–V); within which (6) the pilgrim psalms stand out as a homogeneous collection, also no doubt originally a minor psalter.

Let us now turn to some illustrations of the way in which Briggs makes use of this material. In the first place, the discussion of the doxologies, which we have seen to be the natural starting-point of the investigation, is deferred to the end of the analysis. This is due to the chronological arrangement of the material. Briggs believes that the doxologies were inserted by the final editor of the Psalter. Hence they are discussed last. Even granting that they are due to the final editor (though this is very much to be doubted in the case of the first three), they have been shown to mark lines of critical cleavage. Hence, if the object is to show how the Psalter should be analyzed into earlier minor psalters, the postponement of all mention of the doxologies to the end of the discussion is most unfortunate; it prevents any use of this first clue to the analysis.

In the next place, the treatment of the elohistic psalter stands

midway in the discussion, after the reader has already had to accept largely on faith the *miktam*, *maskil*, Davidic, Korah, Asaph, and *mizmorim* psalters. The discussion of the elohistic psalter (§ 32) is entirely separated from the discussion of the threefold division of the Psalter (§ 38), with which it would naturally be connected, because the compilation of the elohistic psalter preceded in point of time the present threefold arrangement.[33]

Again, the critical use made of Ps. 72 20 must be regarded as wholly inadequate. It is used only to confirm the supposition of a Davidic psalter (§ 27). It is not used to disintegrate the elohistic psalter into its original elements. One might as well pass a current of electricity through water and say that the result was two parts of hydrogen, with the oxygen totally ignored. The domination of the chronological point of view would again seem to be responsible for this failure to make full use of Ps. 72 20. Each of the groups—Davidic, Korah, and Asaph—is treated by itself in the supposed chronological order of their origin and without reference to the other groups. As Ps. 72 20 is attached to the Davidic group, it is mentioned only in connection with that group, and the indirect bearing which its position gives it upon the separation of the Korah and Asaph groups is not mentioned. Thus the doxologies, the peculiarity of the elohistic psalter, and Ps. 72 20, which, taken together, are the clues to the critical analysis of the Psalter, lose almost all their evidential force through the chronological disposition of the material adopted by Briggs.

But what, then, it may be asked, is the evidence which Briggs adduces in favor of the existence of minor psalters previous to

[33] The threefold division of course implies the artificiality of the doxology at the end of Book IV (Ps. 106 48). But in discussing the threefold division, nothing is said as to this implication. The artificiality of the doxology as the closing doxology of Book IV is, indeed, implied at § 35, where the attempt is made to show that there was a *hallel* psalter, and at § 40, where the connection of Ps. 106 48 with 1 Chron. 16 36 is discussed. But the bearing of Briggs's view of this doxology upon the book divisions is not brought out where we should expect it to be. Briggs further holds that this doxology was arbitrarily inserted by the final editor. This is by no means so probable as the view that the doxology originally belonged to the psalm, and that the unfortunate division into books was made at this point because the doxology already stood here.

our present Psalter? Strictly speaking, none whatever. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not mean to convey the impression that no facts which might have been used as evidence are mentioned. I only mean that their evidential value is not pointed out. The nearest approach to an argument for a minor psalter is found in § 27, which treats of the Davidic psalter. Briggs starts from the phrase in the title of these psalms *le-david*, ambiguously translated in the Revised Version, "*Of David.*" Until comparatively recent times it has been commonly held that the preposition *le* denoted authorship, and was to be translated "by." Briggs departs from this traditional view, saying:

> The *le* is not the *le* of authorship, as has generally been supposed. The earliest collection of Pss. for use in the synagogue was made under the name of David, the traditional father of religious poetry and of the temple worship. The later editors left this name in the titles, with the preposition *le* attached, to indicate that these Psalms belonged to that collection. This explains all the facts of the case and the position of these Pss. in the Psalter. This view is confirmed by Ps. 72 20, which states that this Ps. was the conclusion of the prayers of David, and implies that the collection was a prayer-book.

The argument of this paragraph would seem to be that the preposition *le* implied a Davidic psalter, and that this is confirmed by Ps. 72 20. But this begs the whole question. The correctness of the interpretation of the *le* is assumed, not proved. Briggs's view of its meaning is a favorite one at the present time, and may be correct, but it is distinctly debatable, and has a number of weighty arguments against it. One of the objections to the assumed interpretation of *le* is found in the very passage cited in its support, Ps. 72 20. The editor who appended this note must certainly have thought that David was the author of the preceding psalms. But if so, the title *le-david* must already have stood at the head either of each psalm or of the collection, and must have been understood to imply authorship. As this editorial note would seem to be regarded by Briggs (and quite correctly) as appended to the original Davidic collection, it indicates that the theory of the meaning of *le* which he rejects existed as early as the first stages in the evolution of the Psalter. Since Briggs's interpretation of the *le* plays so large a part in his theory of the Psalter,

surely it ought to have been exegetically and linguistically justified, and not simply assumed.[34]

Whether the phrase *lamenaṣṣeḥ* usually translated, "For the chief musician," indicates a director's psalter, is again a debatable question. The statement is simply made that the *le* has the same meaning in this phrase which Briggs assigns to it in the phrase *le-david*. But whether the *le* in these psalm-titles always has the same significance is just the problem which requires discussion. When, for example, in the title to Ps. 51 we find both phrases, *lamenaṣṣeḥ*, *le-david*, the question presses as to whether we have a right to interpret *le* both times in the same way. What we want is proof, not assumption. Yet it is not impossible that there really may have been a director's psalter, and this theory was also advocated by Beer. One piece of evidence for it is found in the fact that the obscure musical or liturgical directions are only found in these director-psalms, though they by no means occur in all of them. Briggs notices this fact, but as usual fails to point out its evidential force. So far as the *miktam*, *maskil*, *mizmor*, and *hallel* psalms are concerned, where the preposition *le* does not appear, no attempt whatever is made to prove that they once formed independent collections. It is simply asserted that they did so. There is a possibility that the *hallel* psalms which appear in certain groups in Book V may have formed a psalter, but the contrast

[34] When it is said in the above citation that the meaning of the *le* adopted "explains all the facts of the case and the position of these Pss. in the Psalter," we have an instance of one of those sovereign dicta which are altogether too frequent in this commentary, and whose effect is irritating rather than reassuring. In this connection it may be noted that from the theory that the *le* does not imply authorship the conclusion is reached that all the psalms are anonymous except Psalms 72, 88, 89, 90, and (strangely enough) 102. These are all held to be pseudonymous. Even in the thirteen cases where historical notices are attached to the title *le-david*, it is denied that the editor understood the *le* of authorship, on the ground that "it is altogether improbable . . . that an editor of the middle Persian period could have thought that his references to experiences of David were historical." Briggs's theory is that by means of these historical notices the editor simply wished to illustrate the psalms, and not to express an opinion as to their author, a theory already tentatively suggested by Beer (Individual- und Gemeinde-Psalmen, p. lxxxviii), but which is distinctly improbable in view of the strong Davidic tradition which is known to have existed at the time when most of the psalms were composed (cf. the Chronicler).

with the very clearly defined pilgrim songs in the same book rather suggests the opposite view. The *miktam* psalms also form a little group (Pss. 16, 56–60); but there is no critical reason, apart from the fact that they stand together, for holding that they formed an independent collection. The *maskilim* are, to be sure, mainly concentrated in Books II–III (eleven out of the thirteen *maskilim* are found in these two books), but they are scattered through these books in a haphazard manner, while the *mizmorim* are shuffled through all the five books in a way that is now wholly unintelligible. There are no critical indications of psalters in the case of these psalms, which are not even clearly grouped, and the question presses whether in these cases Briggs is not following phantom psalters.

At this point we meet with another of Briggs's assumptions. The objection just raised, drawn from the unmethodical distribution of the psalms in the psalters, is met by the assumption that all the psalms which had a common element in their titles once stood together, and that their present distribution through the Psalter is due to various revisions. So far as I have been able to observe, no evidence for this view is offered, and the unorganized character of the *maskilim*, *mizmorim*, and even the *hallel* psalms, where there are no critical evidences for the existence of independent psalters, as contrasted with the Davidic, Asaph, and Korah psalms, where there are such evidences, makes strongly against the theory. When the same theory is applied to the Korah and Davidic psalms, it is equally gratuitous. Briggs assumes that the elohistic Korah-psalms and the Jahvistic Korah-psalms once stood together, but that the present position of the Jahvistic Korah-group (Pss. 84–89) was due to the final redactor. Why all the Korah psalms were not adopted into the elohistic psalter, if they once stood together, he does not tell us.[35] In the same way, he assumes that the Davidic Jahveh group of Book I and the Davidic Elohim group of Book II once stood together, though it is again difficult to see why only a part of the Davidic psalms were selected from the original psalter for elo-

[35] We have seen that the greater probability is that the two groups of psalms had a different literary history, and that the Jahveh group was an appendix to the Elohim psalter, not an insertion by the final editor.

histic redaction.[36] He further assumes that the Davidic psalms of Books III–IV also stood in the same general collection, and therefore transfers them in imagination to a place before the editorial note, Ps. 72 20. This procedure would of course overturn the argument advanced above from this note, that the Davidic psalms in the later books were unknown to the editor who was responsible for Ps. 72 20; but at the same time it calmly ignores what has usually been held to be one of the best clews to a true analysis of the Psalter. As a matter of fact, as we shall see, Briggs himself distinguishes certain Davidic psalms in Book V from the other Davidic psalms in the later books, and denies that they stood in the original Davidic psalter.[37]

If a true presentation of Briggs's method of discussion has been given thus far, it is clear that the student who wishes to find any formal justification of the critical analysis advocated in the commentary will be disappointed. Briefly stated, the argument can be reduced to the following: In the titles to a number of psalms the name of David occurs. Therefore there was a Davidic psalter. In another series of psalms *mizmor* is found in the title. Therefore there was a *mizmor* collection. Sometimes both the name of David and *mizmor* occur in the same title; in such cases the editor of the *mizmor* psalter took over the psalm from the Davidic psalter. If, in addition to *le-david* and *mizmor* the phrase

[36] The fact that Psalm 16 appears, as Psalm 53, in an elohistic redaction, and the bearing of this upon the right to assume an independent elohistic psalter, is not even referred to in the chapter on Higher Criticism, though it is noted in the chapter on the Text. This omission shows how oblivious our author is of the necessity of first proving the existence of independent minor psalters in the present compilation.

[37] Much labor is given to the establishment of the supposed original order of the Davidic Psalms (p. lxiv), but the results are far from convincing, and do not seem to throw any light either upon the critical analysis of the Psalter or upon the interpretation of the psalms. It may also be noted that Psalm 50 is supposed to have originally stood with the other Asaph psalms (Psalms 73–83). This is possible; its present position is at first sight anomalous. It is variously explained by our author as due to the desire of an editor "to make an appropriate concluding Ps. to the first division of 50" (p. lxvi), and as "giving an appropriate liturgical close [in what respect is Psalm 50 liturgical?] to this [Korah] group before the penitential Psalm 51" (p. lxxii). The propriety of the word "appropriate" in these citations may be questioned. The real reason for the present position of the psalm would seem to be its topical connection with the present form of Psalm 51. Both psalms are anti-sacrificial.

lamenaṣṣeḥ is found, this means that the psalm was first in the Davidic, then in the *mizmor*, and finally in the director's psalter (cf. Psalm 62), and so on indefinitely. All this is stated as if it were self-evident; no proof is given for the theory advocated. The discussion is so formulated as to show, not that there were original minor psalters behind our present Psalter, but, such psalters being assumed, their chronological relationships are stated, and thus is indicated the growth of the present Psalter from its first beginnings to its final form.

The criticism thus far made has been upon this chronological method of approach. This method does not allow the evidence for the existence of previous psalters to be marshalled in any adequate way. But has not our criticism after all been somewhat captious? Is it fair to judge a writer by what he does not set out to do, rather than by what he actually undertakes? Briggs sets out to show what he believes to be the chronological stages of the growth of the Psalter. This he does very clearly. The reader can easily follow the orderly sequence, *miktamim*, *maskilim*, David, Korah, Asaph, *mizmorim*, and the rest. May not the advantages of this method of presenting the subject, by which the student is enabled to grasp without difficulty the theory propounded, compensate for the disadvantages which have been noted?

But even if we thus consider this chronological mode of treatment simply on its positive side, and judge it by what it does do and not by what it fails to do, we immediately encounter a grave difficulty. Turn again to the title of Psalm 62. The three elements in this title are chief-musician, *mizmor*, David, arranged in this order. On Briggs's theory of the titles these represent three minor psalters. But this order is not the chronological order of the psalters. Briggs adopts the order David, *mizmor*, director. What are the principles upon which he bases his view of the chronological relationship of the various psalters?

It is noteworthy that only once in Briggs's entire discussion does he make use of any external evidence. In discussing, namely, the date of the director's psalter, he refers to the fact that the term *lamenaṣṣeḥ* is found again in Habakkuk 3 19. This,

he says, was taken from the director's psalter, though he gives no proof of this statement. Hence Habakkuk 3 is subsequent to the director. But since the prophetic canon was closed by the time of Ben Sira (219–198 B.C.), therefore the director's psalter also must have been composed before this time, that is, in the middle Greek period.

This almost total neglect of the external evidence in determining the date of the Psalter is in the present reviewer's estimation a very serious omission.[38] The formula for the use of internal evidences of date is a simple one: the date of the latest psalm in an assumed collection is the *terminus ad quem* of the compilation of that collection.

But at this point a new difficulty emerges. The Davidic psalter is held to have been closed in the late Persian period, because on grounds of internal evidence no Davidic psalms were composed later than this period. But there are psalms with *le-david* in their titles which are assigned by Briggs himself, again on the basis of internal evidence, to the Greek period. How is this contradiction avoided? By supposing that the Davidic titles in the Greek psalms are not genuine old titles. Attention is also called in this connection to the tendency present in later times, as is evidenced by the versions, to ascribe psalms to David. Now if evidence independent of the internal criteria of the psalms themselves had been advanced for the completion of the Davidic psalter in the Persian period, it would perhaps be legitimate to exclude psalms of the Greek period from the original Davidic psalter of the Persian period. But if the dates of the minor psalters are regularly determined by the dates of the latest psalms in them, it seems distinctly fallacious, to put it very mildly, to assign the Davidic psalter to the Persian period in spite of the fact that some psalms with Davidic titles admittedly date from the Greek period.

The entire theory of the evolution of the Psalter as elaborated

[38] It is not treated even in the section on Canonicity, where the omission of any reference to external evidence is even more striking. The whole section on Canonicity is, it may be remarked, rather elementary, and is mainly taken up with a defence of the imprecatory psalms. The discussion seems to move upon the old assumption that the canonicity of a Biblical book can be vindicated by means of its religious, doctrinal, and ethical contents.

in the introduction thus turns out to be built exclusively upon the criticism of the individual psalms which compose the several subsidiary collections. But, unfortunately, the discussion of the dates of the psalms is rigorously excluded from the introduction. Only the tabular results of the conclusions reached in the body of the commentary are presented. It is a pity that the reader could not have been apprised at the outset of some of the general landmarks by which the attempt is made to date the psalms in the ensuing detailed discussions. If only a few words could have been said, for example, on the relation of the Psalter to the Law or to Second Isaiah or to Job, to the development of Individualism or ethical monotheism, if it could have been shown toward which of the two poles, to the JE narratives of Genesis or to Chronicles, the Psalter inclines, the student could have formed some idea of what to expect in the following pages. As it is, he must plunge unprepared into the swollen stream of detailed criticism that flows through the nine hundred and sixty-seven pages of the commentary proper. It must be said that the very important section on the Higher Criticism of the Psalter is thoroughly unsatisfactory. The method of presentation adopted results in a complete disorganization of the proofs of the evolution of the Psalter in the interest of a formally clear presentation of the assumed chronological stages of evolution. But when the chronological theory thus propounded is examined, it is found to be based on a mechanical principle, which the author himself does not always adhere to, and for proof of which the reader is referred to the body of the commentary. The process is nothing short of bewildering to one who is not already acquainted with the criticism of the Psalter, while to one who is acquainted with this the result carries no conviction.

With regard to Briggs's actual theory of the dates of the psalms, only the results of his investigation and one or two tests of his method can be here given.

Briggs assigns seven psalms to the early monarchy before Jehoshaphat, seven to the middle monarchy, thirteen to the late monarchy (altogether twenty-seven pre-exilic psalms, a goodly proportion as modern critics go), thirteen to the exile, thirty-three to the early Persian period, sixteen to the times of Nehe-

miah, eleven to the late Persian period, fourteen to the early Greek period, forty-one to the later Greek period, and eight to the period of the Maccabees. These results seem precise. But for that very reason they awaken suspicion; can the psalms be so accurately distributed over all these centuries of development? This suspicion is strengthened when one observes that the *miktam* psalms (Pss. 16, 56–60) are distributed over several centuries. If any group of psalms bear on their face the marks of homogeneity, it is these. Duhm assigns Psalms 56–59 tentatively to one author, certainly to the same period.

The attitude which a commentator assumes toward the question of Maccabean and pre-exilic psalms is one of the surest touchstones of his critical ability. On the one hand, the fact that only eight Maccabean psalms (Pss. 33, 102b, 109b, 118, 139c, 147, 149, 129) are accepted represents a wholesome and timely reaction against Duhm and his followers, who would bring the larger part of the Psalter down to the Maccabean period, and much of it to the latter part of the period. On the other hand, the assignment of twenty-seven psalms to the pre-exilic period, and seven of these (Pss. 7, 13, 18, 23, 24b, 60a, and 110) to the very early monarchy, is most precarious. A few illustrations of the method of dating these earlier psalms will show what weight is to be attached to some, at least, of Briggs's conclusions. On Psalm 7, which the conservative Baethgen assigns to the Persian period and Duhm to a very late period, Briggs observes that there is nothing to prevent its being as early as David. In this particular case his judgment seems to be somewhat influenced by the title, though in general he rejects the titles as authoritative. Regarding Psalm 13, which Baethgen and Duhm make no attempt to date exactly but which is closely related to the other psalms of persecution or martyrdom in Book I, it is stated that there is no internal evidence against a date as early as David, and the claim is actually made that "the author of 2 Sam. 1 19–27 might have written it." The attempt to fix the date of Psalm 23 must be regarded as a peculiarly striking instance of ineffective argument. "The language and syntax of the Ps.," says Dr. Briggs, "and all its ideals are early. There is not the slightest trace of anything that is post-deuteronomic. The his-

torical circumstances of the poet must have been peaceful and prosperous." On the basis of this characterization of the psalm, the possibility of its composition in the prosperous Greek or late Persian periods is denied. The exile and early restoration are ruled out because they are times of sorrow and because the singer is able to resort to the temple.[39] The reference to the temple also rules out David, and properly so. The troubled times of the Assyrian and Babylonian periods are dismissed for the same reason as the exile. Hence the psalm is assigned to "an earlier and simpler period, the days of the early monarchy, not earlier than Solomon, or later than Jehoshaphat." So far as the language of the psalm is concerned, this does not prevent Baethgen from assigning it to the post-exilic period or Duhm from regarding it as Maccabean. Apart from the argument from language, is it really to be supposed that no pious Israelite or Jew could have spoken with the quiet confidence of this psalm except in the period between Solomon and Jehoshaphat? As to its ideals, Briggs expressly admits that "the three figures, shepherd, guide, host, are all simple, natural, and characteristic of the life in Jerusalem and its vicinity at any period in Biblical history." As a matter of fact the figure of the shepherd is especially prominent in Second Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, and might suggest that the psalm was subsequent to these writers. That a psalm of only six verses should be dated before Deuteronomy because it lacks any post-deuteronomic characteristics, is surely a most fragile argument from silence. In fact Psalm 23 cannot be dated by itself alone. The only safe method of procedure is to attempt to fix the approximate date of the group of psalms with which it is most naturally associated.[40] These illustrations do not awaken much confidence in the principles of historical criticism underlying them, and doubt becomes despair when we find Psalm 110 tentatively brought into connection with the victory of Jehoshaphat recounted in 2 Chron. 20. Moreover, many of Briggs's results are only obtained by the assumption of more or

[39] The reading of the LXX at vs. 6b is adopted, cf. R. V.

[40] Psalm 23 is very closely related to Psalm 27, so closely in fact that it is not impossible that they had a common author (cf. Duhm). But Briggs ascribes Psalm 27 to the middle monarchy.

less extensive glosses or accretions.[41] Psalms which in their present form are shown either by language or by religious and other ideas to be late, may be dated earlier if these modernisms can be eliminated as glosses. The assumption of the possibility of glosses is theoretically entirely legitimate. Hymns are notoriously tinkered with, and it can be demonstrated in the case of the duplicate psalms that the hymns of the Psalter are no exception. The question is whether the glosses and accretions can be successfully detected. It is at this point that we touch Briggs's metrical analyses of the psalms. It is poetical considerations, metre and strophical arrangement, that are most often used as clues to the detection of glosses. It will therefore be necessary to turn our attention for a few moments to the next great problem which confronts us in the Psalter, the problem of Hebrew poetry.

Hebrew metrics forms one of the most technical and most vexed questions in Old Testament study. Briggs has been for a generation a valiant champion of the existence of Hebrew metre, and has contributed perhaps more than any other American scholar to the advancement of this particular subject. It has been more and more recognized that in Hebrew poetry we have on *a priori* grounds every right to expect some sort of a metrical system. The difficulty has been to determine what are the exact principles of that system. Briggs long ago adopted the principles of the German scholar, Julius Ley, in which the accents or tone-syllables are laid at the foundation of Hebrew metre, and he has lived to see these principles, which were at first regarded with great skepticism, adopted by a steadily increasing number of scholars. Yet there is a weakness in the so-called accentual system of Ley and Briggs. If accents or tones alone are counted, we do not get any real metre. This defect was pointed out by Sievers, who insisted that the falls and pauses, as well as the accents or rises, must be counted in. Ley himself, in articles published since his death in 1901, seems finally to have

[41] So, in the case of Psalm 110 just cited, and most notably in the case of Psalm 18. The two other parts of psalms assigned to the early monarchy, Ps. 24 7 ff. and 60 6 ff. have perhaps a more defensible claim to antiquity than those which have been noticed.

recognized this defect, but Briggs seems to be still skeptical of the value of Sievers's supplement to Ley's system (p. xli).

Our author does not go into the technicalities of this subject beyond giving a few general rules for counting the tones.[42] He holds that there are four measures in the Psalms: trimeters or three-toned lines (these being the most frequent), tetrameters, pentameters (a measure particularly investigated by Budde, and with great success), and hexameters. The existence of two-toned lines is denied (against Duhm). All the psalms are stretched or contracted to fit these measures.

Briggs also holds to a strophical arrangement of most of the psalms. The strophes are primarily determined "by a more decided separation in the thought of the poem," and by noting the relationships of the several poetical parallelisms. In other words, while the metre of the different lines is closely connected with textual criticism, the determination of the strophe is intimately allied with exegesis.

The present reviewer cannot claim to be an expert in the department of Hebrew metres; his judgments are those of a layman. But his impressions are that a very large amount of truth must be admitted in Briggs's metrical system. Many of the psalms lend themselves with but little emendation to a consistent metrical scheme. In many the emendations which are supported, independently of the metre, by purely text-critical or exegetical considerations enable the student to recover the strophical analysis, and therewith restore the original beauty and meaning of the psalm. In such cases the result justifies the process. In seeing the psalm assume shape and color the student finds the same pleasure which a critic of paintings might take in watching the gradual restoration of an old masterpiece of which the lines and colors had become confused and dulled by the grime of ages. The exegetical and aesthetic value of such successful restorations can scarcely be overestimated. But there are a large number of instances in which it does not seem as if the accentual system

[42] For instance, monosyllabic words are not usually to be accented. Words of four or more syllables have a secondary accent, which is counted in the measure. The insertion of the conjunction *ve* before a monosyllable will justify giving to the latter the force of a tone.

or any other had as yet solved the metrical problem, and in which the strophical arrangement is correspondingly obscure. The hammering and sawing of the lines which at times Briggs finds necessary in order to bring his metres into accord, makes such a tremendous din that the music of the reconstructed psalm is fairly drowned out.[43]

What Smend says in reference to the interpretation of the psalms generally has a particular application to their metrical reconstruction and strophical analysis: "Every expert knows that many a psalm is like a fortress which defies a regular siege and can only be conquered by a lucky chance." In the present uncertainty in the field of Hebrew metre successful restorations or emendations depend more on deftness of exegesis, soundness of judgment in textual criticism, and poetic divination than on the system of metre adopted. In the two illustrations which I shall give of Briggs's poetical analyses, the criticisms will be made from the exegetical point of view. In the one case his siege-works seem to me to have utterly failed to reduce the fortress. In the other he has captured it with brilliant success.

Psalm 18 has always been a touchstone of the commentator's principles of historical criticism and of his exegetical tact. Upon it all those fall back who wish to defend the Davidic authorship of any of the psalms. At the present time no scholar who has been at all influenced by historical criticism will undertake to defend the psalm as it stands. Those who defend its Davidic authorship can only do so at the expense of its integrity. This is the course adopted by Briggs. The psalm is Davidic, but only after all that in his judgment is non-davidic has been eliminated. The question is whether these eliminations can be exegetically and text-critically justified. By the battering-rams of metre and strophe Briggs proposes to break through the outer bastions and get back to the old Davidic wall.

The metre of the psalm is the trimeter, and forms one of the most obvious examples of this measure to be found anywhere. It is in general so clear and consistent that departures from it

[43] As an example, note the carpentry-work that must be done on the *miktam* psalms. Psalm 59 has practically to be rewritten in order to bring it into a metrical scheme. Whether the result is poetry is another question.

at once arouse suspicion. In the majority of the emendations necessary to preserve the metre, considerations of textual criticism and exegesis enable us to cut out intruding elements with considerable assurance.[44] But these metrical emendations have little direct bearing upon Briggs's reconstruction of the psalm, except as they affect the structure of the strophes. It is the strophical analysis which is made the basis of Briggs's critical process.

We have seen that the strophical analysis depends primarily upon the understanding of the course of thought in the poem. In Psalm 18 there are two very clearly marked divisions: Part I, vss. 1–26, and Part II, vss. 32–50. Part I describes the deliverance of the singer from some great danger; the description is highly figurative and the precise nature of the danger is not revealed. Part II treats of the equipment for war of the singer by his God and his complete triumph over his enemies; the theme of Part II recalls Homer. Between these two sharply distinguished parts stands the obscure passage vss. 27–31.

If we examine Part I more attentively, it is found to break up into three clearly marked sections: (1) vss. 1–3, gratitude to God for deliverance; (2) vss. 4–19, the description of the singer's danger (very rhetorical and ornate); (3) vss. 20–26, the religious and ethical significance of the deliverance. This last section is an amplification of the closing thought of the second section (vs. 19b). In Part II the equipment of the warrior, his pursuit of the enemy, his triumph, and thanksgiving for victory follow in natural order; the whole, however, is woven more closely together, so that the transitions of thought are not quite so distinct as in Part I.

Is it possible to take one further step and discover a strophical analysis which will coincide with the logical analysis just made? If the student will turn to the second section of Part I (vss. 4–19), and read vss. 4, 5; vs. 6; vss. 9, 10; vss. 11, 12; vss. 13, 14 (omitting 13c, with LXX, as an accidental repetition of vs. 12b); vs. 15; vss. 16, 17; and vss. 18, 19, he will find that the subordinate divisions of the section naturally make little stanzas of four

[44] In the case of Psalm 18 we are happily in possession of four different recensions, Psalm 18, 2 Sam. 22, and the translation of both in the LXX.

lines each (quatrains). Only at vss. 7, 8, is this regular scheme interrupted. In these verses we have six lines; and it is not at all impossible that originally there was a quatrain here also.[45] Again, if the third section (vss. 20–26) be examined, and the reader count backward from the very perfect final quatrain (vss. 25, 26), it will be seen that vss. 23, 24, and 21, 22, will also give two excellent quatrains (the symmetry is still more evident in the Hebrew). This, to be sure, leaves vs. 20 hanging in the air; but vs. 20 is almost an exact duplicate of vs. 24, and may safely be rejected altogether. With the elimination of this verse the division into quatrains in vss. 4–26 becomes the most obvious division; and when it is once observed, it is also exegetically illuminating. The thoughts of the psalm are now seen to be chiselled out with great care, and their outlines are sharp and distinct. In the introductory section (vss. 1–3) we do not find the quatrain which we certainly should expect there; but a comparison with 2 Sam. 22 2–4 again shows that the text of the section is greatly corrupted, and the conjecture is entirely proper that it originally harmonized strophically with what follows.[46] In passing, the completeness of Part I, taken by itself, should be noticed. It is a rounded whole, composed with much artistic skill.

Now let us turn to Part II (vss. 32–50). If for the moment we omit vs. 32 from our reckoning and examine vss. 33–42, a beautiful quatrain division can be recognized: vss. 33–34, God's training of the feet and hands (participial construction in the Hebrew); vss. 35, 36, God's further equipment of the hero (second person; vs. 35 is admittedly corrupted and one line must be omitted, cf. 2 Sam. 22 36); vss. 37, 38, the warrior's pursuit (first person); vss. 39, 40, God's assistance in the pursuit (second person again; vs. 40b probably to be emended to second person with LXX [codices A and B] and Jerome); vss. 41, 42. With

[45] In the Hebrew there is metrical difficulty also at vss. 11, 12. But the text at this point is notoriously corrupt, as its inherent difficulties and a comparison with 2 Sam. 22 12, 13, testify.

[46] Whether the exact wording of the introduction can be recovered is another question. Emendations thus far proposed are not very convincing. Duhm's suggestion that there were originally eight lines (two quatrains) here would seem to be in the right direction.

the extra line omitted at vs. 35, for which there is warrant on other grounds, nothing could be more smooth, regular, and obvious than the division into quatrains in vss. 33–42. Yet this arrangement leaves vs. 32 hanging in the air just as the obvious arrangement of vss. 21–26 left vs. 20. But, curiously enough, just as vs. 20 was seen to be a duplicate of vs. 24, so vs. 32a is a duplicate of vs. 39a. Further, the thought and phraseology of vs. 32b are in well-marked antithesis to vs. 30a, that is, to a verse which we shall find to be a very suspicious element in a very suspicious passage. There is therefore good critical warrant for suspecting that vs. 32, at least in its present form, is not to be taken with what follows, although its thought is in keeping with the succeeding verses.

The strophical arrangement of vss. 43–50 presents considerable difficulties, which cannot be overcome without resort to the knife. The verses fall into two clearly marked sections: vss. 43–45 and vss. 46–50. If quatrains are found, they must agree with this division into sections, and the sections themselves be kept strophically distinct. In the case of vss. 43–45, verses 44 and 45 give a good quatrain; while vs. 43 contains only three lines. Is there any way to recover the missing line? To answer, we must turn to the other section.

In vss. 46–50, verses 46 and 47 will give a quatrain. Verse 49 is exegetically suspicious, for its spirit is wholly inconsistent with the context. In the context the speaker is distinctly hostile to the nations. Verse 49 is animated by benevolence toward the nations. Further, verses 48 and 50 are closely connected in the Hebrew by their grammatical construction. Those two facts suggest that vs. 49 is an interpolation. But even if verse 49 is eliminated, six lines still remain, whereas only four are desired. Accordingly, the suggestion has been made that the extra line at vs. 48 (either 48b or 48c) should be transposed to a place after vs. 43a, where it would fit admirably. The only other line that can be lopped off is vs. 50c; and there is justification for rejecting it, for this clause may well be an interpretative gloss by some editor who thought that David was the author of the psalm. Critically, this clause is on a level with the title.

The arrangement here suggested for vss. 43–50 is of course con-

jectural. Yet each step of the process has its own good reason, and the result is attractive, even if not entirely convincing. Part II of the psalm thus falls into a consistent series of quatrains, which, as in Part I, correspond admirably to the thought. But we cannot call Part II a consistent *whole* like Part I. It cannot originally have begun with vs. 33. The introduction must therefore be found in vss. 27–32, or else we must suppose it to be lost.

This leads us to the consideration of vss. 27–31 (32). These verses are exegetically unintelligible, and strophically impossible. Verse 31 is a formulation of the doctrine of monotheism in no organic connection with the context, which, whether we look at Part I or Part II, treats of God's relation to the singer, not of what God is in himself. Verse 30 might be regarded as a generalization based on the singer's experience, though why "the *word* of Jahveh" should be emphasized in Psalm 18 does not appear, and it is suspicious that clauses b and c are also found in Prov. 30 5. Moreover, difficulty has always been found with the text and the relation of vss. 27 and 28 (cf. 2 Sam. 22 28, 29). Verse 27 tells what God does for an afflicted people; vs. 28 what he does for the speaker. In what relation do these two thoughts stand? Again, vss. 27, 28, taken together, seem to be an application of the ethical principles embodied in vss. 21–26; but such an application is entirely unexpected and unnecessary, since vss. 20–26, as we have seen, fully explain what goes before. Verses 27, 28, thus form a sort of limping appendix. Of all these verses only vs. 29 seems in its picturesque concreteness to have any connection with Part II. Strophically also, this passage is hopeless. Verses 27, 28, might form a quatrain, if we could suppose that the speaker identified himself with the afflicted people; but vs. 29 is an isolated couplet, vs. 30 a three-line stanza, and vs. 31 a tetrameter couplet.

What, then, is the significance of this passage? Observe that vs. 27 unexpectedly refers to "the afflicted people"; vs. 30 is also a generalization (note the plural, "all them that take refuge"); and at vs. 31 we actually meet with the first person plural. Light at once dawns upon the passage if it is interpreted as a bit of liturgical padding inserted between the two main parts

of the psalm. But when this is once recognized, a further consequence is seen to follow. Since the introduction to Part II cannot be found in vss. 27–31 (32), it must be lost, and vs. 29 is probably a fragment of it. Further, when we ask ourselves what is the relation between the two main parts of the psalm, we fail to find any. The last part is usually taken as the interpretation of the first part, but in that case all real progress and movement must be denied to the psalm. We have seen that Part I is a self-consistent and artistically perfect whole, and so is Part II, with the exception of the missing introduction. The subject, spirit, and style of the two parts are entirely different. We have, therefore, two originally distinct psalms, and the liturgical passage vss. 27–31 was inserted when they were united.[47]

Let us now examine the analysis proposed by Briggs.

He also recognizes two parts, but they do not coincide with the two outlined above. His first part is found in vss. 1–19, his second in vss. 27–50. The intervening verses, 20–27, are eliminated, being themselves broken up into two little sections, (*a*) vss. 20–23 (eight lines), a legal gloss from the Persian period; (*b*) vss. 25–27 (eight lines), an ethical gloss from the Greek period. The elimination of these verses would appear to have no exegetical or strophical justification. Exegetically, they attach themselves immediately to vs. 19b, and amplify that clause in a way to round out the whole poem. Strophically, Briggs's view requires that vs. 24 go with what follows it, and vs. 27 with what precedes it. Since vss. 25, 26, form a perfect quatrain, we then have to suppose that it was preceded and followed by a couplet,—a supposition which we have seen to be not only unnecessary but improbable.[48]

The motive for the elimination of these verses is clear. They are, as Briggs says, inconsistent with the Davidic authorship of the psalm, hence they must go out. But another conclusion

[47] There have been many attempts to explain the critical difficulties of this psalm. I have used the scaffolding which others have reared, but I hope to have pointed out the real architectural outlines of Ps. 18 somewhat more clearly than has previously been done.

[48] Why Dr. Briggs should characterize one gloss as legal and Persian, and the other as ethical and Greek, when both begin with exactly the same sentence (vs. 20 = vs. 24), is hard to understand.

would seem to be the more natural one. Verses 20–27 are intimately connected with what precedes; and therefore at least the first part of the psalm cannot be by David. The only way this argument can be met is by showing that vss. 1–19 are so clearly Davidic that the rejection of vss. 20–26 becomes a necessity. Briggs accordingly argues for the primitive character of vss. 1–19, and compares the theophany in these verses to Judges 5. The comparison suggests to me just the opposite view. Verses 1–19 are good poetry, but only in the sense of being good conventionalized poetry; they are too formally correct to be primitive; Part I is in no sense creative. This, however, is a judgment of taste, and as such may or may not have argumentative value.

Briggs further breaks up each of his two parts into three fourteen-line (!) strophes. Without following this analysis into all its details, some of its more conspicuous infelicities may be pointed out. His first strophe of Part I combines vss. 4–6 with vss. 1–3. This is bad, for the description of the distress is then blended with the initial thanksgivings, whereas in reality there is a sharp break between vss. 1–3 and vss. 4 ff. Again, his first strophe of Part II combines vss. 28–32 with vss. 33, 34. This is worse, for the liturgical generalizations of vss. 28–31 should not be combined with the highly concrete and intimate descriptions which begin at vs. 33. But even in the form which Briggs gives to it this first strophe cannot be hewed out without resort to the most improbable suppositions. For example, vs. 30b is rejected while 30c is accepted. Yet both clauses are found together in Prov. 30 5; and why should they be torn apart here? So vs. 31 is admittedly a tetrameter, and admittedly monotheistic and as such out of relation with the context and inconsistent with Davidic authorship. If there was ever a good case for a gloss, one would think it would be found here. But Briggs emends the line into a trimeter, and turns its monotheism into henotheism in the couplet:

> For who is a God (like) Yahweh?
> And who is a Rock (like) our God?

It is difficult to follow such a procedure. Is it really responsible criticism? Furthermore, out of vss. 43–50 Briggs makes one of

his long stanzas. This is accomplished by the elimination, not only of vs. 49, for which there is good reason, but also of vss. 44b and 45. On the other hand, vs. 50c is retained, and thus the necessity of the transposition suggested above is avoided. The greater simplicity of this theory is an advantage, but the propriety of eliminating vss. 44b, 45, rather than vs. 50c, may be doubted, and we have already seen that the division into fourteen-line stanzas has broken down completely at two crucial points. Elsewhere it is so awkward as compared with the division into quatrains that no adequate justification for attempting to find a fourteen-line stanza in vss. 43–50 can be drawn from the fact that the rest of the psalm is so divided. To the present reviewer Briggs's poetical analysis of Psalm 18 appears to have no exegetical basis in the text, but on the contrary is opposed to all the exegetical probabilities of the case. The attempt to save the Davidic authorship by the supposition of glosses and accretions is in the present instance a failure.[49]

It is a pleasure to turn from Briggs's analysis of Psalm 18 to his restoration of Psalm 73. Psalm 73 is one of the greatest of the whole collection; it is the hymn of an original religious genius. In his work upon this psalm we see Briggs's poetical analysis at its best, and we cannot be too grateful to him for the thorough and convincing way in which he has restored to us this masterpiece in all its rugged grandeur.

Psalm 73, like Psalm 18, falls into two parts: Part I, vss. 1–12, the recognition by the poet of the prosperity of the wicked; Part II, vss. 13–28, the effect of this recognition upon the poet's faith. Can these two parts again be broken up into exegetically justified strophical divisions? In the present instance this question is complicated with that of the identification of the speaker. From vs. 1 it might be argued that the "I" of the speaker is collective, and refers to the personified congregation of the godly. On the

[49] The only portion of the psalm which might lay claim to Davidic authorship is Part II. Here there are a number of details which would seem to fit David, or an idealized David, better than any other character in Israel's history, but here language and literary connections (compare vss. 44, 45, with Micah 7 17, especially in the peculiarities of the Hebrew) make the Davidic authorship very dubious, even if the authenticity of this psalm were treated solely by itself and apart from considerations of the growth of the Psalter as a whole.

other hand, an examination of the rest of the psalm would suggest that if there is an individual speaker anywhere in the Psalter, it is here. The feeling in the psalm is poignant and personal to the last degree. Briggs rightly feels this, and accordingly holds that vs. 1 is a liturgical gloss. The strophical analysis will therefore begin with vs. 2. A division into quatrains can be readily followed through the rest of Part I (vss. 2, 3; vss. 4, 5; vss. 6, 7; vss. 8, 9) until we reach vss. 10–12. Here there are two lines too many. Verse 10 is eliminated by Briggs, and on good grounds. The verse is very obscure (it would seem to be promissory); and it interrupts the connection, since vs. 11 naturally tells what the wicked men of vs. 9 say. With vss. 1 and 10 thus eliminated on entirely intelligible grounds,[50] Part I is seen to fall into five quatrains.

In Part II there is an exegetical difficulty. The "for" at vs. 21 does not attach itself readily to what immediately precedes, and would seem rather to refer to vss. 15, 16. Thus the syntax suggests that vss. 17–20 may be an interpolation. The verses contain a description of the final lot of the wicked in terms of the theology of Job's friends. If they are retained, the poet, though cast down by the thought of the present prosperity of the wicked, yet takes comfort in the belief that they will ultimately be punished. After this he is ready to cast himself upon God, vss. 23 ff. But how much the psalm gains in power when vss. 17–20 are omitted! The psalmist realizes the great theological difficulties which the prosperity of the wicked presents, and has no solution for them. All he can do is to make the great venture of faith, and unreservedly trust in God. How the wonderful glow of the living faith, created by the friction of doubt, which finds expression in vss. 23 ff., is chilled into a formal dogma by vss. 17–20! But if these verses are removed, it is probable that vss. 27, 28, are also to be pruned away. In them the same doctrine emerges as in vss. 17–20. Also, the psalm reaches its radiant climax in vss. 21–26: vss. 27, 28, are only embers. It is prob-

[50] Briggs's assumed glosses are not always so convincing. When he says, for example, of Ps. 59 14, "A prosaic editor made the couplet into a prose sentence," one can but ask what the editor's object was in doing this. This sort of explanation that does not explain is found again and again.

able that here again we have liturgical accretions, and the LXX adds still another line, "In the gates of the Daughter of Zion," which indicates that the present end of the psalm, like the beginning (vs. 1), was adapted to congregational use. If vss. 17–20 and 27, 28, be rejected, Part II will also be found to have exactly five quatrains (vss. 13, 14; vss. 15, 16; vss. 21, 22; vss. 23, 24; vss. 25, 26). In this reconstruction the psalm stands out in all its original perfection of form and nobility of thought.

I have thought it more instructive to show the reader in detail in the case of the two important psalms just discussed how Briggs applies his metrical and strophical theories to the restoration of the psalms rather than to make bare reference to a larger number of examples. What is true of his exposition of these psalms is true for the others. In some cases he takes the fortress, in some he fails. The interesting thing to observe is that even an approximately correct theory of Hebrew metre does not guarantee convincing results in criticism. These depend after all very largely upon skilful exegesis and textual criticism. Without these a metrical theory is a dangerous tool, as apt to do damage as to be serviceable. With them a metrical theory can often be used with excellent effect when other tools fail.

It will be interesting, therefore, to look at Briggs's treatment of questions which are fundamentally exegetical rather than historical or critical. For this purpose I have selected his discussion of certain typical "I-psalms," because, while criticism often enters into this discussion, yet in the main the definition of the "I" is a distinctively exegetical question; and it is here that the exegetical skill of a commentator can most readily be discerned.

It will be well at the outset to give a brief sketch of the history of this problem, and to indicate its signal importance. The tendency to explain the "I" collectively of the Jewish people is already to be seen in the Septuagint, for instance in the title of Psalm 56. The Targum interprets in this way Psalms 23, 38, 56, and 88. In the Talmud the problem was clearly formulated: "R. Eliezer says: David spoke all the psalms in his own interest; R. Joshua thinks: In the interest of the congregation. The Wise on the other hand explain: He spoke some in his own interest,

some in the interest of the congregation." [51] The church fathers, notably Theodore of Mopsuestia, at times adopted the collective theory, and the great Jewish commentators of the Middle Ages maintained it, although in varying degrees. On the other hand, Calvin, an exegete greater than them all, interpreted the "I" individualistically, no doubt because of his hostility to everything that savored of the allegorical method of exegesis. But it was reserved for the nineteenth century to discuss the problem of the exact identification of the speaker in the Psalms at length and in all its bearings. Only then did the fundamental significance of the problem for the interpretation of the Psalter fully reveal itself. Passing over Olshausen's commentary on the Psalms (1853), in which the Psalter was regarded as the song-book of the Second Temple, and the Psalms treated as hymns primarily designed for public worship, the "I" being therefore collective, attention must be called to the epoch-making essay of Smend, "Über das Ich in den Psalmen" in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1888). Since the appearance of this paper, and largely because of it, an extensive literature on the subject has developed. The monographs of Beer (1894) and Coblenz (1897), already mentioned, and the discussion of the subject in Cheyne's *Historical Origin and Religious Ideas of the Psalter* (1891), are among the main contributions; but since Smend's essay every Old Testament scholar has had to define his own attitude toward the problem. How far-reaching this exegetical question may become may be briefly illustrated.

(1) Smend argues on *a priori* grounds that the "I" of the Psalter must be collective, because the Psalter is a temple hymn-book. But was it so? At least, was it *only* a temple hymn-book? Briggs holds that it was used in the synagogue also; Duhm believes that it was designed for private as well as public devotion. The so-called "anti-sacrificial psalms" certainly do not favor the idea of exclusive use in the temple service. The identification of the "I" is thus closely related to the question of the

[51] Cited from Coblenz, Über das betende Ich in den Psalmen, p. 2. [Coblenz has not quoted the whole passage; it continues: "Those which are expressed in the singular number refer to himself, those in the plural to the community" (Pesaḥim 117 a).—Ed.]

purpose of the Psalter, and so we are led into a new series of problems.

(2) In by far the largest number of the "I-psalms" the speaker is surrounded by enemies. Who are these enemies? Are they private enemies of a private individual, or public enemies of a public individual, or the public enemies, whether foreign or domestic, of the community? Have we, that is, in these psalms reflections of private quarrels, or of wars, or of party contests? It will readily be seen what importance the answer to these questions may have for the dating of these psalms.

(3) If the speaker should prove to be a collective person, the religion of the speaker is the religion of the community. Then, since the religion of the Psalter is in general of the same type throughout, the natural inference is that the psalms originated in the same general period, and a community-religion of that type can only be understood in the conditions of the post-exilic period. The identification of the "I" is thus brought, as Smend expressly urges, into direct connection with the dating of the psalms.

(4) The ethics of the Psalms assumes a very different complexion according as the "I" is interpreted individualistically or collectively. The difficulties of the imprecatory psalms, for example, are relieved, even if not altogether removed, if it is held that the curses are not expressions of individual hatred against other individuals but rather of community feeling against other parties or nations. Community hatred may be very bitter, and yet be coupled at times with generous consideration for individuals of the opposite party; and thus the fierceness of these psalms may not always represent personal hatred.

(5) The same question enters in a crucial way into some of our judgments upon the religious significance of the Psalter. For example, under the individualistic interpretation Ps. 16 10, 11, probably refers to personal immortality. On the collective interpretation it refers only to the preservation of the community. Again, under the individualistic interpretation, the sense of sin in Psalm 51 would be a sense of personal sin, and would approximate to the Pauline conception. On the collective theory it would be the confession of the sin of the community.

(6) Finally, the interpretation of the "I" is of great importance for the proper interpretation of the Messianic passages in the Psalter. On the usual patristic theory it is Christ himself who speaks in the Psalms. Thus Psalm 22 becomes a direct description by Christ himself of his own passion. On the collective theory such an interpretation of Psalm 22 is impossible. On the other hand, passages which would have no messianic significance under the individualistic interpretation may acquire such significance under the collective view. The confidence expressed in Psalm 6, if the speaker is Israel, is a confidence in the messianic future. On the individualistic interpretation there is no messianic reference whatever in this psalm.

It will be seen that the problem of the identification of the "I" is really the fundamental exegetical problem in the great majority of the Psalms. Does this problem stand out clearly in our present commentary? Far from it. In the introduction no allusion is made to it. Even in the section on Interpretation it is not mentioned, though this would have been a fitting place for some information upon the subject. The student stumbles upon the problem for the first time at Psalm 5, in which the "I" is interpreted collectively by Briggs. The omission of any preliminary discussion of so important a topic puts the student at a serious disadvantage. Not even when Briggs comes to the detailed exposition of the "I-psalms" in the commentary does he make good the omission by enlarging upon the subject. At Psalm 5, where the question of the identification of the "I" is first raised, the collective theory which is adopted is not proved, but is simply assumed. Inasmuch as there are no very clear individualizing traits in the psalm apart from the use of the first person, this might be allowed to pass, but when we come to Psalm 6 and its kindred "invalid psalms" (Psalms 38, 41, 22, 30, 69, 88, and 102) we are confronted with an exegetical problem of the most delicate description. In the interpretation of these psalms failure to set forth the reasons for the theory adopted is fatal.

Take for example Psalm 6. In vss. 1–7a the speaker describes himself as a sick man, in vs. 7 specifically referring to his bed, and prays that God may deliver him from his sickness. On the

other hand, in vss. 7b–10 all reference to sickness is dropped, and enemies take the place of sickness. Further, in these last verses there is no prayer for deliverance, but an assurance that God has already heard the psalmist's prayer and will deliver him from his enemies; the past tenses in vss. 8, 9, are "perfects of assurance." At first sight it seems as if the two parts could have nothing to do with each other and as if the psalm were composite. If unity is to be brought into the psalm, the most natural method is to hold that the sickness described in the first part is a figure for the persecution implied in the second part. Then the prayer for deliverance from sickness in vss. 1–7a becomes the prayer which is answered in vss. 7b–10, where the figure is dropped, and unity of subject is introduced into the psalm. But if the "I" is an individual, the poet has in the first part needlessly hidden his meaning. The reference certainly seems to be to actual sickness, and the sudden change in the last part to enemies is unmediated and confusing, and therefore bad from a literary point of view. If, on the other hand, the "I" is collective, it would be understood at once that sickness is only a figure, and hence the transition from the figure in vss. 1–7a to the thing figured in vss. 7b–10 would be natural and easy.

But there is another exegetical difficulty in this psalm. How can the sudden change from almost despairing entreaty in vss. 1–7a to confidence in vss. 7b–10 be accounted for? Why is the speaker so sure that God will stand by him as against his enemies? Why is he so certain that he is in the right? On the individualistic theory this is hard to explain. It is usually supposed that in the very expression of his despair the speaker induces a reaction and finds relief. Hope takes the place of agony. Of course this is psychologically possible, but it would seem far simpler to hold to the collective interpretation of the "I." In that case the community can be easily thought of as persuaded that the cause of the religion of Jahveh was so bound up in its own redemption that God must deliver it from its enemies. Thus, under the collective interpretation of the "I," the hope in vss. 8–10 becomes messianic.

The collective interpretation of Psalm 6 is strongly confirmed when we turn to Psalm 38. Here we meet with the same curious



difference between the first and last parts of the psalm. In vss. 1–11 the speaker describes himself as sick, but in vss. 12–22 (except vs. 17b) only persecution by enemies is referred to. In Psalm 38 there is not the change from despair to assurance which is found in Psalm 6, but there are several new and important factors which bear upon the interpretation of the "I." The description of the sickness is given in such varied terms that it can hardly refer to a real sickness, and the phraseology of verses 3, 5, and 7 seems to be consciously reminiscent of Isaiah 1 6, where the nation is described as sick. Most important of all, there is a remarkable, and at first sight unaccountable, paradox in the psalm. In the first half the singer acknowledges his guilt; it is because of his sin that all his troubles have come upon him. But in the second half (with the exception of vs. 18) he appears to be innocent and wrongfully persecuted by his enemies. It is hard to explain this paradox if the speaker is an individual, but simple if the "I" is collective. A community, especially if it be the community of the pious, can acknowledge its guilt, since it is a part of the nation, and can explain its sufferings accordingly. But as against the nations or the ungodly among the Jews themselves the congregation of the pious can maintain its innocence.

These, in outline, are the arguments which have been advanced to prove a collective "I" in these two very interesting, but at first sight perplexing, psalms. Does Briggs use any of these arguments or contribute anything new to the discussion? On Psalm 6 he merely remarks in the introductory note, "The Ps. was composed for the congregation, and there is no trace in it of the experience of an individual." In the exposition proper the collective theory is assumed, no exegetical argument being advanced for it.

No reference whatever is made to the peculiar relationship of the two parts of the psalm, and on the abrupt change from despair to assurance at vs. 8 we have the merely passing note that the congregation's "prayer receives its answer while they are making it." This would seem to imply the psychological explanation of the transition offered by the advocates of the individualistic interpretation,—an explanation which is unneces-

sary and even unnatural on the collective theory. The comment on the sympathetic relationship between the singer's trouble and his aching bones also agrees with Beer's individualistic interpretation of the psalm, but is hardly pertinent on the collective view. Again, vs. 5 must be interpreted figuratively if the "I" is collective, but no explanation of its figurative significance is forthcoming. To the statement that there is no trace of the experience of an individual in Psalm 6 an advocate of the opposite view might urge vs. 6; so Coblenz, though sympathetic toward the collective interpretation in many of the psalms, holds to the individualistic interpretation of Psalm 6 mainly on account of this one verse. Briggs ignores the difficulty which it presents to his theory.

On Psalm 38, again, there is not an argument advanced for the collective theory. On the contrary, our author robs himself of a very strong confirmatory argument furnished by this psalm, namely the paradox of the simultaneous confession of sin and the assertion of innocence by the speaker. On metrical grounds vss. 2–5 and vs. 18, in which the confession of sin is found, are rejected as accretions, and the paradox is thus removed; but at the same time the interesting argument from it for the collective theory is lost. On vs. 18b the suggestion is made that a later editor inserted this verse, "in order to adapt the psalm to public worship." But if the "I" is collective, the psalm must havebeen originally designed for public worship; the comment is really inconsistent with the view taken of the "I." On the collective theory some attempt should be made to identify the lovers and friends of vs. 11 and the enemies of vs. 12, but the comment on vs. 11 is simply the paraphrase "those upon whom I could ordinarily rely for sympathy and aid."[52] Nothing is distinctly said on the identification of the enemies. One might infer from

[52] A considerable portion of the exposition printed in large type is devoted to just such tautological paraphrases of the Biblical phraseology. For instance, in the present psalm, vs. 6, "*I am bent* || *bowed down*], by a weight of care, anxiety, and suffering, and this, *exceedingly*, to the utmost degree of intensity"; vs. 8, "*I am benumbed and crushed*]. Strength has so departed from him that he has become, as it were, paralysed and incapable of effort"; vs. 10, "*The light of mine eyes*], the light that illumines the eyes, enabling them to see what is to be done, giving confidence and courage."

the time at which the psalm is dated (in the restoration before Nehemiah) that foreign enemies were thought of, but this is not certain. As a matter of fact, in the comment on Psalm 6 the enemies are explained as "workers of trouble in Israel itself."

In Psalm 41 the various factors that entered into the identification of the "I" in Psalms 6 and 38 are again all present, but this time the concreteness of expression is so striking that the psalm would be almost unintelligible did we not have the two former psalms to guide us. Sickness and persecution are again found, but intermingled in a most confusing way. The enemies are represented as gathered around the bedside of the dying man, malignantly slandering him and devising evil against him (vs. 8). There is also the confession of guilt (vs. 4) and the assertion of innocence (vss. 11, 12) already found in Psalm 38, and the sudden transition from despair (vss. 1–9) to hope (vss. 10–12) found in Psalm 6, though in Psalm 41 an additional vengeful cry is sent up to the Lord for recovery in order that the speaker may requite his enemies. The individualizing traits of the psalm are especially pronounced. Smend says of it, "One can learn from this song how far the personification of the community can go." Duhm, on the other hand, who follows the individualistic interpretation throughout, draws a repulsive picture of the state of society reflected by this psalm,—with the sick man on his deathbed, surrounded by hypocritical friends who, like Job's comforters, argue from his sufferings to his wickedness and, dominated by their wretched dogmas, fairly gloat over his condition, while the dying man himself with his last breath cries to God for recovery so that he may avenge himself upon them. It is a lovely deathbed scene of one of the people of God!

Surely in the case of such a psalm there ought to be some discussion of the identification of the "I," with a defence of the collective theory, if that is adopted. But as usual there is simply the statement, "The Ps. is national . . . and there is no reference to an individual." This time Briggs seems to have felt that some explanation of vs. 9 on the collective theory is due. It is interpreted (in all probability correctly) of "nations in covenant, who have treacherously broken covenant and become bitter enemies," but unfortunately there is no reference to Obadiah 7

which supports the nationalistic interpretation, at least if the text of that passage can be trusted.[53] As in Psalm 38, the clause in which sin is confessed (vs. 4b) is rejected. It may be noted also that vs. 10b is dropped on metrical grounds.

An equal obliviousness to the need of any exegetical defence of the collective theory of the "I" is found in the exposition of Psalm 30, though here Sheol in verse 3, cf. verse 9, is interpreted of national exile, with reference to Ezekiel 37. This is the explanation which we looked for at the parallel passage Psalm 6 5. It was just as much needed there, but was not given.

On Psalm 88 there is a somewhat clearer exposition of the details of the psalm on the basis of the collective theory, and at vs. 15 there is the first exegetical argument for the collective "I" to be met with anywhere in the comment on the five psalms thus far reviewed. It is urged that the reference to "youth" in this verse cannot be satisfactorily explained if the "I" is an individual.[54]

In the case of Psalms 22, 69, and 102 the identification of the speaker is complicated by the serious critical problem of the integrity of these psalms. Psalm 69 I shall pass by, since the analysis of this psalm, both logically and poetically, is too uncertain to allow of a clear formulation of our problem. Attention need only be called to the fact that it is analyzed by Briggs into two distinct psalms, in one of which the "I" seems to be an individual prophet, and in the other the ideal community. The grounds for the analysis are metrical, and of doubtful cogency. Duhm, for example, has a different metrical theory of the psalm. Briggs makes no attempt to explain why the "I" is interpreted differently in the two parts which he thinks he can distinguish in the psalm.

[53] The crucial objection to the collective interpretation of Psalm 41 is found in vss. 1–3, a didactic observation and strongly individualizing. Briggs notes that these verses are "in a strange sort of isolation"; he adopts a new translation in order to connect them with what follows, but the translation is more than doubtful. If the collective theory is adopted, it is probable that vss. 1–3 will have to be eliminated. It is difficult to connect them with the rest of the psalm, even on the individualistic interpretation.

[54] The only meaning it could possibly have on the individualistic interpretation would be that the speaker had been all his life a chronic invalid. Duhm seeks by emendation to avoid this objection to the individualistic interpretation.

In the case of Psalms 22 and 102 the bearing of the critical problem upon the identification of the "I" can be much more readily grasped by the reader. Psalm 22 1–21 contrasts strikingly with vss. 22–31, and even the Revised Version separates the two parts by a space. On the supposition of the unity of the psalm, the praise for the deliverance of the afflicted in vss. 22–31 can be naturally interpreted only as praise for the deliverance of the afflicted speaker in vss. 1–21. Now this deliverance not only has a national significance (vs. 23), but has a world-wide application (vs. 27), in fact a messianic significance in the largest sense. The nations are to be converted to Jahveh because of this deliverance, and its effects will be felt upon nations yet unborn, vss. 27–31. If we allow vss. 22–31 to govern our theory of the personality of the speaker in the first part of the psalm, he must be either a most extraordinary individual, who yet cannot be identified with any person known in Jewish history, or he is the personified community.[55] The advocates of the collective "I" urge vss. 22–31 as one of the strongest arguments in support of their theory. This is said to be corroborated by the fact that in vs. 4 the personification is dropped for a moment and the actual "we" of the congregation appears ("Our fathers trusted in thee"), and by the further fact that the present condition of the "I" in vs. 6 (very emphatic in the Hebrew) seems to contrast with the previous condition of the nation in vss. 4, 5, which would be unnatural except on the collective theory. It might be thought that at vss. 22 and 25 the speaker separates himself from the community and is accordingly an individual. There is a difficulty here for the collective interpretation, but it is by no means fatal. We may explain it with Smend by the theory that "Israel is distinct from the Israelites, cf. Hosea 1 and 2," or we may suppose with Coblenz that in verses 22 and 25 the individual members of the congregation are speaking.

In our commentary the collective theory of the speaker seems to be adopted, but the unity of the psalm is denied, and of the last part only verses 22 and 25 are admitted to belong to the original. Herein is a marvellous thing. That part of the psalm which

[55] Even Calvin did not venture to identify the speaker in this psalm directly with Christ.

can be urged most forcibly for the collective theory is rejected, but those verses which bear most strongly against the theory are retained. Yet the collective theory is adopted without one word of explanation as to the bearing of either of these points upon it. In this psalm, however, we meet with the second instance thus far observed of an exegetical argument for the collective theory of the "I." In the introduction to the psalm it is said that "the description is too varied for any individual experience." But no inference as to the nature of the "I" is drawn from the first person plural in vss. 4, 5.[56]

Finally, with regard to Psalm 102, if its unity is accepted, the case for the collective "I" may be considered to be proved beyond peradventure. In vss. 13 ff. Zion stands out in her own proper person. If there is any connection at all between these verses and what has gone before, the "I" of the first part of the psalm must be collective. As for Psalm 22, the collective theory is maintained ("the author wrote in the person of afflicted Israel"), but the unity of the psalm, which is the strongest support of the theory, is denied. It must be confessed that the argument for the composite character of Psalm 102 is particularly strong, but the point is that our author seems quite oblivious of the bearing of the critical question upon the exegesis.

The present reviewer cannot pretend to have examined the treatment accorded to all the "I-psalms" in the present commentary. But a typical group of them has been selected in which the exegetical problem of the identification of the "I" is peculiarly acute and demands at least an attempt at solution. For not one of these psalms is there anything that can be called a discussion of the question. Only two exegetical arguments in favor of the collective "I" have been found in the sixty-two

[56] The unity of Psalm 22 is a fairly debatable question. The transition from the first part to the second is certainly abrupt. Yet it has its analogy in Psalm 6, the integrity of which is universally admitted. Further, the relation of the last part to the first corresponds so strikingly with Isa. 53 (cf. Beer's illuminating exposition) that it seems hardly due to chance compilation. But even if the original unity of the psalm is denied, the present combination of the two parts can hardly have been made on any other than a collective theory of the "I" (unless we hold that it is due simply to accident), and hence it may be argued that at the time of the redaction of this psalm the collective theory of the "I" was prevalent (a point not noticed by Briggs).

pages devoted to the exposition of these psalms. The theory is regularly assumed, but the arguments for it are either ignored or are actually invalidated, as by the critical theories adopted in the case of Psalms 22, 69, and 102. The difficulties in the way of the theory, especially those presented by the detailed personifications which must be assumed, are largely passed over without a word of explanation. This means that the really vital problems in the interpretation of these interesting and important psalms are scarcely touched, for they can only be revealed in a discussion of the identification of the "I."[57]

It is unnecessary to sum up the general results of our review. The dissent from the methods followed in this commentary may seem to some to have been emphasized too strongly; yet I trust that the discussion has made it evident that the dissent is an honest and not a captious one. Of the four topics which have been reviewed, the interest and permanent value of the commentary, apart from the vast collection of material, word-studies, and discussions of the literary relationships of the psalms, lie in the treatment of the poetical form of the psalms. The establishment of the original poetic forms of the psalms is the one dominant interest of the commentary. Here many valuable suggestions have undoubtedly been made of which the professional student of the future will make grateful use. But in the nature

[57] In the above discussion as to the nature of the speaker no notice has been taken of the light which the Babylonian penitential psalms may throw upon the problem. These psalms would seem to have been originally individualistic, though afterwards adapted to liturgical purposes. In many respects they are very similar to the Hebrew "invalid psalms" (compare the end of the truly remarkable psalm cited in Jeremias, "Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients," pp. 210 ff., with Ps. 41), and might suggest that after all the "I" in the latter psalms was originally individualistic, though its exegetical argument is strongly in favor of a collective theory. Briggs does not refer to the Babylonian analogies in his comments on the psalms which have been examined above. In general, the analogies between the Hebrew Psalter and other ancient Oriental literature do not seem greatly to interest him. He does not once mention the great hymn of Chuenaten in his exposition of Ps. 104. He alludes to the Babylonian Tiamat-myth in connection with Ps. 89 10 ff., but unfortunately explains the very similar passage Ps. 74 12 ff. of the redemption from Egypt, whereas it almost certainly refers to the creation-myth. On the other hand, it is interesting to notice that Briggs inclines to an original mythological background for Ps. 19. In this view he agrees with Gunkel, though the two scholars arrived at it quite independently of one another.

of the case those results are not exact or final, but are necessarily conjectural. The lay reader or minister or theological student who may use this book must constantly keep in mind the tentative nature of the poetical analysis, and always test the reconstruction by the requirements of exegesis. Unfortunately, on the side of exegesis the commentary does not inspire confidence.

MEDIAEVAL GERMAN MYSTICISM

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The German mysticism of the fourteenth century was one of the most remarkable manifestations of that individualistic trend of thought and feeling which set in during the thirteenth century with the height of chivalric culture, developed under the influence of the growth of civic independence in the great municipal republics, and finally, in the religious Reformation of the sixteenth century, overturned the whole corporate system of the mediaeval church and state.

The fundamental thought of the German mystics of the fourteenth century was nothing new. It was a revived and christianized Neoplatonism. Throughout the Middle Ages more subtle thinkers had been fascinated by the neoplatonic conception, that the world is an incessant and gradual differentiation of the originally undivided and undifferentiated Divine; that man, however, and man alone, possesses the power by a free act of will to reverse this incessant process of differentiation, and thus to return from the diaspora of manifold phenomena into the oneness of the undivided Divine. The so-called Dionysius Areopagita, Scotus Erigena, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux—these all see the essential goal of human life in this return from the many into the one; they all love to dwell on the different stages of inner concentration by which man approaches this goal; they all praise enthusiastically the state of highest self-surrender where man is completely welded into one with the Divine—as the waterdrop is resolved into wine; or as iron, melting in the fire, seems to become fire, or as the air, illuminated by the sun, seems itself to become sunlight. It is, however, no exaggeration to say that this ideal of complete self-surrender of the individual to the infinite has seldom produced such a variety of individual life as in the German mystics of the fourteenth century. Three of the most pronounced personalities

produced by this mystic longing for the merging of personality in the Divine I shall try briefly to characterize: Master Eckhart, Heinrich Suso, and Johannes Tauler.

A wonderful solemnity and impressive harmony is spread over the thought of Master Eckhart, the intellectual head of the German mystics. The whole universe, from the highest state of purest spirituality to the lowest worm in the dust, is to him the emanation and revelation of one mighty and eternal will. In its most elemental and fundamental form this will is apparently without willing; it is pure, undifferentiated being, uncreated nature; the naught, that is, the negation of all contrasts; the synthesis of all life; the godhead by itself. This infinite and unmodified eternal being, tranquil and unmoved, is, however, at the same time the source of all motion and of all the variety of finite beings. It eradiates without losing its substance; as the sun—according to mediaeval physics—sheds light without losing it. The highest form of this self-manifestation of the godhead is the Trinity, which Eckhart conceives of as a constant process of self-realization of the complexity of the infinite and as its constantly renewed awakening to full consciousness. In the Son the Father comes to know himself, and Father and Son create out of their common love the Holy Spirit—a strange mythical birth of divine forms going on unceasingly in the highest regions of spiritual existence. To this transcendental process of a continual divine birth the visible world forms a lower counterpart. Into the visible world the Divine is also constantly discharging itself; yes, only in the fulness of the world, with its countless forms and contrasts, does the Divine find its fullest expression. "All things are God; God is all things. God may not understand himself without me. Before there were creatures, God was not God." These are some of Eckhart's sibyllinic formulas to express the divineness of the world. But by the side of this fact of the divineness of life there stands the other fact of its earthiness. We cannot get away from the tragic conflict pervading all life, the conflict between the naught and the aught, between the infinite and the finite, between spirit streaming from above and matter pressing on from below. And thus, after all, in its scale of forms from the most highly organ-

ized beings to inanimate objects, the world presents the spectacle of a gradually diminishing admixture of free spiritual power and a gradually increasing admixture of dead material weight.

Man alone has the faculty of freeing himself from matter, of giving himself fully over to the divine spirit and of thus rising above the conflict which enthralls all creation. "In dumb creation there is something of God, but in the human soul there is God divine. The eye with which I see God is the same eye with which God sees me. My eye and God's eye are one eye." It is only a question of man's becoming fully conscious of his high estate, of his divine nature. "We are to turn the eyes of our reason upon ourselves, and contemplate the nobility of our spiritual being, and recognize that we have been so formed as to be by divine mercy united to the eternal spirit. And if we thus come to know our own riches, we should find such transcending joy in them that we should care no longer for any outward pleasure and satisfaction." Inwardness, then, is the great goal of life. Through descending into the innermost recesses of the soul, through retiring from the distracting senses into the oneness of the mind, through complete absorption in the spiritual, do we rise above the dualism of life, do we reach the Divine. "When the soul has reached this state, it loses its own self, and God draws it into himself, so that it is entirely absorbed in him, even as the sun draws the morning red into itself so that it is entirely absorbed by light."

He who thus has fully entered into the *unio mystica* with the Divine has become immune against the perils of circumstance and chance; he has freed himself from the blind superstitions of the multitude; he has emancipated himself from the need of ecclesiastical conventions; he has come near the state of human perfection in which the good will be done for its own sake. "The highest that the spirit may attain in this mortal clay is this: to live in such a manner that virtue is no longer an effort, that is, that all virtues have become so natural to the soul that it not only purposely practises virtue, but makes all virtues shine forth from itself unconsciously, even as though it were virtue itself."

It is certain that Master Eckhart, the doctor of divinity, Domini-

can prior at Erfurt, professor of theology at the school of his order at Cologne, would have inwardly revolted against the idea of harboring unorthodox thoughts. Indeed, a short time before his death he publicly denounced such accusations as misunderstandings of his teaching and explicitly accepted the supreme authority of the church. That, however, the principle of his thought was diametrically opposed to orthodox Christianity, that it tended toward the dissolution of the hierarchical system and toward complete religious freedom, would be clear, even if two years after his death the Roman See had not officially condemned the majority of his teachings and thus formally acknowledged their revolutionary character. Eckhart is indeed a forerunner of modern pantheism. His conception of the world as a continual transition of the godhead from naught to aught, from the potential to the actual, from the formless one to the multiform many, is a clear anticipation of the Hegelian principle of the self-unfolding of the Idea. His ideal of losing oneself in the abyss of the Divine suggests Goethe's "*Weltseele komm! uns zu durchdringen*," and "*Sich aufzugeben wird Genuss.*" And his description of the highest state of perfection, in which duty has become an instinct, brings to mind Schiller's definition of the Beautiful Soul as that state "where the moral sentiment has taken possession of all the emotions to such a degree that it may unhesitatingly commit the guidance of life to the instinct without running the risk of conflicting with its decisions."

If Master Eckhart points toward the great classic German writers of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, his pupil Suso transports us into the emotional world of Romanticism. And as the intense subjectivity of the Romantic poets has led to a curious oscillation in their works between the two extremes of symbolism and naturalism, so we find these same extremes side by side with each other in the effusions of this mediaeval monk. Suso belongs to those over-refined, erratic personalities, like Amadeus Hoffmann, Poe, Ibsen, Hauptmann, who express themselves only in extremes, who rush from the airiest visions to the grossest materialism, who revel now in ecstatic flights of imagination and now in painful reproductions of crass actuality.

In Suso[1] the emotional tension of German mysticism reaches its climax. The whole strife of a time torn by tremendous conflicts seems to vibrate sympathetically in his soul. It seems as though large and wide-reaching popular disturbances—the struggle between Empire and Papacy, the revolution of the guilds against the city patriciate, the religious reform movements of the "Friends of God" and similar sects, the horrors of the Great Plague, the cruelties of Jew-baiting, the fanaticism of the Flagellants—as though all this had been crowding in upon the contemplative mind of this solitary monk, setting in motion its innermost chords and calling forth therefrom sounds of dark passion and fierce power and then again of sweetest purity and transcendent beauty.

With what knightly courteousness and grace does he, the scion of a patrician family of Constance, describe the chivalric love-service which he offers to his chosen one, Eternal Wisdom, in his cloister cell. "As in Swabia," thus he narrates in his autobiography, "the young men at New Year ask for a favor from their sweethearts, so he also on New Year's night turned to his love. Before daybreak he stepped in front of the image where the divine mother holds her lovely child, Eternal Wisdom, on her lap and presses it to her bosom, and he knelt down and began to sing a sequence to the mother, praying that she permit him to receive a wreath from her child, and he was so deeply stirred that the hot tears welled forth from his eyes. And then he turned to Eternal Wisdom, bowed down to the ground, and greeted his love, and spake: 'Thou, dearest, art my Easter day, my heart's summer delight, my joyous hour. Thou art the sweetheart whom alone my soul is wooing and craving and for whom it scorns all other loves. Oh, reward me this night, and let me win a wreath from thee.'"

He invites Eternal Wisdom as a guest to his table, and offers her bread and fruit. He sees her in manifold forms. "She hovered," he says, "high above him on a throne of clouds, she twinkled like the morning star and shone like the sun. Her crown

[1] The following nine paragraphs have already appeared in an article, "A Religious Romanticist," published in the Outlook for December 3, 1910, pp. 785–788. Until recently, Suso's writings were accessible only in modern German adaptations. Now, however, we have an authenticated edition of the original text: Heinrich Seuse, Deutsche Schriften, herausgegeben von Karl Bihlmeyer, Stuttgart, 1907.

was eternity, her garment was bliss, her mantle all joys' fulfilment. She was far and near, high and low, she was present and yet hidden. She reached above the highest of the heavens and touched the deepest of the earth's abysses. At one moment she appeared as a beautiful maiden, and then suddenly changed into a proud squire. She inclined herself toward him and greeted him kindly and spake lovingly: *Praebe, fili, cor tuum mihi.*"

All this sounds like an echo of chivalric minnesong. How little, however, these feelings had, after all, to do with courtly love, from what a cruelly harsh and hideous reality these ethereal visions came forth, is proved by the narrative of revolting naturalism in which Suso describes the fearful chastisements by which he tried to subdue his rebellious body. "He had himself made an undergarment of hair-cloth, and in the garment straps in which there were inserted fifty and a hundred pointed nails, made of brass and filed sharp on the point, and the points of the nails were turned against his flesh. And he made the garment tight and held together in front, in order that the nails should penetrate the flesh, and he made it so high that it came close up to his face. Herein he slept at night. In summer nights, when it was hot and he was tired from walking and ill, or when he had bled himself and lay exhausted and the vermin pestered him, he would betimes feel as though he were lying in an ant-heap; and would weep and gnash his teeth and say: 'Good God, what kind of death is this! Whom murderers kill or the wild beasts, he is done with it quickly. But I am lying here among this horrible vermin and am dying and yet cannot die.'" And with a similar delight in the repellent, with a similarly gruesome naturalism, he makes Christ describe the horrible disfigurements of his body which he suffered when hanging on the cross. "My right hand was pierced by nails, my left hand was hammered through. My right arm was stretched out of joint, my left arm was drawn out of shape. My right foot was sore with open wounds and my left foot was cruelly mangled. I hung in faintness and exhaustion of all my limbs. The blood was breaking forth from all over my body, making it a gory mass and a horrible sight. I was covered with sores and ulcers."

In the ecstasy of enthusiasm Suso often loses control of himself. He would melt away in rapture when Eternal Wisdom initiates

him into the mysteries of the transubstantiation. Like a mediaeval Werther, he would embrace the universe with the arms of love when singing in holy mass the *Sursum Corda*.

This same man, however, experiences all the different matter-of-fact episodes of his life with such an intensity and relates these episodes with such a power and precision of actual observation that they impress the modern reader as scenes of present-day life, and often make one hold one's breath from excitement. Some of these scenes stand before us with a truly marvellous distinctness. How a little girl accuses Suso of having stolen a crucifix, and thereby incites a great tumult against him in the town; how in another village he is accused of having poisoned the wells, and barely escapes death at the hand of the raging mob that has gathered there for the fair; how his sister runs away from the nunnery, and thereby plunges him into the depths of despair until he succeeds in leading her back to her vow; how a lewd woman whom he had tried to convert charges him with being the father of her child and succeeds for a time in making his name despised and rejected; how in a forest on the banks of the Rhine he meets a highwayman and his paramour and is frightened by them out of his wits,—these and similar happenings are told in a manner reminding one of Zola or Tolstoi.

No painter of the Cologne school has represented the idyllic bliss of heaven with more delicate and rosy colors than Suso. "Look upon the beautiful heavenly heath: here summer's delight, here May's festive meadow, here the vale of true bliss. Here you see joyful glances go from love to love; here harping and fiddling; here singing, dancing, and ever rejoicing; here all wishes' fulfilment; here love without sorrow, in everlasting security. Now look upon the countless multitude, how they drink from the welling fountain of living waters; how they gaze upon the clear pure mirror of the godhead in which all things become known to them. Steal still farther forward and look, how the glorious queen of the heavenly land, clad in joy and dignity, hovers above all the heavenly host, how the divine mother of mercy turns her eyes, her mild, merciful eyes, so benignly upon you, how her miraculous beauty gives joy and bliss to the whole heavenly host."

If we contrast with this idyllic vision the fierce, passionate

wailings of a dying man whose voice Suso hears calling for help, we are indeed reminded of the contrast between the Ghent altar of the brothers van Eyck and a Last Judgment scene by Breughel. "O God in Heaven, why was I born into this world? The beginning of my life was crying and weeping, and now my leave-taking is bitter wailing and lamenting. I strike my hands over my head, I wring them feverishly, I turn my glance to all the corners of the world, whether some help or comfort may be found. But it cannot be. I am like a bird that is lying under the claws of a hawk and has lost its senses from fright. My hands begin to wither, my face to grow pallid, my eyes are breaking. Ah, the thrusts of grim death strike my chest! I am heaving heavily, the light of this world grows dim. I am looking into the other world. Great God, what a sight! The gruesome forms of the black Moors are gathering, the hellish beasts have surrounded me, they are lying in wait for my soul. O God, I see the wild raging flames shoot up, hideous monsters pass hither and thither, like sparks in the fire. And thus I depart."

From what has been said it is obvious that the traditional view of Suso as a spiritual minnesinger is far from being adequate. His personality was far too complicated to be a mere reflex or afterglow of the age of chivalric culture. The chords of his soul were so high-strung and vibrated so quickly that the whole fulness of life re-echoed in them. He and his compeers—for he had many kindred and followers, especially in the convents of South Germany—do not point backward to the age of chivalry, they point forward to the great epoch of Flemish and German painting in the fifteenth century. The extraordinary combination of deep religious feeling, of rapturous delight in the mysteries of a divine universe, with minute and often harsh and painful reproduction of the smallest detail of every-day reality which mark fifteenth-century painting from the van Eycks to Dürer, cannot be fully understood without taking into account the intense subjectivity and emotionalism of that phase of the mystic movement which Suso represents.

In Johannes Tauler,[2] the great Strassburg preacher, German

[2] Only within the last few months has there appeared the first authenticated text of Tauler's sermons: Die Predigten Taulers herausgegeben von Ferdinand Vetter, Berlin, 1910.

mysticism of the fourteenth century reaches its fullest popular influence and its sanest and most rational form. Of all mystics, Tauler is the least eccentric; more earnestly than either Eckhart or Suso does he strive for a reconciliation between the absorption of the individual by the Divine and the duties of the individual toward society.

For Tauler, as for his teacher Eckhart, man is originally a part of the godhead. Like Eckhart, he laments the alienation of man from his origin and sees the goal of man in his return to it. But he is less abstruse than Eckhart; he does not revel so much in contemplation of the "formless and shapeless abyss" of the infinite; he lays more emphasis on the striving of man for perfection. In the analysis of the various stages which shall lead man to this perfection, Tauler shows affinity with Suso. But he is separated from Suso by his clearer sense of the attainable, his soberer view of human limitations. With all his predilection for asceticism and renunciation of the world, he is without a trace of fanaticism.

He openly protests against the morbid exaggerations of monkish discipline; he preaches self-control, not self-elimination. In the fine comparison of the human soul with the vine, he represents human nature as an essentially sound and hardy plant whose growth is to be furthered by rational pruning and must not be stunted by senseless mutilation. He asserts that a life of honest labor and faithful fulfilment of every-day tasks is more pleasing to God than eccentric revelling in high inspirations. "Many a man is busy in the world and works for his wife and children, and many a man sits in his shop and makes shoes to get a living, and some poor people go from village to village to earn their bread with great trouble; and, I tell you, all these may fare a hundred times better before God than some would-be prophets." "I know one of the greatest Friends of God, who all his life has been a farmer and is it yet. And he once asked the Lord whether he should give up farming and sit in church. And the Lord said, No; he should rather go on earning his bread by the sweat of his brow; that was the best service he could give to Him." Tauler, then, believes in the divine origin and the divine mission of every calling and every kind of activity; with truly demo-

cratic conviction he praises work as the truest title to nobility; in the right conception of work he sees the way to social peace. "One can spin, another can make shoes, and some have great aptness for all sorts of business, so that they can earn a great deal, while others are altogether without this quickness. These are all gifts proceeding from the Spirit of God. If I were not a priest, but were a member of a guild, I should take it as a great favor that I knew how to make shoes, and should try to make them better than any one else, and would gladly earn my bread by the labor of my hands." "So let every one see to *his* appointed office, and all work thereby for the common good."

In all this we recognize an individualist in the best sense, a man who, standing in the midst of life, has an open mind for the needs and the duties of all classes and of each individual, and who has before his eye the ideal of a democratic society resting upon the mutual acceptance and free co-operation of each and all. The fullest significance, however, of Tauler's individualism comes to light in his utterances on the last and highest questions, on the relation of the individual to God. None of the mystics has conceived of the *unio mystica*, the sinking of deified man in the infinite, in so genuinely human a manner, or in terms so far raised above all exclusively ecclesiastical views. With what a deep, manly earnestness does he oppose to external conventional churchliness the inner self-scrutiny and self-discipline of the individual. "Behold, dear friend, if thou shouldst spend all thy years in running from church to church, thou must look for and receive help from within, or thou wilt never come to any good; however thou mayest seek and inquire, thou must also be willing to be tormented without succor from the outward help of any creature. I tell you, children, that the very holiest man I ever saw in outward conduct and inward life had never heard more than five sermons in all his days. Let the common people run about and hear all they can, that they may not fall into despair or unbelief; but know that all who would be God's, inwardly and outwardly, turn to themselves and retire within." With what a glow of sacred conviction does he describe the necessity of ever deeper scrutiny, ever higher striving, ever purer knowledge, ever freer and fuller surrender, until at last man, without the interposition

of any external institution, finds himself indissolubly welded into one with the Divine. "And if such a man were dragged into the bottom of hell, then there would be the kingdom of God and eternal bliss in hell." And what a truly grand exaltation, what a wonderful vision of human possibilities, is there in the picture which Tauler draws of this state of ideal humanity. "When through all manner of exercises, the outward man has been converted into the inward, reasonable man, and thus the two, that is to say, the powers of the senses and the powers of the reason, are gathered up into the very centre of the man's being,—the unseen depths of his spirit, wherein lies the image of God,—and thus he flings himself into the divine abyss in which he dwelt eternally before he was created, then, when God finds the man thus simply and nakedly turned towards him, the godhead bends down and descends into the depths of the pure, waiting soul, and transforms the created soul, drawing it up into the uncreated essence, so that the spirit becomes one with him. Could such a man behold himself, he would see himself so noble that he would fancy himself God, and see himself a thousand times nobler than he is in himself, and would perceive all the thoughts and purposes, words and works, and have all the knowledge of all men that ever were."

Here, we may say, the individualistic tendency of mediaeval German mysticism has reached its consummation. Here the conception of personality has been heightened and deepened to such an extent that it seems impossible to heighten and deepen it further. Certainly the Renaissance, which has so often and so mistakenly been called the classic age of Individualism, has added nothing to it.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SIN

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I

In no other respect, perhaps, are the unity and kinship of the human race more apparent than in the development of the religious rites and beliefs of the various peoples. Even in the case of their myths, where interpretation is so difficult, where there appears to be so much chaos and so little law, and where we seem at times to have merely the product of imaginative spontaneity and of the play of fancy, there is nevertheless striking similarity. Just because of the contrasts and differences that often impress one at a surface reading, the identity of the spiritual life that shimmers through these diverse manifestations becomes the more significant. As a result, added significance is reflected back to the differences themselves. Not only are these seen from the point of view of their connection with those characteristics and temperamental peculiarities which have influenced particular interpretations of life and of the world, but this knowledge in turn sheds light on the principles that are universally operative in the minds and lives of all peoples. We are thus enabled to gain a clue for the interpretation of facts which, considered by themselves, might have remained quite unintelligible.

The practical bent of the Hebrew mind with its political interests and its concern in the affairs of the temporal world stands in strong contrast with the fanciful and imaginative life of the Hindoo, as well as with that aesthetic temper of the Greek which led him to humanize nature and to find there a world of gods whose lives and struggles he delighted to portray. In comparison with these mythologies, therefore, that of the Hebrews is neither extensive nor rich in its appeals to the imagination. But this is not altogether deplorable, for where there is no luxuriant growth there can be no overshadowing thicket to retard the development of the rational and ethical phases of the religious

consciousness. If we consider that the Hebrew has genuine poetical thought and feeling—a fact that is often overlooked—and that he combines strong objective interests with a tendency to reflect on the experiences of man rather than on the beauties of nature, we can readily understand why he should have left us a mythology of a nobility and virility and of an ethical and rational import that surpasses not only that of the Aryan peoples but also that which the cuneiform writings of his Semitic kindred or the hieroglyphics of Egypt reveal to us. The accounts of the creation of the world, of the dispersion of the peoples, and of the origin and development of religious and political institutions are all illustrative of this; and so in a remarkable degree is the description of the primeval age of humanity when suffering and hardship and pain and fear had not entered into the life of man. Accounts of such a golden age are indeed common to many tribes and peoples in all parts of the earth, but nowhere do we find one having such loftiness of tone, such artistic perfection of form, and such significance of content as in the story of paradise in Genesis.

In the story of paradise several mythical motives are skilfully and artistically woven into one sublime narrative. But that which gives life and significance to the whole is a strain that we find nowhere else so explicitly emphasized. The tree whose fruit is forbidden to man is called the tree of knowledge of good and evil, for, the serpent says, "God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods knowing good and evil." And when they did eat, "the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked," and "the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us to know good and evil."

It is this characteristic of the story of paradise, its unique emphasis on moral distinctions and the consciousness of sin, that stands as a monument to the keen spiritual and introspective insight of the Hebrew mind, from whatever source the setting or the incidents may have been derived. The story does more, however, than bear witness to the clear vision of a particular people: it furnishes us with a clue to the underlying motive that has entered as an important factor into the formation of

all myths regarding a golden age. Its emphasis on the fact of the attainment of a knowledge of good and evil indicates that the consciousness of sin was essentially bound up in the mind of the writer with his reflections concerning the originally perfect state of man. But in that which was here focal to an intensely keen ethical and spiritual vision, and therefore present as an explicit motive, we may find, I think, the principle that has been operative more or less implicitly in the case of all similar myths. The principle present *to* the consciousness of the Hebrew writer is the principle operative *in* the consciousness of all peoples.

For while moral criteria and the extent and nature of the particular acts that are considered sinful naturally vary with differences in intellectual and spiritual development, the consciousness of sin itself, in some form or other and to some degree, is, anthropology seems to teach, universal to all peoples of whom we have definite knowledge. There is always a more or less explicit consciousness of a discrepancy between our actual life and conduct and those ideals and postulates which urge themselves upon us as objectively valid, or at least as the ultimate expression of our rational and moral nature. Indeed, the consciousness of sin, meaning by it the consciousness of such nonconformity or transgression, is inextricably bound up with the very nature of human experience. Man has imagination as well as mere perception, and thought as well as mere recognition. As a rational being, moreover, he necessarily transcends the immediate data of consciousness, for to know a limit is already to have passed beyond it, and to know an object is already to have made progress toward the knowledge of other objects. Just so man has ideals as well as sentiment for the actual; and every normal moral consciousness distinguishes the actual from the possible and realizes the discrepancy between attainment and the fullest capacity and potentiality of attainment. As a thinking and moral being, man can never resolve the ought-to-be into the is, the ideal into the real. It is this more or less explicit recognition that present existence does not correspond to man's real estate that has led early peoples to the thought of a golden age in the past history of mankind in which such a dualism did not exist.

This presents to us two important considerations. Imperfection, let us notice, is regarded as degeneration from a state of perfection,—an interpretation which seems almost inevitable on the early level of thinking with its meagre scientific background, yet a doctrine which invites criticism and to which we return below. And secondly, the doctrine is stated in terms of imagination rather than of reason, of picture rather than of concept. Indeed, in the first stages of mental development all attempts to interpret experience, or to give expression to what inner consciousness reveals, necessarily occur in terms of actual existence. Truth and meaning, to some degree always present wherever there is mind, are not as yet grasped in their universal significance but are given the only form which such a consciousness explicitly possesses, namely, that of sense perception. Thus it is that principles become incarnated into incidents and are given a place in the world of space and time. In spite of the clearer vision of the Hebrew writers, essential characteristics of the spiritual life and of human experience were reduced in their hands to the level of the facts of the objective, empirical world; the universal assumed the aspect of the particular and, as such, acquired an accidental nature, or at least became dependent for its existence on causes external to itself. It behooves us, therefore, to be on our guard lest we overlook the high value and significance of such religious myths. They do not, it is true, give us the truth of historical fact, yet they do give us a much higher and more universal truth, —the truth of principle and of the experience of self-conscious beings.

Unfortunately, however, this deeper significance of the story of paradise was long shrouded from the eyes of its readers, and it was regarded as giving expression to fact rather than to principle. It is strange that this distinction does not seem to have been entirely clear to one who had the penetrating insight into the historical development of the religion and culture of the human race and the keen discernment of the deeper implications of man's moral and spiritual experience that was characteristic of St. Paul, for it was he who freed Christianity from its exclusively Judaic expression and liberated its spirit from the historical trammels that might otherwise have confined it to spatial and temporal

bounds. In Origen and St. Ambrose, indeed, we find tendencies to allegorical interpretation, and Philo had assumed a much more extreme position. St. Augustine, however, ascribes to the story of paradise significance of historical fact, and in this many have followed him even to the present day, believing that its value would be lost if historicity were denied. The significance of this story, however, lies precisely in the fact that it is the statement of a universal principle, an eternal truth. If we commit the fallacy of *hysteron-proteron* and regard the action of our first parents as the cause of our characteristic form of experience and of our consciousness of sin, instead of our experience as the cause of the story of paradise, we become involved in all sorts of difficulties which have troubled theologians for ages. How, for example, could a single act and the sin of one man pollute the lives and affect the destinies of all generations in the sense that such a point of view must necessarily maintain? Such difficulties vanish of themselves if we give the story its higher significance of apprising us of a universal aspect of experience, for it is precisely the nature and function of the myth to portray some law of nature or regularly recurring phenomenon, such, to use a more familiar example, as the movement of the heavenly bodies or the succession of day and night, as incidents or actions performed once only at a certain definite time.

II

If we fail to understand the principle that was operative in the minds of those who have given us the story of paradise and similar myths, and interpret these as the statement of historical fact, as is so commonly done by the defenders of traditional notions, we implicitly reject the hypothesis of evolution and all views of the world-process which find in it development and progress. The story of man, we must then say, is a story of weakness, of failure, and of degeneration; it records a genuine and unmitigated physical, moral, and spiritual loss. In our age no doctrine can rest on mere authority, or on the statement of writings whose very date and authorship are under dispute. It has therefore

become necessary to attempt a formulation of the logical grounds for the view that runs so counter to the procedure of present-day science and to its results in the fields of biology and anthropology. Thus the attempt has been made to reach conclusions that may justify the traditional view of the golden age and of the fall of man by means of an argument based on a given and indisputable fact of consciousness. The conscience of all ages and of all peoples, it is pointed out, bears witness to the fact that man's relations to that which he regards as the highest reality of the universe are not what they ought to be; and it is this consciousness of sin which, properly understood, nullifies every attempt to trace an historical progress in man's views concerning God and in his relations with him.

The argument, in many cases at least, as, for example, in the clear exposition of it that Dr. Kellogg gives in his volume, *The Genesis and Growth of Religion*, is directed solely against the purely naturalistic, or so-called scientific, interpretation, without taking into consideration the point of view of an idealistic philosophy. Mankind, we are told, has universally testified that there is something in life and in experience that must be rectified, and it is just this rectification which has ever constituted one of the most essential functions of religion and which alone can explain many of its rites and ceremonies. To neglect or underestimate this factor of the consciousness of sin, as many of the "scientific" school have done, is therefore of necessity to invalidate the conclusions of the investigation. For the consciousness of sin is significant of the pathological character of man's spiritual life; it testifies that our relations to God are not of a normal but of an abnormal character. Those who do not take the consciousness of sin into their reckoning, therefore, are led to results as fallacious as those of the psychologist would be if he studied exclusively the inmates of an asylum and interpreted his results as a description of mind, or those of the morphologist who should examine diseased tissue without knowing that it was unsound. Now, if conscience reports to us a serious disorder in man's moral and spiritual constitution, must we not assume that the history of humanity shall be a record of degeneration, of moral corruption, and of a loss of intellectual power and discernment? It is

a characteristic of sin, wherever we find it, that it weakens the ability to draw fine moral distinctions, and tends to modify for the worse all religious feelings, beliefs, and conceptions. Sin is a factor, which, only too often unconsciously to ourselves, robs us of our power, just as, in the old story, through Delilah's agency Samson's "strength went from him" while even he at first "wist not that the Lord was departed from him." So, gradually the voice of conscience became hushed, and man's eyes blinded to the spiritual realities of the world, until he wandered far from the path of righteousness and truth upon which he had been set by his Creator and which he had trodden until the day when he allowed sin to enter into his life. Sin, moreover, inevitably begets fear and thus leads man to grasp at any anaesthetic which may suggest itself as able to relieve the mental anguish and pain. Thus the lofty conception of a righteous and all-wise God who holds man responsible for acts that he, as a free agent, performs, gradually became blurred, and man embraced instead the doctrines of determinism which seemed to relieve him from responsibility, of atheism or agnosticism which freed him from the haunting idea of moral retribution, or of pantheism which allowed him to believe that sin and evil have no reality but are mere *entia imaginationis.*

We thus find repeated in certain modern thinkers the same general movement of consciousness that originally gave rise to the story of paradise; conclusions, too, are unchanged except in so far as they are clothed in the forms of reflection and logical argumentation instead of in those of the poetic imagination. The consciousness of shortcoming, of imperfection, of the discrepancy between the actual and the potential in man's nature, leads to the postulation of a state in which all capacities are enjoying full and normal realization; and this state of perfection is represented as having prevailed for a longer or shorter period in the dim past of man's history. The consciousness of sin, once the principle giving birth to those theories of the golden age which are expressed in the myths of various peoples, becomes the explicit basis for a doctrine of degeneration and for the belief that man's relations to God were once pure and unstrained and his conceptions of God and of his purposes absolutely true, even though simple and elementary in character.

Thus to emphasize the consciousness of sin is, indeed, a very important corrective to those theories of religion which assume a purely naturalistic point of view and leave out of account all deeper psychological considerations. The awareness of shortcoming, together with the frustration of purposes and the resistance met with in the realization of ideals, are, indeed, factors which have ever driven man to God, as well as sources of religious ritual and ceremony, and even, as we have seen, principles underlying myth and dogma; and the form which the conception of a deity takes and the way in which he is worshipped vary with the stage of development of peoples, that is to say, with the character of their ideals. But while we do well in our study of religion to take serious account of the consciousness of sin, its true significance is not revealed either in the myth or in the argument that we have reproduced above. The objection to the story of paradise regarded as statement of actual historical fact (aside from the purely scientific difficulties, with which we are not here concerned) is that, in violation of true philosophical method, it resorts to transcendent principles,—its explanations are in terms of external facts which break in *ab extra* to produce effects that have no logical warrant in, or rational connection with, the nature of the experience in question. The objection to the attempted logical formulation of the doctrine of degeneration is that, although it assumes as its basis an undeniable fact of experience, the consciousness of sin, it altogether neglects to develop the inner implications of this consciousness or to bring it into relation with other factors and principles of experience. While the consciousness of sin is not explained in terms of some wholly external and therefore accidental factor, as in the case of the myth, it is regarded as something abnormal that has interfered with the regular order of things, as something pathological, and therefore as itself accidental. Instead of considering carefully the significance of the consciousness of sin, it is merely assumed that this is foreign to man's true nature and his progress and that it can have no place in the regular course of spiritual development. Before, however, we can assert that this consciousness testifies that man's relations to God are in an abnormal state, must we not consider just what the normal relation of a rational being to

God is, and what it implies, as well as how it can become possible? The very thinkers who insist most strongly on a degeneration theory give in other connections an interpretation of the consciousness of sin that is quite different from that set forth above. The state of holiness and of closest spiritual communion with God, we are told, are reached by the way of repentance, and to this no one can enter save through the gateway of the consciousness of sin. In further objection to the general argument it may be urged that the consciousness of sin tells us only that man has failed in his endeavors to realize the highest ideals of which he knows, or that he has acted in a manner contrary to them; it cannot tell us that mankind is suffering from spiritual degeneracy and that history is the record of moral failure. This could be proved only if it were shown that the propagation and growth of sin had not been interfered with or its fruits destroyed by other agencies. And finally, we may ask, does not the very fact of the universality of the consciousness of sin, which the argument so strongly emphasizes, seem itself to indicate that there is at least one very important sense in which this cannot be regarded as abnormal? It is certainly bound up with every experience of which we have any knowledge, if we leave out of consideration, as we may for present purposes, the nature of Jesus' conscious experience.[1]

III

No account of experience can be true that recognizes only pessimistic elements. The spiritual perception of the Hebrew writer was too acute not to realize that the story of paradise was not complete merely with an account of the coming of sin into the world. He recognized that in a sense sin was doomed from the moment of its conception, that its power was not to be forever

[1] The question of the nature of Jesus' will presents to orthodox theology an even more complicated problem than that with which philosophy has to cope regarding the relation of man's actual or empirical willing to his real will, that is, to his deepest nature brought to a self-consciousness of itself. We must not, however, overlook in our speculations such passages as Matt. 26 39, "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt."

supreme over man but that one would arise who would bruise its head. Likewise those who give the story a factual interpretation or who find logical grounds for their theory of degeneration, nevertheless maintain that the true end of man is not death but life, not hopeless misery but everlasting happiness. Their argument, it is true, seeks explanations not in terms of principles immanent in human experience or in the history of man but in terms of external and transcendent factors. Salvation from sin is based, not on any principle that God had put into the soul of man when he fashioned it after his own image and breathed into it the breath of life, but on a power from without divinely appointed to redeem mankind. This power alone, we are told, can break the shackles that bind the individual and humanity, and elevate mankind to its former high estate. That Jesus is, as he seems at times to have referred to himself, the son of man, tends to be overlooked; he who led men to the consciousness of their true relation to God is called, in distinction from all others, Christ, the Son of God. As it was an accidental factor that brought about the fall of man, so it is a power equally foreign that achieves his salvation. Objectionable as such a formulation of the doctrine may be, this connection in story and argument between the fall of man and his redemption, between the consciousness of sin and the assurance of salvation, expresses a very significant truth. Latent in every experience there is a basis for optimism, and it is this that becomes the rallying-cry of every striving soul.

While it is true in a sense, as the story of paradise tells us, that before man attains to a knowledge of good and evil he lives a sinless existence, it is equally true that coincident with the consciousness of sin there is the consciousness of a power that may be turned against sin. For while the consciousness of sin rests on the antinomy between the real and the ideal in human experience, on the contradiction between that which man actually is and that which he recognizes as what he ought to be, it is important to notice that the ideal is not a mere figment of the imagination but is the ideal of the experiencing person; it is the expression of his deepest nature, that with which he identifies his real self and with which he feels himself in unity and accord. It is in these deeper recesses of his own heart that man not only finds

the revelation of the need for a better and a truer life, but it is here also that he receives the inspiration to strive for the highest that he knows, and the strength to follow after until he shall have attained.

It thus appears that the consciousness of sin is really the first step in the overcoming of sin, the guarantee that the better land of which we have a glimpse is not one from which we are forever excluded but one which we are already on the point of occupying. Though man is prone to contrast that which is actual in his experience with an ideal, he is in some sense and to some extent already in possession of this ideal. Unless, indeed, his real nature were already higher than the actual state which he deplores, he could not be conscious of the fact that he has not exercised his spiritual capacities to their fullest extent. The power of an object is limited by something to which this power merely extends, but the activity of consciousness, if a mechanical phrascology may be pardoned, has also a reflective movement or aspect. If the object shall be a limit *for* it and not merely *to* it, if, that is, it shall be conscious that there is a limit, its activity must extend not merely to the limit but beyond it, otherwise it could not know that it was limited but only that it had expended the full extent of its power. Thus it is not until man has taken self-conscious possession of himself and of his ideal that he can become aware of the fact that the moral power which constitutes him a rational being has not come to its full expression. From this point of view, the consciousness of sin does not mean that man has fallen from any height of development to which he had attained, but that he has risen ideally above his former level in such a way as to estimate and criticise it. It means that man has arrived at a stage when he has become conscious of ideals that he is striving by very nature of his being to realize. And this consciousness, indeed, is the first and the necessary step toward the realization of these ideals and of man's true nature as a self-conscious being.

If, then, we regard sin as the negation of that which ought to be, we may say that the consciousness of sin prepares the way for the negation of sin and thus for the higher affirmation of the moral and spiritual ideals that underlie our world of reality.

Suggestions of this interpretation may be found as early as in the writings of Augustine, even though his statements are often open to all the objections that may be urged against the factual interpretation of the story of paradise and of the life and mission of Jesus. While contending that sin came into the world only in the original act of disobedience of our first parents, Augustine nevertheless recognizes that this act must have been preceded by certain impulses and desires that were not what they ought to be. For, "if man had not already begun to please himself, the devil would not have been able to bring him to a fall." It would be impossible, moreover, in the absence of psychological motives, to impute disobedience to Adam or to consider his action sinful. Now all these impulses and desires of man that run counter to God's will and to the god-nature of man must necessarily be transformed before man can be a son of God or reach the perfection that represents his goal. From this point of view, then, the fall of man was not so much the time when man became bad or the means of his becoming so as it was the bringing to light of the latent evil that was hidden in his sensuous nature. In so far, therefore, Augustine tells us, the fall was not an unmitigated evil, for in no other way than by becoming aware of evil could man have rid himself of it. Therefore, instead of saying that the consciousness of sin confirms the pathological spiritual condition of man, one ought rather to say that the consciousness is evoked by the sting that is occasioned by convalescence from a disease which, though painless while it ran its course, was none the less death-bringing.

But why, one might ask, should it be the convalescence and not the disease that is fraught with so much pain and unrest? Indeed, the mental anguish bound up with the consciousness of sin, contrasting, as it does, so sharply with the contentment and peace of mind that precedes it, is itself one of the motives which has led many to the hypothesis of degeneration, or has at least been believed to confirm such a view. But again a consideration of the case must lead to opposite conclusions. That act by which a man comes to recognize the sinfulness of actions is the same as that by which he comes to a consciousness of himself and of his true nature and mission. It is the act by which man becomes an

object to himself and recognizes that as the subject of such knowledge he rises not only above his objective or actually realized self but above all other objects of the world as well. Thenceforth he can no longer view himself as a child of nature; in coming to a consciousness of self, he necessarily separates himself from the natural order and asserts himself as a member of a kingdom of ends. Such a one loses the fresh and joyous spontaneity and naïveté that characterized him when he lived a life of nature or, if we will, when he regarded all nature as living his life. Turned in upon itself, as it were, his mind not only loses that feeling of oneness and of unity with the world but even comes into conflict with itself. The price of self-consciousness is strife between the spiritual and the natural elements in man. This is the experience which St. Paul has portrayed in so masterly a way when he says, for example, "But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Hence the cry, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" But the results are worth the cost. It is through such sincere questioning and through the moral endeavor to which it gives rise that St. Paul solves the riddle and is enabled to testify, "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

True freedom and complete selfhood are not a heritage into possession of which man comes at birth, but they are, as Fichte and Carlyle attest, things that must be achieved. It is only in the throes of ceaseless striving that the soul is born into the kingdom of God; its birthright is gained only through a struggle, and this struggle means pain and unrest. To regard this struggle, therefore, as something pathological or as significant of degeneration is as utterly false as it is to assert that living in the state of, and on the plane of, nature is living the life that is "natural" to man. Man is sent into the world with a spiritual mission. He has an appointed goal, the development of his own nature as a rational being, and this goal he can reach only by way of the cross. Striving and unrest, it is true, are not ends in themselves: they are not themselves the final goal. When Fichte interprets ex-

perience as an infinite or never-ceasing striving, this expression of his titanic spirit and of his earnest moral nature needs the corrective that is found in the philosophy of his more intellectualistically-minded successor. For, while man cannot remain on the plane of existence which he occupies on entering the world, the end of his development must, nevertheless, be the restoration on a higher plane of the peace of mind, the harmony with all nature, and the unity with God that he there enjoys. Nevertheless, as Hegel points out in his suggestive remarks on the story of paradise, it is important to remember that, while Jesus said that we must become as children if we would enter the kingdom of God, this is very far from saying that we must always remain as children. We must have the trust in God and the harmony with him that is characteristic of childhood, yet the relation ought not to remain the merely immediate one of blind, naïve confidence. We must live not only in the light of God but also in the knowledge of God; if spiritual things are to have real significance for us, we must become truly conscious of God and of the intimate bond of relationship between God and self. To attain to this, however, we must first come to a consciousness of selfhood, and this involves that cleavage between the natural and spiritual which is the basis in our experience of the consciousness of sin. Viewed, then, in their concrete setting and in the light of the whole development of experience, mental anguish and unrest assume an entirely different complexion from that which they bear when we consider them abstractly, or merely contrast them with the preceding state of satisfaction and contentment.

As the consciousness of sin is involved in the attainment of the consciousness of self, so also it is a necessary step in the process by which we come to know God and the deeper significance of spiritual things. Again we find it profitable to turn to St. Augustine. Sin, he tells us, must be conceived through an antithesis without which it never could have been. God did not allow man to sin in order that he might punish but in order that he might have an opportunity to save and thus to manifest his deepest and most essential nature, that of love, to man. Christ did not come because of Adam, but Adam because of Christ. Sin came into the world only that grace might the more abound.

Only by understanding the sacrifice that God was willing to make in order that man's relations with him might not be cut off, could man come to see God as he really is or to sound the depths of his love; only when man learned to know the God who suffers with him and for him, could he come to know the true God. And, we might add, man must first have experienced that loneliness of heart which comes from feeling himself shut off from the objective world before he can appreciate in any measure the sweetness and delight of communion with God.

But there is also another important sense in which the knowledge of God is bound up with the consciousness of sin. A conception of the highest realities, Kant has helped us to see, can be gained only by one who rises above the causal nexus of the natural order and those desires, instincts, and impulses which drive him blindly on to action, and lives in the light of the freedom that characterizes him as a rational being. To acquire, then, any adequate conception of the nature either of man or of God, man must distinguish himself from all objects of nature and recognize and assert himself as a subject who wills and who knows. Thus to know one's self, to come to an explicit consciousness of freedom and of rationality, is essential for a knowledge of Him who is revealed in all that is but whose highest and truest revelation is in the human heart. The true God is found not by looking without but by looking within, for the true God is not an object of perception but is spirit and is truth. Elijah, therefore, could not find God in the strong wind that rent the mountains, or in the earthquake, or in the fire, but only in the still small voice of his own heart. To learn the nature of spirit, however, man's spirit must return from its objective interests back upon itself; by such a recoil alone can spirit differentiate itself from the external order of nature and come to see itself in its own true character. And it is this occupation with one's own inner life, this reflection on self, that occasions the realization of the contradiction between one's deepest and most essential nature of freedom and that causal bondage of sensuous being which prevents the complete attainment at any time of all one knows and really wills. It is through the consciousness of sin, then, that we are led to a truer knowledge of God because the

very conception of God as universal spirit, and not as merely a particular object among other objects, must be gained through a consciousness of our own essential nature. Only he who knows the self and its implications can conceive of a God who is not limited by external forces and the restraints of the space-time order but who is truly infinite and Lord over all. Confirmations of this may be found wherever we look in the history of religion. It was Jesus who revealed to mankind a universal God of love whose relations to man are expressible only in terms of the relations of spirit to spirit, of self to self. But the time for Jesus' coming was not fulfilled until Jahveh had passed beyond the stage of a naturalistic god who needed to be nourished and strengthened by food and drink, or a political god struggling for the supremacy of his people and for the extermination of rival gods and their worshippers, a god who delighted in the blood of goats and of calves and who could be appeased by sacrifice alone. Suffering and misfortune must have intervened to direct man's mind from the external world with its goods and pleasures back to the greater world within, to the realities of self and spirit. Israel needed first to know the God who requires righteousness and obedience, who delights in heartfelt praise and thanksgiving, and who delivers in times of spiritual trouble and distress, before it could understand the import of a spiritual kingdom and of a God whose throne is in the hearts of men, or before it was prepared for the fuller revelation of God in the life and teachings of Jesus.

But just as the consciousness of sin is inevitably bound up with the development by which man comes to the consciousness of self and to the knowledge of God's true nature, so also is it a necessary step in the progress by which self comes to know other selves, and man his fellow-man. And, furthermore, until man breaks the ties that confine him to the causal nexus of nature, and ceases to regard himself as a natural object, he cannot know of any other kinship between men but that of blood, or realize that any duties can be binding beyond the limits of such relationship. Man must rise above the level of nature, the state in which he is a mere part interacting with other parts, swayed hither and thither by the response of desire and impulse to the

forces of environment, before he can conceive of that spiritual bond which unites man to man and all to God. Whoever fails to distinguish between himself and the objects of his consciousness or the order of nature cannot enter the "City of God," but remains shut up in the seclusion of clan or tribe, together with a small body of related individuals and a finite, naturalistic God. It was only, for example, after the Greeks had lost their joyous, naturalistic temper, when misfortune had turned their thoughts to the inner life, that the Stoic, in shutting himself up in the seclusion, as he believed, of the self, first discovered that he was a citizen not of Greece but of the world. Similarly, the religion of India overcame caste distinctions and proclaimed a message of salvation for all men only in so far as it was successful in directing the attention from God as an existent object to be worshipped by elaborate ritual and sacrifice to the inner principle in the recesses of man's consciousness. And while the further development of Brahmanism and of Buddhism was checked by its too extreme subjectivistic emphasis, so that it never attained to the conception of a universal God who is the source and preserver of all that exists, yet the advance from the naturalistic to the subjectivistic level of thought, even though attended by intense mental anguish and unrest, was yet the stepping-stone to the conception of the kinship of all men and to a religion which was universal in its nature and in its appeal.

The consciousness of sin, then, is not a pathological state that signifies moral degeneration: it tells us rather that man is created not as part of nature but as lord over it. It means that man not merely has a place in a concatenated order of things but that he is the source of ideas and of ideals to which he attempts to give embodiment. Man does, it is true, start from the stage of innocence, and as long as, and in so far as, he lives on this plane and is devoid of ideals and of rational ends with which he identifies himself and which he aims to impress upon the world, he occupies a place within a mechanical system and may, in a sense, be said to be in harmony with the universe round about him. As a rational being, however, it is impossible that man should rest here. He must not only be in harmony with the universe but he must will to be, and know himself as being, in harmony with

the best that he knows. It is the nature of a thing to be part of a rigid causal order, but it is the nature of a self freely to determine itself to become and to be a member of a kingdom of ends. If, however, it is the mission of man not only to be part of a world which the Creator pronounced good but to determine himself to goodness and to grow in spiritual strength by the effort actively to impress his ideals upon the world, he must first of all take conscious possession of himself. It is true, of course, that when man arrives at this stage he may, and often does, betray his own interests and, in acting contrary to his ideals, fall out of harmony not only with the natural order but with the spiritual order as well. Nevertheless, the consciousness of sin is significant of progress in the spiritual life of man and of development in the history of religions, because it ushers in the birth of selfhood and the knowledge that God and man are spiritual and not natural beings; because it is bound up with the self-determination of the individual under the guidance of rational ideals; and because it affords the only basis for regarding man as a being who has ultimate value and significance in the eternal kingdom of God.

HARVARD HYMNS

WARREN SEYMOUR ARCHIBALD

Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

I

Most readers of this article have sung, and many have learned by heart, a noble Christmas hymn whose music is now heard in more than one continent:—

> It came upon the midnight clear,
> That glorious song of old;

but few of those who sing and love it know that it was written by a country minister who graduated from the Harvard Divinity School. Fewer still are aware that a series of men have proceeded from this department of Harvard University who, for now almost a hundred years, have maintained this succession in sacred song. What may properly be called a school of religious poetry constitutes a worthy part of the contribution to literary culture which Harvard has made and which through many generations formed the peculiar and greatest distinction of New England.

In this matter Harvard may claim to have carried on the tradition of the English universities. One of the circumstances which lend dignity and honor to Oxford and Cambridge has been the presence there from time to time of men who are truly called religious poets, because they have had a genius for expressing in lyric and epic verse that interior mystery which gives our humanity "her kindred with the stars." Such men at the English universities occupy no inconspicuous place in the records of English literature. No description of the seventeenth century, for example, could be complete without mention of Herbert, Crashaw, and Vaughan. Nor, indeed, could the temper of that intensely religious period in the first part of the seventeenth century be understood without this lasting expression of that devout piety, pas-

sionate love, and high thought, which in various ways made the period so tumultuous. In Herbert we see the moral earnestness and sincere piety which have always characterized a large element in the English-speaking race. In Crashaw can be studied the ecstatic and mystical spirit of Roman Catholicism which found in his time a visible expression in the religious brotherhood gathered about Nicholas Ferrar at Little Gidding,—a spirit which has received renewed and beautiful utterance in the religious romance of *John Inglesant.* In Vaughan, the poet in the Welsh valley of Usk, the legendary home of Arthur, appears that Celtic strain which in our English race has been a highway for visions and the visitation of dreams. And the name of Milton, who was the contemporary of these more quiet souls, needs only to be mentioned in order to recall his relation to the religious strain in our inheritance. These traits and these traditions have had a certain parallel here at Harvard; for if no harvest of song was among the first-fruits of New England,—no one will be so patriotic as to include Michael Wigglesworth's *Day of Doom* among religious lyrics,—nevertheless the seed was planted which in good time brought forth, if not an hundred fold, at least a reasonable thirty or forty.

The list of these Harvard poets includes O. B. Frothingham, Emerson, H. H. Furness, Henry Ware, Jr., E. H. Sears, James Freeman Clarke, Samuel Longfellow, Samuel Johnson, J. W. Chadwick, F. L. Hosmer, William C. Gannett, and others,—men whose names are many of them less familiar than are their hymns, but who possessed a certain unity and fellowship of deep spiritual feeling which makes it right to call them a school of writers of hymns. It is a striking fact that verses which have since travelled "over the hills and far away" among books and people were written by men while they were still students in the Divinity School, and frequently for the old Divinity Commencement, called Visitation Day, at which, as in other institutions, a hymn written by a student was a prominent part. One of the best of these was written by Edward Rowland Sill, whom most of us know as the Californian poet, not as a student of divinity at Harvard. His hymn is a lyric invocation for the gifts of the spirit.

Send down thy truth, O God!
Too long the shadows frown,
Too long the darkened way we've trod,
Thy truth, O Lord, send down!

Send down thy spirit free,
Till wilderness and town
One temple for thy worship be,
Thy spirit, O, send down!

Send down thy love, thy life,
Our lesser lives to crown,
And cleanse them of their hate and strife,
Thy living love send down!

Send down thy peace, O Lord!
Earth's bitter voices drown
In one deep ocean of accord,
Thy peace, O God, send down!

II

A particular description of all these men would be tedious. So let us select some typical ones, whose work possesses special interest. We may divide the writers of the school into three groups. The first dates from about 1820, and includes Henry Ware, Jr., Frederic H. Hedge, Andrews Norton, Stephen G. Bulfinch, James Freeman Clarke, Theodore Parker, Edmund H. Sears, Horace H. Furness, and C. A. Bartol. All these men attained distinction. Ware, Hedge, and Norton occupied professorships at Harvard. Bartol was for fifty-two years minister of the old West Church in Boston. Clarke was for almost half a century minister of the Church of the Disciples in Boston. Theodore Parker speaks for himself. Sears is well known not only as a hymn writer but as the author of a book of rare spiritual insight, *The Fourth Gospel the Heart of Christ.* Furness was an active pastor in Philadelphia for fifty years, and as minister active and emeritus served his church for the amazingly long term of seventy-one years.

Perhaps the best-known hymns in this group were written by Clarke, Sears, Furness, and Parker. Clarke wrote a number of

hymns, but that which has travelled farthest is the one written in 1856:—

Father, to us thy children, humbly kneeling,
Conscious of weakness, ignorance, sin, and shame,
Give such a force of holy thought and feeling
That we may live to glorify thy name,

That we may conquer base desire and passion,
That we may rise from selfish thought and will,
O'ercome the world's allurement, threat, and fashion,
Walk humbly, gently, leaning on thee still.

Let all thy goodness by our minds be seen,
Let all thy mercy on our souls be sealed.
Lord, if thou wilt, thy power can make us clean;
O, speak the word, thy servants shall be healed.

Among these men, the name of Sears is perhaps the least known, and yet, of all the hymns, his are probably the most famous. He preferred the life of a country parson in Wayland, Lancaster, and Weston, Massachusetts, because this gave him more leisure for study and writing. His two Christmas hymns are sung now in all churches in America and Great Britain. Almost every one knows the Christmas song:—

It came upon the midnight clear,
That glorious song of old,
From angels bending near the earth
To touch their harps of gold:
"Peace on the earth, good-will to men,
From heaven's all-gracious King."
The world in solemn stillness lay
To hear the angels sing.

Still through the cloven skies they come,
With peaceful wings unfurled,
And still their heavenly music floats
O'er all the weary world;
Above its sad and lowly plains
They bend on hovering wing,
And ever o'er its Babel sounds
The blessed angels sing.

And ye, beneath life's crushing load
Whose forms are bending low,
Who toil along the climbing way,
With painful steps and slow,—
Look now, for glad and golden hours
Come swiftly on the wing:
O, rest beside the weary road,
And hear the angels sing!

For lo! the days are hastening on
By prophet bards foretold,
When with the ever-circling years
Comes round the age of gold,
When Peace shall over all the earth
Its ancient splendors fling,
And the whole world give back the song
Which now the angels sing.

Another hymn of his is almost as well known, and appears in most collections as a companion of the first one:—

Calm on the listening ear of night
Come heaven's melodious strains.

Furness wrote an unusually large number of religious lyrics. They have a simplicity of phrase and clearness of thought which remind one of many of the hymns written by Keble and Faber. Of them I venture to think that his vesper hymn will compel the hearts of the largest congregation. I think I have read somewhere that Emerson called it the finest hymn in the world. At any rate it holds a high place.

Slowly, by thy hand unfurled,
Down around the weary world
Falls the darkness. O, how still
Is the working of thy will!

Mighty Maker, ever nigh,
Work in me as silently,
Veil the day's distracting sights,
Show me heaven's eternal lights;

Living worlds to view be brought
In the boundless realms of thought,
High and infinite desires,
Flaming like those upper fires;

Holy truth, eternal right,
Let them break upon my sight,
Let them shine, serene and still,
And with light my being fill.

Attention has frequently been called to men who have reached and held a high distinction by virtue of one book or of one poem. Gray, for example, is practically known only through his "Elegy in a Country Churchyard." The same remark can be made of Theodore Parker as a religious poet. He is known only, and yet very widely and justly, through his hymn beginning,—

O thou great Friend to all the sons of men.

It is interesting that this originally appeared as a sonnet, of which the hymn gives the first three quatrains. As a hymn, it was first published by Longfellow and Johnson in their *Book of Hymns*.

III

The second group dates from the years following 1840, and includes Samuel Longfellow, Samuel Johnson, T. W. Higginson, O. B. Frothingham, and Jones Very. These were an interesting group of men, both because of their high work in religious poetry and because of their connection with Transcendentalism. Samuel Longfellow and Samuel Johnson may be spoken of together, because they were friends who found a happy partnership in writing and thinking. As seniors in the Divinity School, they compiled an anthology of religious poems of unusual value. "They read, criticised, and compared literally thousands of hymns, ransacking the collections of all denominations, and the poetry of other languages besides our own; gleaning even in the newspapers, and utilizing portions of poems by skilful adaptation. . . . It is probable that Mrs. Adams's 'Nearer, my God, to thee,' here first appeared, at least in an American collection. Beautiful hymns from Sears, Furness, Clarke, H. B. Stowe, Emerson, H. W. Longfellow, Trench, Very, Lowell, and others still fresh, if not wholly new, enriched the volume. They diligently gathered material, also, from private sources, and did not fail in

the courage it then required to invite contributions from Theodore Parker. A number of the hymns were original, written by the compilers themselves or by their friends, partly with a view to the particular aims of the new collection. Most, if not all of these, they published as anonymous, and not all have ever been credited to their authors; but among them were some of the finest, which have remained among the treasures of our hymnology."[1]

One hymn in this collection deserves particular mention. They found it in an American newspaper. It was anonymous, but they felt at once its lofty mood and exquisite phrasing. They recognized its nobility, and placed it in their book. It was Newman's "Lead, kindly Light." That discovery speaks well for the editors' range and insight. It must be noted, however, in all honesty, that they made several changes in the phrasing of the hymn, which were decidedly no improvement, and which they had the good judgment to remove in a later edition. This tendency to make alterations in the poems, unfortunately present in the *Book of Hymns*, was even more conspicuous in the revised edition which appeared in 1864 under a new title, *Hymns of the Spirit*.

T. W. Higginson, one of the contributors to the *Book of Hymns*, writes, "My sister, an intimate friend of Mr. Longfellow, satirized this propensity in one of the nonsense stanzas then so prevalent. It must be premised that as both of the editors were named Samuel, their book was often characterized the 'Sam-Book.'

> 'There were two Sams of America
> Who belonged to the profession called "clerica."
> They hunted up hymns
> And cut off their limbs,
> These truculent Sams of America.'

Longfellow entered heartily into this joke, and illustrated the verse with a pen-and-ink sketch, representing two young men with large shears cutting up rolls of paper. The likeness of Johnson, who was very handsome, with the air of a high-caste Parsee or Assyrian, was unmistakable."[2]

[1] Samuel Longfellow, by Joseph May, p. 50. [2] Ibid., p. 54.

The chief interest of these two, and that of all this group, lies for us in their connection with Transcendentalism; for their hymns are spiritual ballads in that border-land of idealism. Most of these men lived in the glory of that movement, for in 1843, the year that Longfellow and Johnson entered the Divinity School, Emerson printed *Nature*. The work of these two men is very likely the best representative of this group and period. It is hardly too much to say that in their religious poetry Transcendentalism is seen at its best, because in these lyrics was uttered the finer spiritual character of that movement without exaggeration and fantastic obscurity. Their poetry emphasized and expressed the spirit in man answering to the spirit in God, the divine in humanity calling to the divine in the Infinite Father. All their poems have a common spirit and a classic beauty, a passion for simplicity and the universal. We shall search far before we find a nobler utterance of that truth that "God is through all and in you all" than is given in this poem by Samuel Longfellow:—

God of the earth, the sky, the sea,
Maker of all above, below,
Creation lives and moves in thee;
Thy present life through all doth flow.

Thy love is in the sunshine's glow,
Thy life is in the quickening air;
When lightnings flash and storm-winds blow,
There is thy power, thy law is there.

We feel thy calm at evening's hour,
Thy grandeur in the march of night,
And when the morning breaks in power,
We hear thy word, "Let there be light."

But higher far, and far more clear,
Thee in man's spirit we behold,
Thine image and thyself are there,—
The indwelling God, proclaimed of old.

A fine enthusiasm, a militant faith, chants in the lines on the Church which both men wrote. It is very striking to find two

poems written by two friends on the same theme, in the same period, both attaining distinction and yet remaining quite dissimilar. The hymn by Samuel Johnson on the City of God is as truly positive as if it had come from the mediaeval "ages of faith":—

City of God, how broad and far
Outspread thy walls sublime!
The true thy chartered freemen are,
Of every age and clime.

One holy Church, one army strong,
One steadfast high intent,
One working band, one harvest-song,
One King omnipotent!

How purely hath thy speech come down
From man's primeval youth!
How grandly hath thine empire grown
Of freedom, love, and truth!

How gleam thy watch-fires through the night
With never fainting ray!
How rise thy towers, serene and bright,
To meet the dawning day!

In vain the surge's angry shock,
In vain the drifting sands;
Unharmed upon the eternal rock,
The eternal city stands.

And few religious poets in Oxford or in Cambridge have with any more truth, simplicity, and spiritual ardor given utterance to their century's vision of the Church than has Samuel Longfellow in the cadence of these lines:—

One holy Church of God appears
Through every age and race,
Unwasted by the lapse of years,
Unchanged by changing place.

From oldest time, on farthest shores,
Beneath the pine or palm,
One unseen presence she adores,
With silence or with psalm.

Her priests are all God's faithful sons,
To serve the world raised up;
The pure in heart, her baptized ones;
Love, her communion-cup.

The truth is her prophetic gift,
The soul her sacred page;
And feet on mercy's errands swift
Do make her pilgrimage.

O living Church, thine errand speed,
Fulfil thy task sublime,
With bread of life earth's hunger feed,
Redeem the evil time!

IV

The third group dates from about 1860 and the following years, and includes E. R. Sill, F. L. Hosmer, W. C. Gannett, J. W. Chadwick, and S. C. Beach. They are connected by inheritance with the Transcendentalists, and they maintain the lyric strain which characterized Samuel Longfellow and his friends. Sill is known to most of us as a poet who belongs to the same circle of thought as Emerson, Arnold, Tennyson,—a man whose message is always ethical, touched with gracious dignity and wistful visions. Doubtless few think of him as a religious poet or hymn writer. But like Theodore Parker he has written one hymn which is widely known and conspicuous for its spirit of devotion:—

Send down thy truth, O God.

Another member of this group, John White Chadwick, has the distinction of having written a hymn for the old Visitation Day which, like Sill's, promises to endure. One stanza will indicate its quality:—

Eternal Ruler of the ceaseless round
Of circling planets singing on their way,
Guide of the nations from the night profound
Into the glory of the perfect day,
Rule in our hearts, that we may ever be
Guided, and strengthened, and upheld by thee.

This exalted invocation is a modern psalm in its ease, clearness, and emotion.

Of this group, the two men who seem most prominent, and who continue the work of Longfellow and Johnson, are William C. Gannett and Frederick L. Hosmer. Both have the lyric quality, the ability to express religious feeling in simple and unencumbered lines. Both are in a large measure unfettered by the weight of commonplace, unburdened by heavily gilded words or phrases of an ancient symbolism. It is wholly proper, of course, to employ the older metaphors and epithets, but in that case, if the hymn is to possess a real and honest distinction, the language must be confessedly archaic. It is legitimate, and in many cases profitable, to be pre-raphaelite, but then the work must be signed "P. R. B." These poets are not pre-raphaelite. They are men of their own time. And they are also, as every poet must be, men who write in the light of the Eternal. The feeling which they express is of the eternal Spirit in man, which is from everlasting to everlasting; the utterance is distinctly colored by the thought of their own time.

Gannett's poetry has a singular felicity, a sharp, clear, New England tone and atmosphere. His words are as distinct as green trees in a snow-covered field; they have the clearness and sharpness which in a New England winter on a bright sunny day the hills, the boundary lines, the solitary trees outlined against the sky impressively possess. For example, these lines, which have for their text the familiar words "Consider the lilies, how they grow," show both this clearness of thought and felicity in expression:—

He hides within the lily
  A strong and tender care,
That wins the earth-born atoms
  To glory of the air;
He weaves the shining garments
  Unceasingly and still,
Along the quiet waters,
  In niches of the hill.

We linger at the vigil
  With him who bent the knee
To watch the old-time lilies
  In distant Galilee;

And still the worship deepens,
  And quickens into new,
As brightening down the ages
  God's secret thrilleth through.

O Toiler of the lily,
  Thy touch is in the Man!
No leaf that dawns to petal
  But hints the angel-plan.
The flower horizons open!
  The blossom vaster shows!
We hear the wide worlds echo,—
  See how the lily grows!

Shy yearnings of the savage,
  Unfolding thought by thought,
To holy lives are lifted,
  To visions fair are wrought;
The races rise and cluster,
  And evils fade and fall,
Till chaos blooms to beauty,
  Thy purpose crowning all!

Hosmer's poetry reminds one very much of Samuel Longfellow. It has the same lucidity, the same skilful employment of common words in such a way that they assume noble and dignified phrasing. Words are very much like people. The Great Master of men could out of fishermen and publicans make the noble army of martyrs. And a master of words, like Lincoln, can out of very common words construct the immemorial prayer of a nation. This is difficult. It is seldom achieved, yet the achievement is the goal of all who strive to utter the thought of God in the words of man. Whenever it is done, whether in large or small degree, we see the best work. Something of this achievement is found in Hosmer's religious poetry. He can express exalted thought in single and intelligible words, the clearness of which does not detract from their felicity. There is no thought more exalted than that of the mystery of God, and few expressions of that mystery have more sweetness and light than these lines:—

O thou, in all thy might so far,
In all thy love so near,
Beyond the range of sun and star,
And yet beside us here,—

What heart can comprehend thy name,
Or, searching, find thee out,
Who art within, a quickening flame,
A presence round about?

Yet, though I know thee but in part,
I ask not, Lord, for more:
Enough for me to know thou art,
To love thee and adore.

O, sweeter than aught else besides,
The tender mystery
That like a veil of shadow hides
The light I may not see!

And dearer than all things I know
Is childlike faith to me,
That makes the darkest way I go
An open path to thee.

V

The men whom we have considered in these three groups constitute, as I have said, a school in religious poetry. For almost one hundred years they have expressed in lyric verse, much of it enduring, much of it beautiful, one phase of the choice religious life of New England. This is significant, if one said no more; but we cannot help remembering that New England, with her theology and her conscience, her religion and her ancient parishes, with her godly men and women strengthened by the austerity of that theology, ennobled by the vigor of that conscience, and given a gracious sweetness and dignity by that spiritual religion,—this New England has been no inconsiderable part of America. At her best she and her ancient college at Cambridge have stood for idealism. Some have asked what centre is there at Harvard around which her activities may gather? The answer is, this

idealism. The ideal for which scholars in old Cambridge fled to a wilderness, for which the college was founded, which has nurtured and bred her poets, her scholars, her divines, her men of affairs and of simplicity of heart and life. The college has endured only because it has by faith seen the invisible. And again some will say, "New England theology has collapsed; what standard is there to which New England Puritanism can repair?" And again the answer is, idealism. That was the life of the New England theology. It has never passed away. It is indestructible. It can build once more a noble mansion for the mind; can rear once more its systems of divinity, its intellectual homes. This faith is established in the knowledge that the soil where fine religious poetry grows is good soil. If the soil has hitherto brought forth these flowers, it promises a yet richer harvest in song and thought.

Of this idealism, this faith, these poets of religion have given noble and true expression. They have kept alive from year to year the sacred fire which burns below all systems of thought and bodies of divinity, which glows in the heart of man and flames in the centre of the universe. They have found the common faith below the sectarian superstructure, the deep foundations on which every spiritual edifice is reared. These poems have survived the controversies and divisions, and they have entered into the rest even of hymn books foreign to their authors' creed.

The most significant remark, therefore, which can be made about this school of poetry is this: these men have expressed that spirit of idealism which is after all the very essence of our New England theology, the fibre of New England character, the common faith of the ancestral order. They have given utterance to this idealism in lyric verse, set to the music of old tunes, —the truest and most permanent tabernacle for a spirit so fragile and so indestructible.

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